

The Month in Review



RECENT DEVELOPMENTS in Eastern Europe make it unmistakably clear that China's momentous "leap forward" to Communism has stirred the imagination of some of the leaders in the area, and is already influencing their attitudes and policies. While Moscow is still striving to re-establish conformity in the shambles of the post-Stalinist debacle, a new kind of disarray is emerging in the wake of a cold blast of Communist extremism blowing across the Soviet Empire from Peiping. At the moment, there appear to be three different stages in the European orbit. First, there are those Satellite nations which, on the whole, have always faithfully followed the Kremlin's turns and twists and have consistently sought to emulate the Soviet Union; Czechoslovakia and Romania belong to this "centrist," orthodox group. Second, there are the countries, Poland and Hungary, which two years ago seemed about to slip out of the Kremlin's grasp and have since then made their slow way back to the fold according to the dictates not only of "Socialist" interests but also national prudence and Party survival. And third, there are the two more backward countries, Albania and Bulgaria, always excessively loyal to Moscow but saddled with a leadership essentially more attuned to primitive Stalinism than to the more pragmatic variety of Communism currently championed by Soviet Party leader Nikita Khrushchev. In the past year or so, a period stamped with the betrayal of the "liberal" theses of the 20th Soviet Party Congress of February 1956, Moscow's chief aim in the area was to cleanse Poland and Hungary of their "revisionist" germs. This has now been largely accomplished. What could develop into a new variety of deviation currently comes from the opposite ideological pole, from Albania and Bulgaria spurred on by the Chinese example—an example the Yugoslavs have identified as a military corruption of the Communist credo.

The new extremism in Bulgaria is reflected in the formulation of new directives and plans, as well as in the tone of recent pronouncements by Party leaders. As in China, astronomical goals have been set, original targets steeply raised, and the time allotted for their fulfillment simultaneously cut. The present Five Year Plan, for instance, is to be completed in "three to four years." Agricultural production, hampered by the Party's imposition of almost total collectivization of the land, is to double by 1959 and triple a year later. In the meantime, existing collectives are being amalgamated in a drive that is far swifter than the similar measure started in the Soviet Union in 1950 and still going on there. Here again, the thoroughness and speed smack of current Chinese practice—in less than two weeks in the second half of October 40 percent of Bulgarian collectives had been merged. The Asian Communist technique of "mobilizing" the masses in complete disregard of popular sentiments, traditions, and family life is being imported. Everyone—men, women and probably also children—is being put to work "day and night." According to the latest decrees, all white collar workers, including presumably the top regime functionaries, are to leave their desks for manual work from a month to 40 days every year. This affects all men up to the age of 50 and all women under 45. "Let our functionaries step a little into mud, let them sweat and work together with the people," said Party Secretary Zhivkov.

In little, isolated Albania with barely a toe in the door to modern times the same harsh measure was imposed. There, too, Party and State officials are now to do a month's work in the sweat of their brows. The link to faraway China was suggested when the official Chinese news agency picked up the announcement with obvious approval. Though little concrete information leaks out from the mountainous country inhabited by a still largely uneducated, clannish and fiercely independent peasantry, what is known suggests that the people, in the

grip of the most Stalinist administration in Europe, are now being subjected to a wave of terror and repression. In the last few months, for instance, Albania overtook Czechoslovakia in the extent of its collectivization; in ten months, from the beginning of the year to November, the collectivized sector grew from 58.1 percent of the total arable land to some 75 percent.

In the more industrialized nations of the area events in China seem to have had much less of an impact. There, the regimes are prone to stress that what has happened in the great Asian country was peculiar to its conditions and, in any case, could not possibly have happened had it not been for Soviet help. All the same, the trend to orthodoxy continued everywhere, sometimes to the accompaniment of grating echoes from the Stalinist past.

In Poland, where a plenary session of the Central Committee prepared the ground for the coming Party Congress and detailed the political and economic planks to be endorsed at this meeting, the verbal regression is still somewhat greater than the retreats in actual policy. Still, there is now more and more talk of the ultimate goal of collectivization and ever less reference to the real significance of the "October Days." The new tone in official circles could be heard in monotonous incantations calling for the re-creation of "houses of culture" (centers of enforced indoctrination), and the revival of "Socialist competitions" (the much-resented industrial speed-up system). A more concrete—and potentially more dangerous—step backward was the passage of a new law depriving lawyers of some of the freedoms they had gained two years ago. Henceforth, the selection of members of the legal profession will again be under State influence, and civil liberties which, in Poland, are still incomparably greater than elsewhere might thereby be impaired. So far, though, the Poles are far from cowed, as was shown again by the enthusiastic congratulations extended by the Writers' Union to Nobel Prize winner Boris Pasternak.

The general regression was symbolized in Hungary by the return to that country from the Soviet Union of former Premier Andras Hegedus, the Stalinist mediocrity who was dictator Rakosi's pawn in pre-Revolt days. The re-creation of a Painters' and Sculptors' Union, headed by the man who fathered the gigantic statue of Stalin torn down by the 1956 insurgents, is another such symbol. Yet despite the continued pressure on intellectuals and the Church, the regime was outwardly relatively conciliatory, currying popular favor in a much-advertised "election" campaign. In neighboring Romania, symbols and facts merged in a terrifying reality. The temper of the times was indicated by a remark in the Party paper, which announced that "the majority of doctors . . . realizing that private practice seriously impeded the care of national health, decided on their own initiative to give up private practice." What probably "decided" the doctors was mounting regime terrorism, expressed most concretely in a decree passed in summer (and neglected in the press) which now threatens the life and liberty of every Romanian citizen. Decree Number 318 imposes the death penalty for a variety of political and economic crimes and extends the range or raises terms of imprisonment in many other cases.

On the whole, therefore, it can be seen that there has been a general shift to the "left" throughout the area, with the less advanced countries inspired by the Chinese example, the others closer to the Soviets. Among the latter, one must count the Poles, whose leaders were copiously feted in Moscow and there gave up the last vestiges of "independence" in foreign policy. Particularly noteworthy were Gomulka's endorsement of Khrushchev's dismissal of the Potsdam Agreement (the treaty which allowed Poland continued control over the Western Territories), and his sudden active participation in the anti-Yugoslav campaign.

The character of continued onslaught against Yugoslavia is in itself perhaps more revealing of relations within the Soviet bloc than of those between it and the beleaguered country. For this attack is now many-sided. The Yugoslavs seem to think that there is an overall strategy, with different roles assigned to the participants. It is however remarkable that those countries in Eastern Europe which have followed China internally are also emulating her in regard to Yugoslavia. Whereas Khrushchev openly said that State economic and cultural relations are not affected by the dispute (and finally released to Yugoslavia 200,000 tons of promised wheat), China, Albania and Bulgaria continue to wage the kind of cold war short of military intervention much more reminiscent of the first, post-1948 Cominform-Yugoslav struggle.

Christmas

Rekindled

CHRISTMAS, LONG a wistful and hectoring fugitive from Communist rule in Eastern Europe, has recovered some of its traditional good spirits in at least three of the Soviet bloc countries.

The renewal of family and religious ties felt in the fulfillment of Christmas is anathema to Communist ideas and purposes. Communist regimes have adopted a variety of tactics toward it, have sought to banish it, to secularize and "Sovietize" it; even, in certain circumstances, to take advantage of it.

In the Stalin era of militant "Socialist construction" in Eastern Europe, the advent of Christmas could only be regarded as an alien, and indeed incongruous, intrusion on the scene. Church observances were, of course, forcefully "discouraged" and there was little call and few means for celebrating.

But even at the peak of Stalinist rule, the Party did not attempt a direct all-out assault on Christmas. The technique was to divert attention from it by splitting up its symbols and ceremonies between Stalin's Birthday on December 21 and New Year's Day, with Christmas an ordinary working day in between. The Christmas tree became simply a "winter tree" and Saint Nicholas (Santa Claus or Father Christmas, as the local custom might be) became the Soviet "Father Frost" distributing largess to the children on New Year's Day as a symbol of Soviet beneficence toward the Satellites.

After 1953, the reaction against the leaden uniformity and utilitarianism of Stalinist life, and the New Course emphasis on national culture and higher living standards, brought back some of the regional holiday customs. The increased tolerance toward religious worship restored a measure of the serious meaning of Christmas. Even in Czechoslovakia, where the regime is a bastion of materialist Communist orthodoxy, mass church attendance on Christmas Eve appeared to be acceptable by 1956.

Gradually, it seems, and in emaciated but basically un-mutilated form, Christmas returned to Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia. In Romania and Bulgaria, however, it has never emerged from the pall of Stalinism. Christmas Day is still a working day, and there are no signs of Christmas—no wayward sprig of holly, or the sound of church chimes—anywhere in the cities. Christmas has taken refuge in the countryside where the peasants, freer from scrutiny and with at least the fruit of their own farm plots, can still give it a token welcome.



Saint Nicholas in a Polish department store at Christmas time. *Swiat* (Warsaw), December 22-29, 1957

The Father Frost Myth

OF THE MANY forms and faces of Soviet imperialism in Eastern Europe, Father Frost was perhaps one of the more ineffectual specimens. His fate in the Satellites, where he was forcibly introduced between 1950 and 1952, varied from passive assimilation in Bulgaria to complete rejection in Hungary. Poland tolerated him for three or four years but was quick to throw him out with the rest of the trappings of Stalinism. His career in Eastern Europe can be well traced through the example of Czechoslovakia. Here, in 1951, it was announced with considerable fanfare that Father Frost, whose visits to children had hitherto been confined to Soviet Russia, would embark on a tour of Czechoslovakia. This, according to *Lidove Noviny* (Prague), December 13, 1951, was the start of "a new content and concept of joyful festivities for children." The Ministry of Information sponsored a contest for children under 16 to stimulate their interest in Father Frost. A typical contest question was: "Where [in the USSR] was Father Frost on Stalin's Birthday?"

By 1952 the cult was well developed. Reporting that Father Frost had begun his rounds in the Soviet Union and would arrive in Czechoslovakia shortly, the December 17, 1952 *Rude Pravo* (Prague) said solemnly that "Father

Christmas Dinner in Poland

THE TRADITIONAL family Christmas dinner in Poland is held on Christmas Eve. Straw is placed on the table to symbolize the straw-lined manger of Bethlehem and covered with a white linen cloth. In peasant cottages and well-to-do homes alike, a sheaf of wheat is often placed in a corner of the room. It is also traditional to set an extra place at the table as an indication of hospitality to a passing stranger.

The feast begins with the ceremonial breaking and sharing of a wafer previously blessed in church. Everyone present exchanges wishes for good health, happiness and prosperity.

The Christmas Eve menu is meatless and composed mainly of fish in a variety of styles: fish noodle soup or borscht for the first course, then carp in a sweet raisin sauce, pike in horseradish sauce, jellied carp, perch or pike, accompanied by mushrooms, potatoes, sauerkraut, baked beans. The dinner concludes with dried fruits, sweet poppy seeds with cookies and *kutia* made from wheat and honey; also almond and poppy seed strudels, and fruit pies.

Frost has quickly become very popular with our young people. He carries a joyful message from the Soviet Pioneers [children's organization] and the young builders of Communism and tells stories of their happy life. . . . *Svet Prace* (Prague) of December 18 explained that the Soviet Father Frost was "a transformation of the Czarist religious figure" who used to bring gifts to children on December 24—Christmas Eve—but, the paper added, in Soviet society this figure has "an entirely different character and meaning. Now Father Frost's arrival is celebrated at the turn of the year. . . . In our country also we have created the preconditions for entirely new celebrations of Christmas and the New Year. Welcoming the New Year [with Father Frost] is becoming traditional with us and the children are looking forward to him with joy." The Ministries of Education and Information and the mass organizations were reported arranging Father Frost celebrations throughout the country "in order to strengthen friendship with the Soviet Union."

By the first Christmas after Stalin's death, in 1953, Father Frost was already somewhat de-Sovietized and "naturalized." There were references to numerous Father Frosts in Czechoslovakia, but almost no reference to their Soviet origins. In 1955 there were extensive newspaper stories on Father Frost's activities in Moscow, but little indication of plans for a Soviet Father Frost to visit Czechoslovakia.

By 1957 the Old Man had undergone an unmistakable degeneration. *Praca* (Bratislava) carried the following story on December 30, 1957:

"Father Frost visited all the working places in December, distributed goodies to the kiddies and created much joy. However, at the Zilina Second School which he visited on December 21 he did not behave at all in the manner ex-

pected of him. When little Zloch from the third grade went home and opened his gift package, he could not make out what had happened. Since 15 to 25 *koruny* had been collected in advance from each pupil, it was not expected that the value of the package would be greatly under that amount. This unhappy little student's father helped to count up and the result was very bad indeed: the bag was worth about 10 *halere* [100 *halere* = 1 *koruna*], the apple 56 *halere*, seven candies 1.75 *koruny*, 20 peanuts 50 *halere*, cookies 2.20 and wafers 1.40 *koruny*—a total of 6.61 *koruny*. The boy had contributed 20 *koruny* toward the presents. Could the overhead really have come to over 13 *koruny* for each package, or did Father Frost and his partners stop at the liquor store for a few drinks on their way to the school?"

Christmas, Politics, Propaganda

CHRISTMAS HAS had its uses for the Communists—it has in fact figured in all the major propaganda campaigns against the Church, capitalism, Western warmongering. In Hungary, Christmas cards with traditional texts stopped being produced in 1951, and those with religious themes which had not yet been used were printed over with slogans such as "Down with American germ warfare." The December 25, 1952 issue of the Party paper *Szabad Nep* (Budapest) contained only two Christmas messages. One was an article



Front page of the Christmas 1957 issue of *Slowo Powszechnie* (Warsaw), the Polish daily published by PAX, a regime-dominated "Catholic" organization. The design is traditional for Polish Christmas. The article, by a well known writer, discusses the customs of family gatherings at Christmas time.



In front of a toy store before Christmas, one St. Nicholas to another: "One must be a saint indeed, colleague, to stand this." The Polish press published a good deal of wry humor about the shortages of goods at Christmas.

Szpilki (Warsaw), December 23, 1957

on Cardinal Spellman's Christmas visit to American troops in Korea: the title "Germ-Prelate's Christmas" was indicative of the contents. The other was a cartoon captioned "Gifts from Adenauer and the Americans" alleging that relief packages being sent by the West to East Germany contained arms and ammunition.

Four years later, the Kadar regime attempted to exploit Christmas for internal political purposes, trying to invoke the sentimental appeal of the holiday season to conciliate the embittered and rebellious Hungarian people after the 1956 Revolt. The Party newspaper *Nepszabadsag* published a lavishly decorated Christmas Day issue with Christmas poems and stories by popular pre-Communist writers* and a number of "Christmas appeals." One appeal signed by the Patriotic People's Front (reconstituted on paper by the Kadar regime) called for national unity, "peace and good will." Another Kadar paper organization, calling itself the National Association of Hungarian Students, appealed to the American government to return, as a Christmas goodwill gesture, the "Holy Hungarian Crown" (St. Stephen's Crown, the emblem of the Hungarian monarchy). Bela Illes, a Colonel of the Soviet Security police long active in Hungarian Communist literary life, published a formal appeal to Ferenc Munnich, then Minister of Interior, for leniency toward the imprisoned revolutionary poet Gyula Illyes; the same issue of the paper carried Munnich's blunt rejection of the appeal. There was a long article speculating on the bleak Christmas which would be spent by the Hungarian refugees still in camps in the West.

* The Christmas literary supplement reprinted Frigyes Karinthy's well-known story "Barabbas," written in the 1920's. In the story, each member of the crowd that demanded the release of the murderer Barabbas rather than Jesus is offered a second chance to choose who will be spared. Individually they unanimously choose to save Jesus, but when gathered into a crowd they perversely cry with a single voice for Barabbas again. The ostensible purpose of the Party in publishing the story at this time was to draw a parallel with the Revolt, implying that the people, turned into an irrational mob, repudiated their own salvation—Communism—and called for what they knew was against their own interests—the bogeys of "bourgeois" democracy, sovereignty and freedom.

The regime endeavored to propagate the same factitious Christmas spirit in 1957. *Nepszabadsag's* Christmas Day issue illustrated a sentimental essay by Party-liner Lajos Mesterhazi with a reproduction of Andrea del Sarto's "Madonna delle Arte"—the only illustration of the Virgin Mary ever published in a Communist paper in Hungary.

Christmas: Spiritual or Material

The Communists have resented most the religious content of Christmas, and although there is less pressure against church attendance, the regimes are still trying to reduce the influence of organized religion and to "Socialize" religious holidays. While the Party press tends either to omit mention of Christmas or stress its worldly and social character, the Church press continues to expound the Christian doctrine of the birth of Christ. The two sources of influence are of course not comparable, since the Party commands a gigantic propaganda apparatus while the circulation of the Church press is in general rigidly circumscribed.

The Polish Catholic press (by far the least circumscribed) in 1957 published Christmas issues with traditional Nativity stories and illustrations, but there was no information on church services or activities. The PAX paper *Slowo Powszechne* mentioned the large number of visitors who went to Cracow churches to see the traditional manger scenes. The Party organ *Trybuna Ludu* published the Pope's Christmas message, underscoring his appeal for peace.

In 1956, for the first time since 1948, the Czechoslovak press carried an account of Christmas Eve religious observances. *Lidova Demokracie* (Prague), December 28, wrote: "On Christmas Eve the freshly snow-covered streets of Prague were filled with believers hurrying to be on time for the Holy Midnight Mass. And they were right to hurry, because the churches of Prague were filled to the last seat. In the Church of the Virgin Mary on Charles Square a group of thirty-six children played the charming Biblical scene of the birth of Christ."

(Continued on page 7)



The second Soviet Sputnik (bearing the dog Laika) went aloft on November 3, 1957. The Soviet bloc press used the Sputnik as a very common theme in connection with Christmas. Above "Father Frost" riding the Sputnik marked "USSR."

Drawing from *Nova Svoboda* (Ostrava), December 24, 1957

"What Do I Want? What Will I Give? What Will I Have to Eat?"

ONE HUNDRED and one Warsaw inhabitants were polled on their Christmas wishes and their answers printed in the Christmas (December 24, 25, 26, 1957) issue of *Sztandar Młodych* (Warsaw):

"Food (a little different than usual) plus drink (a little more than usual) plus presents under the Christmas tree plus sincere good wishes plus fatigue times 2.5 days equals THE HOLIDAYS.

"We decided to prove the above theoretical equation. According to custom, therefore, we turned to our readers with a few questions:

"What will you eat during the holidays?

"What presents will you give your family and friends?

"What presents would you place under the Christmas tree for Comrade Gomulka, for the Minister of Internal Trade and for the Minister of Finance?

• • •

"Will tradition be satisfied? On the whole, yes. That is the first conclusion of our poll, based primarily on the answers to the first question, since in Poland the holiday tradition is closely connected with the holiday menu. More than 60 percent of the answers say that at least one holiday dish will be served during Christmas: fried carp, borscht with noodles, or if preferred, mushroom soup, noodles with poppy seed, marinated herrings, cabbage with mushrooms, special holiday pastry baked at home. All tasty foods! What else? The old Polish *bigos*—cabbage and meat—(at least 15 per cent of the homes); meats: pork, veal, pate, rabbit, *kielbasa*, ham; poultry: turkey or goose; drinks: clear vodka, lemon vodka, cherry vodka, liquor made from Bulgarian peaches and two answers even mentioned real, honest-to-goodness sour mash. . . . Several students answered: 'How do I know what I'm going to eat—whatever the charming hostess provides us with!'

"Christmas tree? Compulsory in the majority of homes. And what will be under the tree from close family members and friends? In addition to toys . . . 59 percent mention apparel such as sweaters, men's shirts, underwear, socks, ties, stockings, blouses, shoes, and even one 'evening gown for my wife, because she's dreaming of it.' Next, books, also 'a small radio for the parents,' lottery tickets, 'good school report cards,' sweets.

A Knife to Cut the National Pie

"What would the Warsaw inhabitants like to present to Comrade Gomulka? Primarily a tremendous amount of good wishes which seem to radiate from the majority of answers. Some more concrete and real presents are, among others: warm bedroom slippers, an elegant tie, a cat, because 'he already has a dog,' and also—about 15 percent of the answers—wine, chocolates, good novels, flowers. Then come the concrete but unreal presents: a check for three billion dollars, a million apartments to be disposed of according to his wishes, a star from the heavens, a key to Sesame, if such existed, and so forth. 16 percent would

provide him with a two- or three-month vacation, somewhere in absolute peace and quiet. Three percent would take advantage of the situation, as well as the holiday spirit, to submit their requests for an apartment. 18 percent would like to wish him one or two hundred years of life. . . . 26 percent of the participants in the poll wish him (and themselves also, undoubtedly!) an improvement of the situation in the country and realization of the Eighth Plenum [October 1956] Resolutions. Someone would like to present him with a whip 'with which to chase away all thieves, parasites and hooligans'; someone else wants to give him a knife 'for an equable slicing of the national pie'; and yet another would like him to have Schopenhauer's 'The Art of Conducting Disputes.' Only five percent do not want to give him anything and only one percent do not know what to give.

Ministerial Christmas

"The Ministers fared much worse in this distribution of imaginary presents: our Warsaw compatriots took advantage of our poll to have some fun at their expense, in a benevolent but slightly spiteful manner. A housewife, forced to stand in long lines and still unable to buy what she wants, voiced the fervent wish that the Minister of Internal Trade submit to this pleasant experience 'at least once in his life.' She would like to present him with some of the things which distress her: green lemons, calcified eggs, margarine, ready-made MHD [Municipal Retail Trade] suits.

"At the same time, others would like to present Minister Lesz with more agreeable gifts: 16 percent would gladly present him with good professional tradesmen and honest salesmen, while at the same time dismissing all speculators and swindlers. Some wish for him improved industrial products, an improvement in distribution, transportation, etc.

"With regard to the Minister of Finance, 11 percent would like to give him a heap of foreign currency, several foreign loans, one Pulaski* inheritance and one gold mine. Three percent would like to give him, for luck, sums of money ranging from 1 *grosz* to 100 *zloty*; just as many want to present him with a 'thirteenth paycheck' (extra month's pay bonus), and five percent want him to have a piggy bank, as well as a magic needle to mend the holes in the national budget. Several want to give him 'my month's wages, just so he'll see what life looks like on that amount of money.'

"On the basis of these answers, it may be concluded that our equation, presented at the beginning of this report, is correct. On our part, we wish all those who took part in the poll tasty and traditional holiday meals, escape from hangovers, beautiful presents, and for the ladies—at least a few hours of rest.

"Merry Christmas!"

*Polish hero of the American Revolution whose fortune has been a subject of legal dispute for generations.

The 1957 Christmas Eve editorial in the Party paper *Rude Pravo* (Prague) tried to represent Christmas as a humanistic institution, whose spirit was human cooperation, and the Communists as its staunchest defenders: "Most assuredly it is not we [the Party] who would wish that in the coming modern society all the established poetry of such customs be drowned in the clatter of machines." Another article in the same issue discussed the Christian doctrine of the Nativity, and asserted that the charms of Christmas "did not come from the trumpets of angels or the rays of the Star of Bethlehem, but from the intentions of people of good will, from their dreams and longings for peace, tranquillity and happiness." Christmas in Czechoslovakia has a "new beauty, new because in this country it has ceased forever to be a cloak concealing human misery and humiliation."

Christmas Economics

AT PRESENT the regimes in Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia accept and even encourage family festivities at Christmas: decorated trees, exchange of gifts, traditional feasts; (the more archaic and quaint the observances the better, from the Communists' point of view, since these are so patently fanciful and without any contemporary meaning).

According to Marxist categories Christmas must be related to and indeed an expression of material conditions. Unquestionably, traditional Christmas observances do require a degree of economic abundance sufficient for people to invest in glittering trinkets and culinary delicacies solely



The Bulgarian press tended to use Christmas as just another excuse for propaganda. Above, US Secretary Dulles in front of a Christmas tree decorated with American guided missiles attached to a detonator marked NATO: "I have the Roman candles ready but the children haven't come." The reference is to disagreements within NATO on the siting of missiles.

Cartoon and quoted caption from *Sturshel* (Sofia), December 27, 1957

Christmas Customs in Old Romania

Once upon a time. . . Perhaps these are the words which mothers use when they tell their children about Christmas in Romania before Communism.

CHRISTMAS CELEBRATIONS in pre-Communist Romania lasted for several weeks and included six legal holidays. The season was officially begun on St. Ignatius Day, a week before Christmas, when peasants slaughtered the pig for the traditional Christmas feast.

For children the main festival was the *colinde* on Christmas Eve. At daybreak they gathered in groups of three or four and walked through the snow and frost from house to house singing carols. They were received in the homes to get warm and were given cakes, fruit and pennies. In the evening the children again toured the neighborhood farms and houses, this time carrying a huge star which they made out of colored paper, with a lighted candle in the center.

On Christmas morning the children woke to find the Christmas tree laden with the customary gifts. Then the whole family went to church.

The adults also had their *colinde*. Dressed as Magi or in folk costumes, they followed a plough drawn by colorfully decorated oxen through the streets, cracking whips, dancing and singing.

On New Year's Day the children toured the neighboring houses with a bundle of artificial roses called the *sorcova*, with which they touched the grown-ups and wished them a good new year.

The holiday season ended on Epiphany Day, with one of the most picturesque ceremonies: "throwing the cross into water." In Bucharest, the King, members of the government, and high clergy headed by the Patriarch, took part in the ceremony. In generally sub-zero weather, the Cross was thrown into the river and young men hurled themselves after it into the icy water. The one who succeeded in picking it up was rewarded by the King as the hero of the day.

for their ceremonial and decorative value, and the economy must be geared to a certain satisfaction of consumer demand. And this is precisely what was lacking (and is lacking in Romania and Bulgaria): the bareness of the cupboard in the Stalin era probably went further toward the extinction of Christmas than did any Party propaganda. This stringency has been somewhat relieved, although the situation is scarcely one of plenty. Newspapers list the supplies of Christmas goods such as candies, toys and trees which will be available in the market. Last year in Czechoslovakia the traditional Slavic feast dish, carp, was reported in good supply for Christmas; in 1952 it was not on the market at all and papers suggested that families make artificial fishes out of dough for the Christmas meal.

Just prior to Christmas in 1957 the woman's page of



From a photo-story on the Christmas dinner of a well-known Hungarian actress, Hanna Honthy, and her family. In regard to Christmas, the post-Revolt Hungarian press tends to stress "human interest" devoid of political content.

Photos from *Orszag Vilag* (Budapest), December 31, 1957

Erdekes Ujsag, a popular Hungarian illustrated magazine, published a rich Christmas menu with many illustrations headlined "Touring the Festive Board" which suggested that, in contrast to 1956, there were considerable supplies of delicacies available.

Since the 1956 upheaval Christmas in strongly Catholic Poland has a curiously bittersweet flavor. There is more freedom and a more active religious life in Poland than anywhere else in the bloc. But there is also great poverty; daily life is plagued with irritations and national life with frustration, and the mood is reflected in the rueful attitude toward Christmas festivities.

Elusive Pleasures

Last year the Christmas market pointed up all the difficulties—shortages, inconsistencies in distribution, rising prices—which characterized the Polish economy throughout the year. Despite a considerable increase over 1956—according to *Trybuna Ludu*, December 21, 26 percent more meat, 33 percent more herring, 20 percent more seasonal candy, 13 percent more chocolate products—Christmas supplies were still inadequate, and there were great discrepancies in the deliveries to various parts of the country. Fish and citrus fruits were in short supply generally. Warsaw reportedly had sufficient supplies of staple foods and

most seasonal foods; Wroclaw claimed its worst shortages in several years, and there were severe shortages of Christmas supplies in Gdansk, Gdynia, Sopoty and Lodz.

Christmas trees in Warsaw were alleged to be scarce and spindly. *Slowo Powszechne* (Warsaw) on December 22 lamented that many people in Warsaw would be without the traditional holiday tree. The paper attributed the shortage to the government ban on private trade in Christmas trees; the militia were confiscating trees by the hundreds. "It's very fine that at least the policemen will have nice trees," remarked the paper.

The available trees were substandard, it added. "Just sticks, say the disappointed customers who have waited for hours in long lines." Trees over two meters tall were rarities, and most of these fell into the hands of speculators before they were even unloaded at the depots. "As can be seen therefore, speculators have not disappeared and the strict regulations against private trade have missed the mark, and injured instead the people who will spend this year's holidays without any tree at all or with a couple of criss-crossed branches," said the paper indignantly.

However, *Trybuna Ludu* reported two days after Christmas that, despite gloomy forecasts, there was a Christmas tree glowing in practically every window in Warsaw. The last-minute arrival of 10,000 trees just before Christmas saved the day.





The entrance to the Festival Theater in the Hotel Moskva.

East Europe Photo

Karlovy Vary Film Festival

Eyewitness Report by A Western Freelance Journalist

IN RECENT YEARS the major annual Western film festivals of Cannes, Berlin and Venice have acquired an aura of glamorous sophistication which marks them almost as much as their presentation of top quality films. Although the one Soviet Bloc film festival—held for the past eleven years in Czechoslovakia's Karlovy Vary—is allegedly concerned purely with showing films that fit into a chosen high-minded festival theme, its organizers seem to be doing their best to give the Communists' annual cinema round-up a bit of decadent Western glamor. This year's festival—based on the theme, "deeper insight and better understanding among all men"—produced a number of interesting and occasionally amusing political and social insights, as well as side-lights on present cultural thoughts and behavior in the Soviet Bloc.

Held in the once fashionable watering spa of Karlsbad, the festival was centered in a large luxury hotel (\$12.55 per

day per person) known as the Moskva (formerly the Pupp), which housed all the foreign delegates and some of the journalists. Its reception hall had been converted into the festival theatre and had rather uncomfortable seats but a very handsome modern stage.

On arrival, delegates and journalists were handed—along with a mass of literature on Czechoslovakia—books of meal coupons entitling (and limiting) them to three meals a day in the Moskva's large dining rooms. Tactfully, tables had been arranged by country and by political allegiance, with Western representatives seated in a glassed-in terrace and the Soviet Bloc in an adjacent room. Table-hopping was common. Once, when the Soviet Delegation had invited some American journalists to lunch with them, they joked, "We don't know which will be worse—for you to be seen eating with us, or for us to be seen eating with you."

Life at the festival followed a pattern common to all

film festivals, with out-of-competition films scheduled in the mornings, and competition showings at 2, 4:45 and 9:30. The evening film was usually followed by an elaborate reception in one of the hotels, which in turn frequently led to all-night partying in the Florentina Bar of the Moskva. The Florentina could hardly be distinguished from any smart hotel bar-night club in Western Europe, except that there were fewer elegant women, and the band's songs were about a year or two out of date. Men without ties were not admitted—a detail which profoundly shocked some French leftist film critics—and women not in evening or cocktail dress were frowned on. There, every night until 6 in the morning, the five-piece band in white dinner jackets played American pop tunes, rumbas, cha cha chas, mamboes, and Rock and Roll. A pretty girl in a low-cut white lace gown belted out "Rock Around the Clock" with a good American accent, as well-dressed Czechs, Russians, Hungarians and Romanians swung their partners energetically around the tiny dance floor.

Rock and Roll seemed to be in particular favor, and was played both at the Soviet reception, attended by Czechoslovak President Novotny, and at the closing party of the festival given by the hosts. When asked if this brand of music was well-known in the Soviet Union, one member of the Soviet Delegation replied, "It's danced in all our better night clubs."

Fewer Western Visitors

This year, possibly because of East-West tension over the Middle East, there were notably fewer Western visitors than in past years. Among the important guests who did brave the international situation were France's grand old lady of the cinema Françoise Rosay, who was a member of the jury, and Roger Pigaut, former *jeune premier* turned director; from Italy came top scenarist Cesare Zavattini, directors Giuseppe De Santis and young Gillo Pontecorvo. The glamor of the festival was supplied by a tiny Turkish starlet who seemed to dazzle the Czechs with her low-cut gowns, the East German Marie Hagen, and several lively Czechoslovak actresses who all appeared nightly in elegant versions of the sack and the trapeze. The Turkish and East German starlets came in for a large share of cheesecake photographs, which were generously spread each day in the Prague press.

At no time during the festival was there ever any overt attempt to woo representatives of the West. On most occasions when talk of a political nature would arise, Soviet Bloc people tended to try good-naturedly to sidestep any such discussion. The only actual political incident which did occur at the festival was an address given by the Ambassador of the United Arab Republic, who, speaking at a cocktail party, made pointed and highly negative references to the United States and Great Britain. The Czechoslovak organizers of the festival and members of the Soviet Delegation who understood French (the language used by the Ambassador) appeared acutely embarrassed and immediately went about apologizing for his "bad taste" in introducing politics into an international festival. The one sign of political rigidity came from the

Peiping delegation whose members, when introduced at receptions, would bow and politely inquire, "Member of capitalist-imperialist or Communist State?" The response "capitalist-imperialist State" produced a curt bow and a quick about-face.

As for the competition itself, thirty-five countries had entered features and documentaries. Of these countries, only ten belonged to the Soviet Bloc. The only major world power not officially represented was the United States. Unofficially, however, a young American distributor, J. Jay Frankel of New York, presented fourteen American films, primarily for Soviet-Bloc distributors, but the showings were always jammed with the general public. Among the U. S. films shown were *Joan of Arc*, *Pajama Game* (some of its airs were whistled and hummed on the streets the same day), *East of Eden*, and *Escapade in Tokyo*. Soviet, Hungarian and Czechoslovak film directors attending the festival did not miss a single American film. "We've all read about them, of course, but this has been our first chance in years to see what the Americans are really doing," said a Hungarian director. One American film, John Huston's *Moby Dick*, was screened in the festival hall following the regular evening film. Although the showing was held close to midnight with no subtitles or translation, the hall seating some 1,000 people was filled to capacity. Melville's novel, which had just been translated for the first time into Czech, may have been known to some in the audience. At any rate, the film was warmly applauded.

Soviet film director Sergei Gerassimov, however, was greatly disappointed. "A film for children," he termed it, and went on to say how much more he had liked *The Old Man and the Sea*, which he had seen at the Brussels Film Festival earlier this year. "A very great actor, Spencer Tracy." He also found the American version of *War and Peace* "a fine film, although, of course, your notion of Tolstoi's Russia made us all laugh."

The competition films from both East and West disap-



Two actresses enjoying themselves at the Karlovy Vary Festival: Marie Hagen of East Germany (at right) and Eva Christianu of Romania. Miss Hagen was one of the belles of the occasion.

Czechoslovak Life (Prague), September 1958



Servant girls watching the Festival guests dance. The Czechoslovak Festival promoters strove for "bourgeois elegance"; no pretense of a "classless society" was attempted.

East Europe Photos

pointed delegates and journalists, and were subjected to unexpectedly heavy criticism from Professor Brousil, Czechoslovak president of the jury. He complained that because the East had wanted to create a sensation at the festivals of Cannes and Brussels, they had sent their best productions there, leaving Karlovy Vary only second-rate films. The Soviet Delegation was reportedly displeased by Brousil's comments, since their leading entry was Part III of *Quiet Flows the Don*, an expensive and much bally-hooed production.

The only film in the competition to draw an ovation from the audience was a ten-minute French documentary entitled "Vivre" (To Live), a montage made from newsreels. Among the scenes showing the catastrophes that can strike man today—famine, earthquakes, floods—were shots of the 1953 East Berlin riots and the 1956 Hungarian Revolt, although neither were specifically labelled. These scenes drew a spontaneous burst of applause from the audience, and at the end of the film people applauded and stamped the floor for five minutes. No other film received more than a polite patter of applause.

The competition included a fairly large number of entries, mainly documentaries, from countries producing their first films. For Western film critics there was a certain curiosity value in seeing the first Outer Mongolian or Albanian film, but such curiosity was quickly satisfied, as the technique of all these productions was wobbly and their story and message simple and familiar.

The films that did make Western journalists sit up and

take notice were a small collection of Polish, Hungarian, Czechoslovak and Soviet movies shown outside the competition at odd hours in the morning in tiny projection rooms seating fifteen to twenty people. Most of the films had been or were shortly to be entered at other principal European film festivals. In this group of some ten films one suddenly saw something very rare and satisfying: surprisingly fresh, original work of top artistic quality with no propaganda overtones. Whether the present governments will permit films like these to be made again remains of course to be seen, but the net impact was startling to say the least.

The Polish films, as expected, showed by far the greatest artistic exuberance. The full-length feature *Eva Wants to Sleep*, which can be summarized deceptively as the story of a girl who arrives at school a day before the term starts and searches for lodging for the night, is one long, clever nose-thumbing at authority, discipline and law. The police, who arrest Eva at one point, are ridiculed and mocked at every turn of the plot. Nothing is held sacred. The final denouement has the police completely foiled and baffled, and the band of criminals involved in the plot proves that crime does pay—at least for a while; the film ends with the director and actors literally being blown off the screen



by an explosion. Entered a few weeks later at the Festival of San Sebastian in Spain, *Eva* won the Grand Prize.

The same tone of spirited anarchism marked six Polish short subjects, shown at the Brussels Experimental Film Festival in April of this year. One of them, *Dom*, won the \$10,000 first prize as the best film from among 334 sent by 19 different countries. Somewhat related to the Dada and surrealist films of France in the thirties, the film projects a fine sense of revolt and irritation with convention while poetically evoking the meaning of "home."

Two Hungarian Films

The two Hungarian films were somehow more adult and sophisticated in tone than the Polish movies, and dealt with the past rather than the present. (Indeed, in the period just before the 1956 Revolt, the Hungarian film industry had begun to produce movies of a consistently high quality.) *The Iron Flower* takes place in the early thirties and *The Smugglers* in the immediate post-World War I period. The fact that both depict economic conditions that, according to Communist thinking, existed only because of the "capitalist regime," by no means turns the films into anything resembling propaganda tracts. As one Hungarian director at the festival observed, "We prefer to work with stories in the past, it gives us so much more leeway artistically. Besides, one wants to make honest films, and it's so hard to be honest about contemporary affairs." The two films handle unhappy love affairs with deft psychological insight and honesty.

The Czechs showed *The Diabolic Invention* which had unanimously won the Grand Prize of the Brussels Film Festival, and *The Wolf Trap*, which later won the International Film Critics' Award at Venice. *The Diabolic Invention*, based on the Jules Verne novel, is an extremely clever job of montage, combining live actors with animation, so that the whole resembles the original illustrations from the Verne book. Without political content, the film, intended for children, keeps adult audiences fascinated with elaborate Jules Verne inventions coming realistically alive. *The Wolf Trap* is a somber psychological study of three people that could have been written by Strindberg. Cast in the 1920's, the film does not even make a gesture in the direction of reflecting economic conditions, but simply concerns itself with the story of a domineering woman married to a man twenty years her junior, who falls in love with her orphaned niece who has come to live with them in a tiny provincial town. Immediately after being shown in Venice the film was bought for distribution in France.

Of the two Soviet films shown outside the festival one was the well-known prize-winner of the Cannes Film Festival, Mikhail Kozlov's *When the Cranes Fly Over*, which has achieved a popular success rare for Soviet films in the West. A rather odd mixture of the lyricism common to French films of the thirties, the neo-realism of postwar Italian films and just plain old-fashioned soap opera, the movie still manages to have a certain freshness, and its small touches of self-criticism set it off from other Soviet films of the past twenty years.

The other Soviet movie *Ilya Mourmetz*, was a super-

extravaganza, interesting mainly because for the first time the Soviets seem to have taken over, with surprising skill and ease, pure Hollywood technique—including a cast of thousands, stunning costumes and abundant action. In cinemascope and color, the story portrays the legendary adventures of a pre-Christian folk hero. What is striking is that the hero is not treated with excessive seriousness, and that the film is full of broad jokes and displays masterful trick photography producing such feats as a three-headed, flame-throwing, flying dragon. One high point of the film—showing perhaps most strongly its Western orientation—is a scene in which a slim, very pretty girl, wearing far less clothing than any Hollywood starlet could, dances on a huge shield supported on the backs of fifty naked men. The three thousand Czechs in the open air theatre where it was shown on the outskirts of the town reacted in much the same spirit as that shown by US children seeing a western at a local movie house on Saturday afternoon. Observers who have attended previous festivals in the past five years say this is the first time they saw a Czechoslovak audience react so enthusiastically and openly—their usual response being one of polite apathy.


At the festival's end the awards were fairly predictable, going in large number to the Soviet Bloc entries. It is interesting, however, that the Grand Prize which, unofficially, was expected to go to the Soviets' *Quiet Flows the Don*—a competent but pedestrian treatment of Sholokhov's novel—was shared by that production with a Japanese film, *The Half-Brothers*, a study in family relationships devoid of political content or implications.

Apart from presenting evidence of a clearly-defined class structure, the most interesting aspect of the festival for a Western journalist was the opportunity to see and talk with



USSR film director Sergei Gerassimov at the Soviet reception.

East Europe Photo



The ending of the Polish experimental film "Dom" ("Home"), shown at the festival. The film won first prize in the experimental film competition at the Brussels World's Fair.

Poland (Warsaw), No. 8, 1958

Soviet Bloc directors. While they all spoke easily and frankly, they obviously preferred to do so during walks in the nearby countryside where they did not have to worry about being overheard. These men all had certain things in common: they had all lived or worked for some time in the West; had been educated and formed in pre-Communist

days; were clearly intellectuals, and extremely well-dressed—often with marked elegance (in some instances their suits had an unmistakable Italian cut and the material was visibly superior to that worn by people in the streets of Karlovy Vary); all had what amounted to a burning thirst for any information on artistic or intellectual developments in the West. Most of them readily admitted that they lived extremely well—had a comfortable apartment, country house, car, TV, etc.—and that this was important in keeping them attached to their countries. In most instances they said that in recent years they had been able to work with considerable freedom from Party and bureaucratic supervision. One or two said, "Of course, we wouldn't mind living in the West, but what can we do? We don't speak French or English, how can we live as directors in a country where we don't even speak the language? If one of our films had a big success in the West, and we knew that Hollywood, for instance, would like to hire us, that'd change everything." And they would sigh and shrug.

The Eleventh Film Festival of Karlovy Vary in its own way did fulfill its theme to a certain extent—it did help give deeper insight into the mentality of the intellectuals and artistic creators living and working under a Communist regime. It also gave these people a rare opportunity to see American creative work under relatively relaxed circumstances. The effect of this brief association combined with the burgeoning free spirit in some of the Soviet Bloc's film production may just possibly bring about further exciting artistic revelations.

Original Research

FROM ROMANIA:

An inspector in the district educational department—a Party member, of course—comes to look into the school. In the sixth grade classroom he asks a front-row student, "Now, my child, tell me about the origin of the world we live in."

The boy scratches his nose. "The world was created by God," he says.

The inspector goes scarlet. "You are a stupid, ignorant, perverted, reactionary scamp," he yells, "Go to the principal's office at once." The boy leaves, snivelling. "Now then," says the inspector, "is there anyone here who can give me a sensible answer?"

A bespectacled, earnest student rises in the last row. "Well," he says, "it is indeed true that the world was created by God, but long before that several famous Soviet scientists concerned themselves with the problem."

Soviet Bloc Higher Education-II

This is the second of a two-part survey of higher education in the Soviet bloc, indicating the political and economic circumstances behind the introduction of the new program of "polytechnicism" which, as recently elaborated by Soviet leader Khrushchev, will substantially change the system of entrance qualifications and the studies program in Communist universities. The first article, covering developments in Czechoslovakia and Hungary, appeared in the October 1958 issue.

HIGHER EDUCATION in the captive East European countries, despite definite advances in volume and probably in technological instruction, has failed to meet many of the goals set for it by the Communist leadership. Not only did the events of 1956 show the universities to be centers of political dissidence, but it became apparent to the regimes that higher education was woefully out of line with their economic needs and plans. Decline in intellectual standards and fragmentation of the curriculum, adminis-

tration of academic life by bureaucracy and dogma, insufficiency of the much-vaunted State financial support of students—all these features were criticized, first by professors and students and ultimately by regime leaders. In 1957 most of the regimes took steps to introduce the educational program known as polytechnicism, which was laid down authoritatively by Khrushchev in September 1958 as the guiding principle for Soviet education. This program calls for a drastic curtailment of access to higher studies for



In the entrance-hall to a Warsaw University building stands this Soviet-style statue of the "ideal student" clutching a volume bearing the names of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin. Polish students have tried to scratch out Stalin's name. East Europe Photo

young people and an increased emphasis on education for and through industrial production work. Also last year, as part of the current reduction and decentralization of the State bureaucratic apparatus, a certain amount of autonomy in internal administration was handed back to the universities. This does not mean a reversion to the autonomy of academic institutions as understood in the free world or pre-Communist Eastern Europe: State and Party still have absolute authority over the program of studies, admission policy, political activity, etc. In fact, political and ideological requirements, such as the instruction in Marxist-Leninist theory and the selection of candidates for higher education according to social origin, have been stiffened, except in Poland.

Romania and Bulgaria

IN ROMANIA AND BULGARIA higher education has followed a pattern more or less typical of the area. In both countries it was rapidly expanded during the Stalin era. In 1956-57 there were 81,206 fulltime students in Romanian institutions of higher education, allegedly more than three times as many as in 1938 (*Anuarul Statistic* [Bucharest], 1957). Bulgaria's 20 institutions of higher education had an enrollment of 36,705 students in 1957-58, raising the proportion of students to 540 per 100,000 population, as compared to 430 in 1952 and 160 in 1939. According to *Rabotnichesko Delo* (Sofia), March 16, 1958, 30,000 students graduated from institutions of higher education during the period of the Second Five Year Plan (1953-57). This report claimed that the 10,885 new students admitted in 1957-58 represented an increase of 50 percent since 1952.

However, in contradiction to this picture of steady and rapid growth, Bulgaria's Minister of Education Vulko Chervenkov (formerly Party chief and Premier), told the Party Central Committee on July 7, 1957, that it had been necessary to cut down the number of new admissions in the past few years and that this would continue to be the policy because of difficulties in placing graduates in jobs.

In June and July 1957 respectively, the Party Central Committees of Romania and Bulgaria ordered the introduction of "polytechnicism" in the institutions of higher education. Lecture hours and examinations were to be reduced, laboratory, shop and factory practice were to be increased, and many specialized faculties and institutes merged. To improve material facilities, mainly equipment, all factories in Bulgaria were ordered to supply free of charge one article or unit of their product to the institutions of higher education.

New, more "class-conscious" admissions requirements were laid down in both Romania and Bulgaria. The Romanian Central Committee decree stipulated that 40 percent of students must be of "working class" origin and 30-35 percent of peasant origin. This is the largest "proletarian" representation called for by any regime in the Soviet bloc. The decree also provided for more and larger scholarships and stipends.

In Bulgaria, new categories of priority for higher education were announced (Radio Sofia, March 18, 1958). The regime is discriminating in favor of candidates with practical experience; 20 percent of all places in institutions of higher education are to be reserved for candidates who have already worked for two years in industry or agriculture. Another 20 percent of the vacancies in specialized technical institutes are reserved for children of workers and of collectivized peasants. A total of 40 percent of the places in agricultural colleges are reserved for children of collectivized peasants.

A new Education Bill, supplanting the original Communist bill of 1948, was passed by the Bulgarian National Assembly in February 1958. In line with areawide policy, it gives a greater degree of self-government to the universities and prescribes the election, rather than State appointment, of university officials (rector, dean, etc.). At the same time, the scholastic requirements for obtaining degrees, titles and teaching posts were raised. University administration was similarly "liberalized" in Romania in 1957 (*Gazeta Invatamintului* [Bucharest], January 11, 1957).

Ideological Climate

There is believed to have been considerable unrest in Romanian universities, although the strictly controlled press has barely hinted at this and there has been no documentation of any overt anti-regime activity. In the January 11, 1957 issue of *Gazeta Invatamintului*, the head of the scientific-cultural section of the Bucharest Party Committee accused university instructors of having "misconstrued" the resolutions of the Soviet 20th Party Congress and the Second Congress of the Romanian Party regarding the struggle against "dogmatism." The paper charged that "under the guise of criticism, some instructors have belittled the achievements of the People's Democracy and have slipped on the path of liberalism." Echoing the complaints in Czechoslovakia, the Romanian press has reprimanded professors for shirking ideological instruction on grounds that "politics" has no place in their professional tasks.

The impact of the Hungarian Revolt on students in Romania, particularly those among Romania's large Hungarian minority, was generally concealed by the Romanian press. However, the January 4, 1957 issue of *Gazeta Invatamintului* published an article by the rector of Cluj's Bolyai University, a university for the Hungarian minority, which praised the way in which the students and faculty had "stood up to the political-ideological test" of the Revolt. But although the Party and youth organizations had "succeeded in preserving order," the rector acknowledged there had been a need for more thorough political-ideological work to combat some of the "wavering" of the students when they first received the news of the uprising. He called for an expansion of this work in the light of the fact that the present generation of students "never knew the intensity of the suppressive activities of the past regime"—knowledge which presumably would dilute their

shock at the "intensity" of Soviet suppression of the Hungarian Revolt.

The low level of Marxist-Leninist instruction at V. Babes University and the Medical Pharmaceutical Institute in Cluj was criticized in *Scinteia Tineretului* (Bucharest), March 29, 1957. The paper said that "the need for improvement of these courses, which are an integral part of the Party's propaganda machinery, is accentuated by the prevalence of imperialist views regarding people's capitalism, the vacuum in the Middle East, and the insistent cries of those who demand a reform and revision of Marxist views."

The June 6, 1957 issue of the same paper attacked the Marxist-Leninist instruction in the Faculties of Legal Sciences and Philosophy at Bucharest University. Citing the high—20 percent—rate of failure among the fourth year journalism students, the author scored their "parrot-like knowledge" of Marxist-Leninist principles and their factual confusion. He deplored the fact that many of them could not identify the leading philosophers of the past, "confused the Utopian Socialists with the Encyclopedists," and did not know the name of a single contemporary bourgeois philosophical movement.

Scinteia (Bucharest), March 6, 1958, called for balancing the teaching of dialectical materialism with "criticism of contemporary reactionary philosophy." The danger of "revisionism" was again stressed. On the same day *Scinteia Tineretului* denounced "political and ideological chaos" as well as chauvinism, mysticism, and adulation of the West among students. "Confusion" evidently continues unabated.

Political apathy and "religious illusions" among Bulgarian university students were scored in *Otechestven Front* (Sofia), March 13, 1958. *Rabotnichesko Delo's* leading article on March 22 criticized the inertia of the Party organizations in educational institutions; in the Dimitrov district of Sofia "not one Party school organization has on its own initiative discussed the Central Committee decree [on polytechnicism]." On various occasions in 1957 and 1958 Education Minister Chervenkov warned against the decline in the level of Marxist-Leninist courses at the universities. The director of the Elementary Teachers' College, writing in *Narodna Mladezh*, February 22, 1958, urged the introduction of Marxism-Leninism as a separate course of study in the secondary schools, indicating that the instruction on the college level had been inadequate.

Albania

A NEW UNIVERSITY, Albania's first, was opened by the Communist regime in September 1957. The State University of Tirana is set up according to the old, orthodox model of Communist institutions of higher education: centralization of administration, rigid political and economic direction of professors and students by the State and Party. The university, which enrolled 3,560 students in 1957-58, has faculties in history and philology, law, economics, engineering, natural sciences, and medicine.

Poland


Poland, in this facet of its system as in so many others, is something of an anomaly in the Soviet bloc. After the October 1956 upheaval the Gomulka regime embarked on a policy aimed at the regeneration of academic life and standards in Poland; and the freedoms then granted have reportedly so far been preserved at the universities to a greater extent than in other areas of public life. Some of the reforms in higher education—the disengagement of the Party-State bureaucracy from educational administration, free election of university officials, reduction of the curriculum—were part of a uniform program throughout the Communist bloc. But only in Poland was the rule on compulsory attendance at lectures, one of the main grievances of East European students, abolished. In Poland the requirements for candidates for higher education are far less politically weighted than in other Communist countries, most of which have reverted to the policy of "class discrimination." Perhaps the most profound, if least tangible, change unique to Poland was the official espousal of the principle of intellectual freedom, however hedged by qualifications and conditions. Marxism-Leninism was still the official ideology, but intellectual practice far less doctrinaire.

The Communist takeover of higher education in Poland was launched by a decree of October 28, 1947; totalitarian State and Party domination reached a peak in the years between 1950 and 1953. At this time the regime



Wroclaw students at their annual festival.

Photo from *Poland* (Warsaw), No. 8, 1957



Buildings of the new State University in Tirana, Albania's first institute of higher education. The buildings were constructed by the Italians 1939-1943 for use as a local parliament. In 1944 it was used as German Army headquarters.

Photo from *New Albania* (East Berlin), Third Issue, 1957

dissolved most of the established Polish scientific associations and in 1951 founded the so-called Polish Academy of Sciences. This institution, together with the Ministry of Education, had charge of determining the study program of the institutions of higher education.

A number of government decrees issued in this period speeded up the courses and tightened discipline over students. A decree of March 7, 1950 introduced assignment of college graduates to compulsory employment at a place determined by regime authorities for a maximum period of three years. Failure to fulfill this requirement was punishable by fine and six months imprisonment.

Rejection of Stalinist Policy

THE TIDAL WAVE of criticism and protest released by the "thaw" in Poland in 1955 extended to all aspects of cultural life, including higher education and science. The students' weekly *Po Prostu*, leading the campaign for liberalization and reform, published numerous criticisms of the debasement of scholarship under Stalinism. At the beginning of 1956 the Ministry of Higher Education acknowledged the situation by ruling that university courses be lengthened from three to four and five years, in order to overcome the deficiencies noted in college graduates' mastery of basic academic and technical material. This extension was applied first to courses in natural sciences, law, humanities and agriculture in the 1956-57 year and was eventually to affect all branches of study.

On April 22, 1956, a group of professors and scientists published in *Po Prostu* an open letter addressed to the Polish Sejm, demanding a thorough revision of the system of studies in all institutions of higher education. "There is probably no one in Poland now who doubts that the system of studies has not met the requirements," the letter declared. "Neither professors nor students have any illusions. On this point there exists a common opinion which has been expressed in discussions in the press, at the institutions of learning, and at numerous conferences."

The letter called for a system which would prepare students for "independent thinking and realistic action." It deplored the present method of "cursory lectures, often read monotonously from abridgements, which stupefy the

students and in general discourage learning." Exercises should be transformed from drills into seminars, particularly the lectures in Marxism-Leninism which were often presented as "naive historical chats," the letter said. It urged an overhaul of the Marxism-Leninism courses, eliminating duplications and reducing hours. The letter also called for stricter marking, which had been too liberal and failed to ensure that college graduates came up to standard. At the same time, it proposed that the rigid requirements for lecture attendance be modified, that the students be given more choice in the election of courses, and in general be given more responsibility for fulfilling their tasks on their own.

The sponsors of the letter, explaining why they had addressed their suggestions to the Sejm rather than the Ministry of Higher Education, charged that the Ministry had ignored the widespread criticisms and demands for reforms: the only "reform" it had introduced in the 1955-56 academic year was "to have absences from class excused by the group tutor rather than the dean. Such was the most radical practical conclusion which the Ministry of Higher Education was able to reach."

The letter averred that the basic cause of the deterioration of higher education, "the main brake on the development of learning," was the inordinate control and interference exercised by the State bureaucratic machine. This had developed out of the conditions of "the cult of personality"—that is, of Stalinist totalitarianism—and, although in literature and art this interference had already been disavowed, in higher education people from outside the field—the State officials—continued to have the decisive voice. "How can education be directed by men who know nothing about research work, how can officials who know youth only from visits and inspections hand out prescriptions for teaching? . . . In our opinion the premise that education should be governed by bureaucrats has already disappeared. We consider that the time has come for people of learning to direct the schools of higher learning," the letter concluded.

The January-March 1957 issue of *Nauka Polska*, published by the Polish Academy of Sciences, carried further the attack on officialdom's authority in educational matters, including scientific theory. "It is enough to mention that



Polish students in Warsaw demonstrating in support of Wladyslaw Gomulka during the October 1956 upheavals. The placard, from which hangs a bone, reads: "Here lie the bones of the cult of personality." Photo from *Tygodnik Polski*, October 28, 1957, a weekly, now defunct, published in Paris by the Polish regime.

in the philosophical, economic or historical disciplines the periods normally set aside for research work had to be sacrificed to the search for arguments to bolster the theories enforced from the outside," said the paper.

Student Criticism

During this period the Polish press, particularly *Po Prostu*, published a number of statements by Polish students denouncing the intellectual corruption brought about by the Communist indoctrination effort. A stellar example of the hypocrisy and ideological confusion prevailing among Polish students was cited in a letter in *Po Prostu*, February 19, 1956. The letter reported that at a ZMP* meeting a youth had taken the floor and declared: "A moment ago Franek S. said that the teachings of Marx are interesting and beautiful. Do you know why he said it? Because he thinks that this is what he is supposed to say, that it is the thing to do. Yesterday the same Franek told me he had never read a more stupid and boring book than Marx's *Das Kapital*. The question is who is telling the truth, who is lying? Is it Franek of yesterday or the one who is sitting in this hall?"

* The Communist-run student youth organization; it dissolved in the October 1956 upheaval.

"So much for Franek," said the letter. "In the presidium of our meeting sits Marysia S. A couple of months ago I was taking the oral examinations in Marxism-Leninism with Marysia. She had an interesting subject: the primacy of spirit or matter. Marysia was proving that all idealistic theories about the primacy of spirit are erroneous. She did it with passion. She received the highest mark. A few minutes later I saw Marysia in a red tie and ZMP uniform going into church. I could not figure out what she was defending and what overthrowing, in offering her prayers of thanksgiving for having passed an examination in Marxism-Leninism. Tell me whom to believe: Marysia fighting against idealism or Marysia praying to God? Why do we have two faces, two souls?"

The "thaw" in Poland, led by students, Communist intellectuals and writers, started a revolution in the universities. Controversy for its own sake, the right and duty to inquire, criticize and judge—all the intellectual objectives of liberal education in the free world—became the passionate demand of the Poles. More vociferously than anywhere else in the Soviet bloc, the Poles reacted against the Stalinist suppression of thought. Said *Po Prostu*, on January 29, 1956: "Among Polish students the bubble has burst . . . In Warsaw, Cracow, Wrocław, Częstochowa and Lublin, there is probably no school which was not

affected to some extent by the powerful explosion of discussion." The discussions covered a broad range of topics, many previously prohibited; they drew audiences of hundreds and sometimes lasted all night. "These discussions revealed a widespread intellectual ferment," said *Po Prostu*.

Students Role of Honor

In the spring of 1956, in Poland and Hungary, student and intellectual leaders invoked the historical role of university students as a catalytic force in times of change and upheaval. In Hungary, the cry of "1848" was raised. In Poland, the editors of *Po Prostu* wrote on April 8, 1956, in connection with proposals for a new student organization to replace the desiccated Communist Youth League (ZMP): "Students have always played an important part in Polish revolutionary movements. Within the walls of our schools were born new trends of freedom, new social ideals; in the revolutionary student associations were born the ideals of Socialism. In past years there was firmly implanted in the tradition of our society a view of students as the vanguard of youth, as one of the leading forces in the national cause. Such a view certainly does us honor, but alas, it also shames us; honor for the past, shame for the present."

Po Prostu called for the formation of a revolutionary

"On the Seamy Side of Matriculation"

From *Zycie Szkoły Wyzszej* (Warsaw), June 1958

UNFORTUNATELY, THE OPINION is common that in order to be admitted to a university one has to "pay," one has to find "somebody" who will fix up the matter for a certain remuneration (read: "bribe"). . . . This creates an unwholesome atmosphere, which threatens the good name of the universities and of the teaching staff. The doubtless very lively "intervention activity" which takes place before, during and immediately after the exams is one of the causes of the spread of these irresponsible rumors. Various persons "in high positions" make telephone calls and write letters to university rectors and to the members of the admissions boards, asking for the admission of certain candidates or expressing their view that such admissions are "necessary" because of the "merits" of the candidates themselves or of their parents.

This kind of intervention no doubt has its roots in the errors of the past years, when unwritten privileges or reservations were in force regarding admittance to universities. It was no secret to anybody that during [those] years the pupils of the 11th [final high school] classes joined the ZMP [Communist Youth League] in droves in order "to get into the university." The fact that some members of the university teaching staff give paid assistance to the candidates for higher studies in the form of individual coaching or preparatory courses is another source of the improper atmosphere surrounding admission."

student association with complete autonomy—i.e. free from regime controls. "In the future association, the principle of open political life must be unconditionally enforced," said *Po Prostu*. The ZMP was totally rejected by the students and dissolved in the crucible of the October "peaceful revolution." The Gomulka regime formed two youth organizations—ZMS and ZMW—at the beginning of 1957; neither has approached the ideals set out in this *Po Prostu* proposal.

Freedom of Action

After Gomulka's accession a number of professors and scientists barred from active work during the previous regime were allowed to return to their profession. The regulation on compulsory attendance for students was rescinded as part of the repudiation of the Stalinist laws on enforced labor discipline. Living and working conditions in the universities were candidly discussed and to some degree improved. Despite Poland's fiscal crisis, the Gomulka regime substantially increased State funds for higher education. 70 million *zloty* were appropriated in 1957 and 110 million *zloty* in 1958 for higher education, as compared to 20 million in 1955.

The shams of past practice were frankly aired. For example, Josef Duda, a university official, made this comment on the Stalinist methods of student discipline (*Zycie Szkoły Wyzszej* [Warsaw], November 1957): "The regulations, and the law on the formal discipline of work . . . were in practice a pack of lies. They forced youth to tell all sorts of minor falsehoods and commit minor violations. . . . These things were small in scale, but they were done every day. We knew about these consistent violations but we tolerated them because there was really no alternative. The sporadic denunciation of excesses was mostly empty gesture. . . ."

Similarly the true state of the material situation of students in Poland—and presumably to greater or lesser degree in the other Satellites—was exposed in an article in the June 30, 1957 issue of *Swiat* (Warsaw). The article condemned not only the students' material hardship but even more the perversion of the facts about it in Communist propaganda. "The whole truth about Polish students' life has not yet been told," *Swiat* said, "We are still living in the haze generated by the propaganda which proclaimed that the State takes care of these matters, which made us laugh at English students who have to work as bus drivers during their vacations in order to be able to continue their studies. In our country—it was claimed—the State ensures students the opportunity to study without financial worries."

According to *Swiat*, the minimum monthly budget for a student amounts to 509.60 *zloty*. (This does not include clothes, cigarettes, etc. "A student living on this budget is an ascetic," said *Swiat*.) The average State stipend is 360 *zloty* per month. *Swiat* pointed out that this means that every month most of the students are short 150 *zloty* to balance their "starvation budget—starvation, because students get only 2,000 calories while they need 3-4,000. In case of sickness, 60 percent of the students cannot afford

the medicine. Perhaps this is one cause of the poor progress in students' work at the institutions of higher learning."

The paper concluded sharply: "One might say that students have always been starving everywhere since the beginning of time. That is true. But why tell the lie that they are living in excellent conditions? It is very unpleasant to be starving and at the same time hear from all sides how well fed you are! No wonder our students are dissatisfied. . . ."

In December 1957 *Zycie Szkoły Wyzszej* reported that the monthly cash income of scholarship students living in the Warsaw student hostels in 1957 was 519 *zloty*. The sources of this income were: State stipend—401 *zloty* (77%), financial help from family—62 *zloty* (12%); other income from work, etc.—56 *zloty* (11%). These figures were determined by a poll conducted in May-June 1957 at 10 institutions encompassing nearly 1,000 students in Warsaw. The results showed that only 13 percent of the students were fully supported by State aid.

The students' expenses were: food, 62%; clothing and shoes, 9%; cultural entertainment (books, theatre, movies), 10%; school supplies, 4%; transportation, 5%; miscellany, 10%.

A plan for a new scale of scholarship payments was recently advanced by the Polish Students' Association. Radio Warsaw, August 28, 1958, said that the new system, which was formulated as a result of the criticism of the existing student stipends, would be presented as a draft bill to the government and would go into force in 1959.

The plan calls for monthly stipends to university students of 450 *zloty* during the first year, 500 *zloty* for the second and third years, 550 *zloty* for the fourth and following years. This represents a considerable increase over the previous allowance of 350-450 *zloty* (average industrial worker's salary: 2,500 *zloty*).

Student Surplus

POLAND's 76 institutions of higher education had an enrollment of 129,045 students in 1957-1958 (*Polityka* [Warsaw], October 4, 1958). 42 percent are studying technology, 21 percent medicine, 11 percent law; the rest are presumably in the humanities departments (*Uwaga* [Gdansk], May 17, 1958.)

Trybuna Ludu (Warsaw), said on August 8, 1957, that

In the USSR

RADIO MOSCOW reported on August 21, 1958, that 440,000 students began their studies in some 700 universities and institutes in the Soviet Union this year. The broadcast, quoting Deputy Minister of Higher Education Mikhail Prokofyev, said that a new pedagogical institute will be opened this year at Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky, a polytechnical institute in Riga, a correspondence polytechnical institute in Kharkov, a construction engineering college in Penza, and an institute for road construction in Khabarovsk.



Dancing at the Cabaret organized by the students of Warsaw Polytechnic. Photo from *Magazyn Polski* (Warsaw), No. 3, 1958.

there were 14,055* available places in institutions of higher education for the coming year, (about 5,000 fewer than in previous years), for which 32,000 high school graduates had applied.

The job placement of university graduates has been handled differently in Poland than elsewhere in the bloc. In March 1957, the Council of Ministers repealed the 1950 decree on the compulsory assignment of graduates by the State, and made the basis of employment an individual contract concluded directly between the graduate and his place of work. (*Monitor Polski* [Warsaw], April 5, 1957).

The complaint raised throughout the area—most explicitly in Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia—of disparities between jobs and education was echoed in *Trybuna Ludu* on May 4, 1958. Of the total of 84,225 persons in executive jobs in industry, only 16 percent have the required higher education, said the paper. About 48 percent have a high school education, and 36 percent completed only elementary school. This is not due to a shortage of college graduates, the paper said. Inferior positions, both in ad-

* The discrepancy between this figure and the total enrollment is due to the previously-mentioned extension of the length of courses.

ministration and production, are occupied by thousands of graduate engineers.

Job difficulties faced graduates this year to a greater extent than before, according to *Tygodnik Demokratyczny* (Warsaw) May 28, 1958. The paper said that thus far not only ordinary workers, economists and artists were known to be looking for work, but also engineers and technicians. An unknown number of university graduates were working as waiters, store clerks, etc. Although the Ministry of Employment and Social Welfare claimed that this year the situation would be about the same as last, others warned it would be much worse, pointing to the fact that a minimal number of requests from industry for graduates had come in to the universities, said the paper.

Gomulka Affirms Polytechnicism

In September, 1958, less than a week after Krushchev's pronouncement on educational reforms in the Soviet Union, First Secretary Gomulka announced that Poland would follow the Soviet Union's lead in measures to tighten the link between education and practical employment. The Polish leadership had previously issued a regulation under which university students will have to serve work terms in industry or the professions of one to two years before, during or after their studies. Gomulka indicated that the new Soviet program would be applicable also in Poland, as a means of integrating the university students with the "actualities" of Socialism, politically as well as economically; thus presumably diminishing their force as a separate—and unstable—element in society.

The proportion of worker-peasant students in the universities has fallen in Poland,* according to the pattern throughout the Soviet bloc; but the reaction of the Polish regime departs markedly from the pattern. The Party organ *Trybuna Ludu*, commenting on the phenomenon in its May 3, 1958 issue, explicitly endorsed the principle of selecting students according to their ability. It attributed the decline to lack of interest on the part of worker-peasant parents and to the inferior showing of worker-peasant students on entrance tests because of the lower academic level of provincial schools. But there has been no suggestion of reverting to class origin as a qualification in itself for preferred admission to higher education.

Freedom of Thought

According to the Minister of Higher Education himself, the most significant change in Polish higher educational policy since October 1956 was the adoption of the principle of free scientific discussion and research. Writing in *Trybuna Ludu*, September 29, 1957, Minister Stefan Zolkiewski** said that this new freedom had made possible the

* According to *Polityka*, October 4, 1958: last year 29.7 percent of the university students were of working-class origin, 22.9 percent peasant, 42.4 percent intelligentsia.

** Stefan Zolkiewski is a close associate of Gomulka and is believed to hold "centrist" political views. As well as being Minister of Higher Education he was at this time editor-in-chief of the Party organ *Polityka*, a post he relinquished in May 1958 in order to become editor of *Nowa Kultura* after the purge of its liberal editorial staff.

Propaganda and Education

In a speech to the Association of Polish Teachers on December 21, 1956, Wladslaw Bienkowski, Minister of Education, said that the attempt to turn educational institutions into "propaganda agencies" had failed in its object of total indoctrination; and in the process, he said, Polish education had fallen far behind the level of pedagogy of the past decades:

"Until October 1956, education and school procedures were subject to the principle that laws can be dictated to education from outside, that methods from anywhere [i.e. the Soviet Union] can be imposed. . . .

"The school's task was to make of the future citizen a passive recipient of the propaganda media. . . . From this [concept of education] two contradictory tendencies emerged. On the one hand we witnessed a gigantic expansion of education, its popularization, the breaking down of barriers . . . on the other hand, we witnessed its degeneration. . . .

"The supremacy of propaganda over education and instruction found its expression in an abundant growth of the propaganda apparatus in practically all institutions. It was assumed that a citizen subjected throughout the day to a barrage of propaganda from the press, radio, cinema, meetings, speeches, slogans posted on all available wall space, would have no choice but to succumb, to start thinking in terms of the given formulas. . . .

"However, years of experience brought disappointment to these calculations. It can be said that the result in some sense was the direct contrary. . . . The [sloganeering] broke like a great wave into the schools, programs, textbooks, lectures. As a result we have retrogressed from the achievements of pedagogy of the last decades, returning to verbalism, to mechanical cramming of terms and formulas. With one dangerous difference: the given formulas in which one had to believe referred to actual, observable facts and, too often, contradicted them. . . .

"Today, in summing up the state of our education at the end of 1956, it must be said that the total balance shows losses and shortages in many sectors, and we must recognize that these shortages will not easily be made good."

resumption of abandoned lines of research, such as sociology; and development of neglected ones, such as psychology, philology and certain fields of biology which had been hampered by "dogmatism." He cited the increase in contacts with foreign science and education through travel and exchange of literature. In 1957-58, he said, over one thousand Polish scientists would visit scientific centers abroad, as compared to 618 in 1956 and only 121 in 1955. The restoration of free discussion and research had also raised the level of students' work, helping them to acquire the skill of learning and not just memorizing, said Zolkiewski.



Above: A crowded dormitory room in Warsaw Polytechnic.

Below right: Two Polish students in a Warsaw park.

East Europe Photo

Photo from *Poland* (Warsaw), No. 9. (37), 1957

In the February 5, 1958 issue of *Trybuna Ludu* Zolkiewski delved into the delicate question of the areas of control still claimed by the State and Party. He emphasized that "of course the State is not and cannot be indifferent to the course of development of the sciences which directly form Socialist consciousness. . . . And so the People's State will support Marxist-Leninist studies, will guide their direction and [appoint] the [instructors] in this field." He maintained that this did not mean any infringement on intellectual freedoms: "The Party does not meddle in academic discussions. . . . [It] lays down only the main organizational lines. . . ."

The ideological schism within the Polish Communist Party in 1957 was reflected in the universities, and it was plain from Zolkiewski's remarks that the Party's grip on the universities had been profoundly shaken. "This year we underwent a grave crisis in Polish intellectual circles," Zolkiewski wrote. "We are only now beginning to emerge from it. The outcome of the struggle against revisionism and dogmatism in the Party and in Marxist quarters will determine the result. . . . We have introduced Marxism for all university students, but the shock which the philosophers and Marxist economists in Poland have suffered considerably undermined the effectiveness of this work and warped its ideological direction. During the past year we did not manage to put these courses [Marxism-Leninism] into operation everywhere. . . ."

University students launched a well-planned campaign

in 1956-57 against the compulsory courses in historical and dialectical materialism and political economy. According to *Zycie Szkoły Wyższej* November 1957: "Youth presented its case [to the university authorities] with lists of contradictions in these subjects, and charges that these subjects were no longer real. The University's argument for maintaining political economy, on the grounds that it is the basis of other economic subjects. . . did not convince the youth, because the University was not able to produce any new arguments, programs and authorities on the subject." The paper added this significant note: "In their attack against political economy, the young people were first of all opposed to the lecturers, whom they did not consider creative representatives of learning, but rather the delegates of the Party apparatus which bore—in the minds of the public—the responsibility for the errors of the pre-October period."

The article reported that among the 2,000 students of one university "considerable activity has been shown by a small group proclaiming a program of religious and moral renaissance and of opposition to Marxist ideology."

A virtual rout of the authority of the "Party line" appeared to be under way at the universities. *Polityka* (Warsaw), June 7, 1958, spoke of "the crisis of authority and loosening of discipline" at medical schools. The paper cited a professor at the Gdansk Medical Academy, "a serious, not-so-young person who explained to his students after October [1956] that everything he had taught them

on Lysenko* he had done under pressure, without ever believing any of it."

The Party's youth organizations have apparently lost their last pretense to influence. *Tygodnik Powszechny* (Cracow) declared on March 30, 1958, that there are no longer any significant youth organizations in the universities, and the number of members can be counted on one hand: philosophical discussions are carried out on "the fringes of organized life," in clubs and loosely formed social groups.

The Mood of Polish Students

The new spirit of inquiry has recently led to a virtual epidemic of surveys and polls in Poland, reflecting the concern with public opinion and the use of research techniques formerly found only in the West. A number of these surveys published in the Polish press in the winter of 1957-58 attempted to chart the prevailing mood and ideas of Polish university students. The picture which emerged was that of a young generation wandering in intellectual and moral limbo—strikingly similar to the Kadar press' review of Hungarian youth. How much this Polish press picture reflected a genuine sense of frustration and cynicism among the students, and how much simply the regime's disapproval of the students' disinclination to fall into line is difficult to determine. That the students still felt strongly

* Soviet agronomist whose theories, contrary to most accepted biology, were espoused by Stalin and imposed as compulsory truths.

Foreign and Exchange Students

APPROXIMATELY 2,000 foreign students from 60 countries are enrolled at Czechoslovak universities for the academic year 1958-59, according to *Pravda* (Bratislava), June 6, 1958. This is the largest number to date, and includes 500 new students, 90 of them from South America and Asia. The report mentioned a group of 50 Indonesian students "who are leaving Dutch universities prematurely, having been given the opportunity to complete their studies in Czechoslovakia."

During the past academic year, 1,040 Czechoslovak students studied in the Soviet Union and 124 Soviet students were enrolled at Charles University and other Czechoslovak institutions, according to *Svobodne Slovo* (Prague), July 19, 1958. A mutual one-month study exchange of 20 educational experts will be arranged this year, the paper said.

According to official news sources, 1,000 Bulgarian students and 500 from Hungary are currently studying at Soviet institutions of higher education. 700 foreign students are enrolled in Hungarian universities. *Nepszabadsag* (Budapest) said on August 30, 1958, that under new cultural agreements 175 instructors and research workers will be sent from Hungary to the Soviet Union and the rest of the bloc.



about certain ideals was indicated by their protest demonstrations against Gomulka's suppression of *Po Prostu* in October 1957.

The March 2, 1958 issue of the Wroclaw paper *Gazeta Robotnicza* published the results of a poll conducted among law school students at Wroclaw University in December 1957. The findings were alleged to be typical of Polish university youth since this is one of the main student centers in Poland.

The majority of the students questioned "confirmed the widespread idea of a lack of ideals among the university youth," said the paper. A few representative answers were quoted: "It is not known which ideal one serves. All of them are false. . ."; "One of the causes of the spread of nihilism is the lack of interest in youth: nobody cares about us."; "Money is the only authority."; "Yes, it is true that youth has no ideals, especially the girls. There is nothing to take the place of Christian ethics."; "The old morality was taken away, and nothing was given to take

its place."; "Life is absurd. The highest ideal is to drink and make love."

The poll indicated that among first-year students there is roughly an equal proportion of "idealists" and "non-idealists," while by the senior year the "non-idealists" are well in the majority.

"Everybody," commented the paper, "who regards the world without glasses will agree that the world of traditional religious ideas is rapidly decaying in the students' circles, and the new ideas do not fill the vacuum. . . . No wonder—especially after the great political and moral shocks of 1956—individualistic nihilism is growing, expressed in a daily shout: everything is bunk!"

Zycie Szkoły Wyzszej, November 1957, attributed the disillusionment of youth to the exposure of the corruption of society under Stalinism and added that "the still strong conviction that there are many unpunished abuses, the daily instances of incompetence in liquidating these abuses, do not contribute to the improvement of the morality of

Lublin Catholic University

AMONG THE INSTITUTIONS of higher learning in Poland, the Catholic University (KUL) of Lublin is unique. This University, which celebrated its 40th anniversary in September 1957, is the only independent university in Poland and the only institution of its type in the entire Soviet bloc. It is supported entirely by public contributions. It is financed by the Association of Friends of KUL, which, according to *Tygodnik Powszechny* (Warsaw), No. 14, 1958, numbers over 90,000 members. In addition to this association's support, collections are conducted in churches throughout Poland.

The program of studies as well as individual departments, chairs and courses are subject to the approval of the Ministry of Higher Education. Otherwise it acts independently and exercises full self-government. Student candidates seeking admission are not subject to the Party-dominated city and county selection committees but apply directly to the University. The University provides student board and lodgings and grants scholarships.

The University has three major Departments: Theology, Humanities, and Philosophy. At the School of Humanities the student can study: (a) Polish, English, French, German and the classical languages; (b) history and history of art. At the School of Philosophy he may choose one of the following courses: (a) history of philosophy; (b) logic, methodology of sciences, theory of knowledge; (c) natural philosophy; (d) psychology; (e) metaphysics and theology; (f) ethics.

In the academic year 1956-57 the University had 181 faculty members and 1,276 students. In 1957-58 there were 221 faculty and 1,507 students, of which 312 were in the School of Theology, 51 in the School

of Canon Law, 385 in the School of Humanities. Last year (June 1957) 68 students completed their studies.

The November 24, 1957 issue of *Tygodnik Powszechny* published a report on the opening of the academic year at KUL on October 10. After naming the dignitaries present at the opening, among them Stefan Cardinal Wyszyński, Primate of Poland (a former student of the University), the Rector, Rev. Dr. Marian Rechowicz spoke of the improved position of the institution under Gomulka. He cited the return to their posts of professors imprisoned and dismissed in the Stalin era. Publishing activity was increased. The School of Theology was expanded. A department of biology and chemistry was created, a Polish General Center of Libraries, Archives and Church Museums was established; work was started on the organization of an ecclesiastical art department and on conservation of historical monuments. There was also a reorganization of the scientific departments and an increase in the number of scientific personnel. The Rector said that no decision was reached on the question of reactivating the Schools of Law and Socio-Economic Sciences and of the Pedagogical Section, which had been dissolved.

The Rector stressed the increase in the University's contacts with foreign institutions. This, he said, was "thanks to the number of visiting foreign professors, as well as to the trips of [our] professors and younger scientific workers who received scholarships from the Ford Foundation, or universities. Scores of students participated in the foreign exchange. The University was also host to a number of leaders of *Polonia* [organization for contact between Poland and the prewar Polish emigres, active mainly in France and the United States] who took an active interest in its life and needs. . . ."



Students in Wroclaw (where there are seven institutions of higher education) at their traditional annual May 15 festival called *Juvenilia*.
Photo from *Poland* (Warsaw), No. 8, 1957

youth." *Sztandar Młodych* (Warsaw), September 30, 1957, said: "When [young people] are told that they should not 'think with their spleen,' that they should understand the interests of the working class and of the nation as a whole . . . they reply bluntly that it is a matter of the interests of the thievish Kowalski family or of some Michaluk clique. [State functionaries convicted of swindling State funds.] "Socialism is bunk!"—they shout—"Imbeciles and thieves are governing everywhere!"

A more positive note was struck in *Tygodnik Demokratyczny* (Warsaw), October 9-15, 1957. "Six months ago one of the publications conducted a poll among university youth," the paper reported. "The editors wanted to find out what are the leading ideals of the future engineers, veterinarians, philosophers of our society. The results took the poll-takers by surprise. They found that the traditional Polish ideology of Sienkiewicz—"God and country"—still has a mighty influence."

Summary

HIGHER EDUCATION under Communist control in Eastern Europe has been plagued with contradictions, and now, with the introduction of "polytechnicism," is taking a definite anti-academic and anti-intellectual direction. The new program will not only reduce access to the higher professions but also the concentration of young people in the universities, thus diluting their force as an irritant in the body politic. Meanwhile, the question of how to reconcile academic and scientific achievement with ideological thought-control continues to fascinate the Polish "liberals," but has been carefully laid aside throughout the rest of the bloc in the interest of conformism. The record of the past three years thus indicates that the problems of higher education in the Soviet bloc will continue to be profound.

Latest News

New Polish Education Bill

A NEW STATUTE on higher education, confirming the reforms carried out in 1956, was passed by the Sejm in its November 1958 session. The basic premises of the bill, according to *Nowa Kultura*, October 12, 1958, are first, that the schools of higher learning must take a part in the "construction of Socialism" in Poland and, second, that freedom of research, discussion and science be secured—the latter premise being qualified by the former. Criticizing "excessive reactions to the past limitations" at the universities, *Nowa Kultura* declared that "there has never been a social system which permitted freedom of science in State educational institutions to undermine the principles of its existence." Citing instances, the paper said that for example "it is not good if, while doing away with an exaggerated and vulgar political [emphasis], the scientifically valuable aspect of the departments of [Marxism-Leninism] is also destroyed. Nor is it good if, in reaction to the excessive hegemony of the Party organization in universities, its existence is completely disregarded."

Khrushchev Program Reactions

The Khrushchev educational theses were hailed in Bulgaria and Hungary, which had already taken steps to introduce polytechnicism. Bulgarian Party Secretary Todor Zhivkov told the Seventh Party Congress that Bulgaria would follow the Soviet model and all middle school students would prepare for jobs in production: "They must know that after graduating from school only one road lies before them—work" (*Vecherni Novini*, October 7, 1958).

Current Trends in Czechoslovak Culture

It has been generally noted that there has been no parallel in Czechoslovak literature and art to the explosive, highly political ferment which, starting around 1955, took place in Hungary (until the Revolt) and in Poland. In those countries writers and artists were in the forefront of the tumultuous forces that led to political upheaval; in Czechoslovakia there was no tumult and no upheaval. To a degree, of course, this was due to the more repressive nature of the Czechoslovak regime. It was also, as this article points out, a result of the relative political disenchantment and lack of interest in Czechoslovakia. However, a closer look at the situation reveals that there are forces in Czechoslovak culture operating against the official Communist dogma of what art should be and what it should do. Some of these forces are involved with Slovak resentment at Czech domination, but they are equally apparent in Czech literature and art. In refusing to follow the restrictive demands of "Socialist realism," in insisting on breathing the winds of artistic experiment borne from the West, Czech artists—particularly the young poets and painters—are quietly attempting to go their own way. This article includes translations of six poems by young Czechoslovak poets. The illustrations, from official publications, show representative work being done in the fine arts.

A YOUNG MAN with two university degrees who escaped from Czechoslovakia last year was asked about the state of Czechoslovak literature and art. He made an interesting point in explaining the virtual absence of "revisionist" tendencies in the intellectual life of the country. "We may presume," he said, "that intense revisionism implies the intensity and vitality of Communism. The Protestant Reformation was successful wherever religious feelings were real and religion meaningful, and failed where religion had become just a matter of formal Church membership. Similarly, the reformation of Communism—revisionism—has been moving ahead primarily in countries where the Communists themselves still conceive of Communism as a live ideological program." "It follows logically," he concluded, "and experience testifies, that in the Satellite countries where revisionism did not set roots of any significance, most particularly in Czechoslovakia, Communism as a doctrine is dead even for the Communists."

Whether the parallel with the Reformation is a happy one or not, one point is apparent. The contents of the Czech and Slovak literary magazines and publications confirm the fact that Communism as an inspirational ideology, as a driving force in the field of arts and as a messianic social ideal for the intellectuals is indeed dead. As far as the general public is concerned, it is preoccupied almost exclusively with the practical social and material consequences of the Communist order—a psychological phe-

nomenon frequently stressed by foreign correspondents reporting the "materialistic interests" of the Czechoslovak people. In a country where a prewar democracy made people think of political ideologies in terms of relative values, even the "absolute" doctrine of Communism is limited to only a partial influence—mainly in the economic sphere.

In the field of culture we observe the same phenomenon. There is a general apathy toward new ideological proclamations. With the exception of some Party professionals who publish lengthy articles on the meaning of "cultural revolution in the period of the completion of Socialism," hardly anyone takes notice of them. This is a state of affairs that has not changed much since the beginning of the "de-Stalinization" period after the Soviet Twentieth Party Congress in February 1956. In June 1957, the Czechoslovak Party Central Committee made this complaint about the situation:

"In our arguments and conflicts with some writers and intellectuals, the issue is primarily to make clear certain political and ideological questions; such questions as their relation to the Communist Party and its policy, their relation to the USSR and Czechoslovak-Soviet friendship, (the writers') relation to the dictatorship of the proletariat, their view of freedom in a Socialist democracy, their attitude toward our condemnation of bourgeois, liberal views, to our evaluation of the Fall [1956] developments in Hungary [i.e., the Revolt], their attitude toward our fight against revisionism, etc. . . . And it is relevant that



Houses in Winter, by Vlastimil Benes; oil, 1957.

Vytvarne Umeni (Prague), No. 7, 1957

various writers agree on incorrect views in these matters regardless of which creative trend they belong to. . . . The Czechoslovak Writers' Union cultivates some sort of a silent and wary unity of writers." (*Rude Pravo*, June 20, 1957.)

The Party requires a twofold loyalty from artists and intellectuals: that they identify themselves with the views of the Party Politburo and that they create "Socialist-realist" works. The dilemma of the regime is that it has the power to forbid certain trends and tendencies but cannot order the writers and artists to create. Many prominent authors have not written a single novel for a long time—they make their living by producing books for children, historical stories, translations, etc. The Party can have a truly "Socialist-realist" art only if it is prepared for a nearly complete lack of art. One of the foremost regime theoreticians, Moscow-trained Radegast Parolek, therefore made an attempt to broaden the meaning of Socialist realism in art and literature. In his article published in *Nova Mysl* (Prague), August 1958, he first laboriously analyzed the concepts of realism and Socialist realism only to find an escape in quoting Chinese cultural theses from *Jenmin Jihpao* (Peiping) of June 13, 1956: "Thus most diversified individualities and schools of art come into be-

ing—the hundred flowers which are all good, as long as they fight naturalism . . . pure art and formalism . . . as long as they do not claim exclusiveness and do not contradict each other in a sectarian manner, and as long as they all serve the people."

This definition is so broad that it is almost meaningless as an ideological directive. Parolek also asserted that all the following concepts of art "may equally well be utilized in the fight for Socialism": "On one side realistic themes taken from life itself, on the other side imaginative, allegorical, symbolic and supranatural thematic pictures." It seems that the regime is trying to find an all-embracing formula to break its isolation from the creative intelligentsia.

If this implies that the regime is fully aware of the constraints of its position, writers and artists also exhibit a certain self-restraint. Authors whose names appear in "official" cultural life seem to be professing a "Socialist" platform. Their only alternative is to be ostracized. However, if we look closely at their works, we find this "Socialist" platform to be of a peculiar nature. Most works show tendencies which have at one time or other been "passed" as tolerable but not exactly desirable.

The Young Poets

AMONG THE younger generation of poets there is a very strong group of neo-realists creating so called "everyday poetry." They are concerned with the "common man," with the anonymous little wheel in the huge, impersonal machinery of "Socialism." They are turning out to be a new avant-garde which takes up the cause of the ordinary individual against the impersonal society with almost the same force that proletarian poetry claimed to exert during the "capitalist era." A few samples to illustrate the point:

A young poet, Milos Macourek, writes of a traveler who asks for a ticket to "some place where one lives easily, just without worries"; when denied this "the traveler would weep bitterly, disappointed and deceived by words and pictures full of joy and singing, full of flags and exaltation."

Similarly, Karel Siktanc communicates in his "Letter with No Address" with those who share the burden of the day: "I know, I know those sunny mornings. . . . Evenings follow in their footsteps in whose serenity an old violin in the back of a closet suddenly bursts into tears." And adds: "I would just like to say that you are not alone. Sometimes, this is enough."

The poets of "everyday things" seem to be hypnotized by the monotony of the drab round of life, from which there is apparently no escape. "We carried away the phonograph with a sad song," begins Milos Macourek's "Bazaar," and ends with the verse: "We put in the phonograph with the sad song."

Reading this poetry we find bitter phrases and expressions: "everyday execution," "everyday, windswept desert," "two windows high up shrivel over a balcony—dark and empty as if after a weep of despair—fear pulled down the blinds."

Other trends have also been introduced into Czech poetry in recent years, of which at least one should be mentioned. In 1957, a collection called "Monologues," by Milan Kundera, created a sensation. These are pure love poetry, which is, however, very sensitive to the realities of a "Socialist society." Poems on marital conflicts caused by husbands being away from home at Party meetings, intimate verses about a wife consoling her husband denounced by an informer, a set of lyrical pictures of an Army recruit who shoots himself because he is denied a pass to see his young wife, etc.

There are several dozens of these young poets, many of whom contribute only to provincial papers and magazines. Hardly any of them can be regarded as a true protagonist of the typical regime line. It is a generation which a Czech critic described as one that "demands the rights of personal experience and the necessity of personal cognition; one that wants to see how a stone falls to the ground, not just know what Aristotle thought on that subject." (*Novy Zivot* [Prague], July, 1957.)

Some critics have done much to help the young writers. The first and most thorough reviews of crucially important books published after the "liberalizing" Twentieth Soviet Party Congress were written by young critics who gave the necessary push and backing against the ideological uproar



Still Life, by Andrej Barcik; pastel, 1957.

Vytvarny Zivot (Bratislava), No. 4, 1958

of the Stalinists. They also formulated concepts of art which have recently become targets of Party criticism. The 1957 New Year's editorial of *Novy Zivot*, the Prague monthly of the Czechoslovak Writers' Union, said: "And it is precisely life itself and its greatest creation—living man—which force their way into art like a mighty wind knocking over idols and breaking artificially-constructed props, doing away with the transient, the sickly and the fake. Away with the dead a-priori constructions, away with the wiseacre conventions, with the spinning wheel of types and situations—closer to the individuality, homogeneity and integrity, richness and pageantry of life. To this art, a man is no longer a means to prove a thesis, men are no longer mere material for ideological procedures."

It is surprising that it took the regime so long to sense this writer-critic alliance. In an article entitled "Helping the Propagandists and Agitators," the Party monthly *Zivot Strany* (Prague) No. 15, August 1958, made this point on the tasks of the "Socialist cultural revolution": "We must not overlook the manifestations of liberalism and unprincipled indulgence that appear in critical reviews of art, in editorial policies."

Conflict in the Fine Arts

THE CONFLICT between the "passable" and "desirable" ways of artistic creation burst open in the field of fine arts, in painting particularly. First, several exhibitions were held in major Czechoslovak cities showing the paintings of the Czech modernists, previously banned from exhibition halls and galleries. The range of styles, including surrealism and cubism, served immediately as an attractive source of inspiration for younger painters. A group of them called "Maj (May) 1957" got together and announced a program for the development of modern styles—both foreign and domestic, continuing particularly in the footsteps of Czech modernists.

How representative is this trend was confirmed by the illustrated weekly *Kvety* (Prague), July 3, 1958, which announced that "the exhibits of the group 'Maj 1957' will be shipped to Poland to represent our contemporary art." Yet the magazine voiced this criticism: "The group had . . . its second exhibition of paintings this year. . . . With the exception of Miss Cermakova, they are all convinced that there is only one way to new art, namely, through the old bourgeois 'modern' art. Not one of the exhibitors pays attention to the present world and what is going on around him. They live in their own 'realm of art' back in the past and create their works on gleanings collected from old and new Western art magazines. . . ."

Rude Pravo, May 25, 1958, called this an exhibition "to manifest so-called creative freedom" because some young people thought "we [the regime] infringed upon their freedom." The same paper, June 5, 1958, complained that: "A notorious means of confusing young artists is the uncritical propagation of abstract works of Western fine arts." And a week later *Rude Pravo* commented on a Brno exhibition of 480 young painters and sculptors: "This exhibition . . . does not manifest the new life, the breadth and depth of the new life around us, but to a large extent is an escape from realism. . . ."



Girl Student, by Peter Matejka; oil, 1956.
Výtvarný Život (Bratislava), No. 3, 1958

"The Right to Err"

I VAN MOJIK, a Slovak writer, demanded the right to experiment and be wrong, in an article on "modernism," *Kulturný Život* (Bratislava), July 5, 1958:

"Although it is a fact that the new literature has no exact definition of modernism, I do not see anything tragic in that. It is an 'emotional protest,' or, as it looks to me, an instinctive motion of youthful literature which rebels justly. . . . The right to err. . . . Pity, we are granted this right only reluctantly and on the condition that after all our errors we return to the correct road. This is a vain condition—we have to take for granted the fact that some writers will be hopelessly lost, that they will drift away. Such is the logic of development, the logic of search, the logic of truth. If we knew in the beginning of every search what the results were to be, all search would become unnecessary."

Private Clubs

THE NOVEL institution of private "circles" or clubs has much to do with the new ideas penetrating into the Czechoslovak intellectual atmosphere. They are small groups of people with a common interest in art, philosophy, or the social or physical sciences, and a major objective of these circles is to gather all available information on what is happening abroad, particularly in the West, in their field of interest. As a rule, these circles meet as small private groups, but not on a mere social basis. As one of the members said about his "philosophical circle," they used to work very intensively: themes were selected and assigned, members worked on them using all available sources of information, papers were read at meetings and were followed with discussion. "We worked in the most efficient way, there was a strict division of work."

A young poet from central Czechoslovakia reported the existence of a literary club "Kruh" (Circle) with some 25 members. These young writers lived in different cities and communicated by mail, exchanging their work, commenting on its literary value and giving tips where good books by banned authors could be found.

A similar group was reported from Prague. An outsider said he was in touch with a "well organized group of young writers. They meet together to discuss various problems, particularly modern art and literature. They even founded an 'underground' art society." Parallel activities were described by an art student who escaped from Prague only last August.

The existence of another type of club had been confirmed at an earlier date. In the Spring of 1957, a "Jazz Club" was founded in Prague and a little later one in Brno. These small associations, however, operate in public. Originally the Jazz Club membership was limited to professional jazz musicians; the public interest was, however, so great that jazz-lovers were admitted. To underline the spon-

taneous character of these "circles," it should be stated that in Prague a whole theatre was founded by young enthusiasts—the Theatre of Poetry. The group had been struggling with technical and financial difficulties for quite some time before it was recognized both by the public and the regime.

The most dynamic element in Czechoslovak intellectual and artistic life is naturally the new generation. What is their philosophy? In their poetry, it is surprising how often themes of non-erotic love are treated: desire for sympathy, for a human relationship. It might be exaggerated to say that these writers believe in an "innate good" in man, but this is an impression that increasingly forces itself through the poems of surface despair.

Also, this poetry displays some political features. The intellectuals seem genuinely concerned over the possibility of a world conflict involving A and H bombs. As opposed to the professionals in Party Secretariats, they do not want to conquer, they shun a total conflict. It has been speculated that it is just this possibility of the material destruction of the world that makes them revise the "Socialist ideology" of the class struggle (note the "neutralistic" Party

program of the Yugoslav Communists) in terms of hope for a brotherhood of mankind.

Rude Pravo confirmed these tendencies among young Czech intellectuals in an article on September 21, 1958. Commenting on the philosophy of youthful poetry, the paper said: "The 'common' man enters into it as a social outcast, as an individual forgotten by society, burdened with his private grief and worries, full of feelings of injustice and humiliation. . . . What is the meaning of this? To get men closer together. 'A desire not to be a shipwreck,' hope that 'the world crosses the big crossroad without disaster.' . . . All this is characteristic enough. Characteristic of . . . an ideology which penetrates through a section of our youthful art and which could be called an ideology of 'cosmopolitan humanism' peculiar also to a considerable segment of the intelligentsia in the bourgeois world. . . . If this is a concept of so-called bourgeois literary avant-gardism, it is by no means a world concept of Socialist art. . . . The feeling of some sort of a 'humanity standpoint' leading at the same time to an 'above any Party' attitude may, especially in our conditions, only contradict the true path of Socialist art."

* * *

Six Czechoslovak Poems

Such a Time

by Milan Uhde

WOMEN,
snuggled close to the girders of their balconies
on that evening
shaken down from raven's wings,
give a long stare at the stars
as if expecting something,

women,
bowed eternally under some wing,
under eagle's wing of someone's words,
under vulture's wing
of a cracked ceiling
of their everyday windswept desert. . . .

Caravans pull through it
and drink the azure of the horizon—
hence the perpetual thirst
of horizon drinkers,
but also the horror of those who went astray
when in the evening
with a sigh: At last!
they arrive where they started from in the morning.


At such a time

tired caravans
sink in the sand,
they have no wish
but for long, long sleep—
and die slowly
by the law of the desert.

At such a time
just to raise one's head a little
would be too much, too much—
and men with their faces on spilled tables
feel it.

At such a time
only women step out on their balconies,
press to the girders,
as if something were to happen,
as if the bars were to crack open,
the sky to split
the earth to burst open,
as if someone was still to come,
someone handsome,
the only one. . . .

At such a time as never before they feel
the sweet emptiness
under their heart
under the heart. . . .



Repose, by Stanislav Kolibal; gypsum, 1957.
Výtvarne Umeni (Prague), No. 10, 1957

The stars fall down
 and a silent affectionate whisper
 alights gently on the backyards
 and gives the night its wings
 as it moves to the dawn.

Bazaar

by Milos Macourek

WE CARRIED away the phonograph with a sad song
 and put in a hat and a red tie
 We carried away the hat and the red tie
 and put in joyful thoughts
 We carried away the joyful thoughts
 and put in two sparkling girlish eyes
 We carried away the two sparkling girlish eyes
 and put in a desire
 We carried away the desire
 and put in love
 We carried away love
 and put in worries
 We carried away the worries

and put in reproaches
 We carried away reproaches
 and put in the phonograph with a sad song.

Walkers

by Milan Uhde

THEY GO and go,
 rounded-up and knotted-in
 by the collar of their everyday shirt,
 almost iron-like
 in that habit:
 to hold them fast
 and grip below throat.

Here they march them,
 Here they march them,
 somewhere whistles the ashen wind,
 the treacherous wind of the brigands.

But since a man has always
 some soil under his feet,
 they go and go,

forged up and in chains,
 hence the straight, even footprints
 of the *burlaks** of the streets
 of those condemned
 to the bleached dawn of today,
 which just tries to pull over them
 its clothing.

Perhaps this is yet to come:
 to strip the throat naked
 under the glittering knife-edge of the morning light—
 perhaps the last wish is yet to come—
 to chew up hastily
 one's belated mouthful

when so near
 one hears the familiar bells
 as the dark, hungry gates
 of street cars and factories
 open

greedy to get theirs.

After days, nights come,
 after nights come days.

But since a man has always
 some soil under his feet,
 so just for a little step,
 for a footprint,
 for a little footprint named: Hope,

they go again
 and again they perform their story,
 singers so patient,
 as if a step
 were only a slightly different song—

* Russian; a man who hauls river-barges with ropes.

harder,
always harder
by its immortality
in this everyday execution.

The Principles of a Shrewd Canary

by Milos Macourek

MAIN thing is
to get the time right
when to sing
Not to sing in the morning when the master shaves
because the master
sings himself
Further,
to know what to sing
Not to sing just anything
that comes to your mind
sing only what is proper
for a canary
a canary in a cage
To warble, to sing lightly
and clearly
not to sing about the cage
but rather sing about the hempseed
Not to think selfishly only of your self
but sing about dried ephemera
on behalf of golden fish in the aquarium
which cannot sing
because they are
as is known,
dumb

Thus to sing in the most joyous way
in the most mellow way
and not to turn around
either to the blue air
or to red flowers in the window
or to the Sun

An Everyday Ode

by Miroslav Florian

OH, THINGS that no one likes
but which we all need all the time,
the water pipe, stairs to the doctor, train seat,
things, touched by cool and absent-minded looks,
no, do not blush,
you are more beautiful than Venetian mirrors and chased
silver. . . .

I do not know how to tell you tender words you do not
ask for;
like women, who pour soup in a quick-lunch,
like men who sweep the streets at daybreak,
like all those who often are not worth a glance to us
and who we lean against like bird against air, which is
everywhere,
like a house against the earth, which is everywhere,
like life against love, which is everywhere.

The Dog in The Street

by Rudolf Skukalek

THIS is the dog that left its lord
beaten, bloodstained, derelict . . .
Everyone hunts it away from his door
enraged shouts hurl curses after it.

Haunted by horror of dreamless nights
avoiding the anger of imbeciles
it drifts past thresholds, tail down
and blood of hatred in its eyes.

It can't stand the look of conceited men
and dogs who have their bone and kennel.
Whenever it likes, it's free to bark,
its soul in pain but proud.

Nowhere's the rest this dog can find
neither any hands to caress . . .
This dog astray, that is I.
The dog that left the right way.

And, perhaps, I am no lame dog,
I'm just a man who's somewhat sick.
Though, like him I've no place to go
Around me all the padlocks click.

I wait for a door to open somewhere
like a dog is doing, that's gone astray.
If any love in the world should flare
among people it would quickly die away.

When my dog's doomsday comes
I'll creep into a ditch somewhere—
till then I'll bear the beating
and always bark at men.

I'll be howling in the night
in sleepers' dreams with tearing voice.
This beaten puppy, that is I.
I am that dog. I am. I am.

Sources: "Such a Time," from *Novy Zivot* (Prague), June 1957. "Bazaar," from *Novy Zivot*, September 1957. "Walkers," from *Novy Zivot*, June 1957. "The Principles of a Shrewd Canary," from *Novy Zivot*, September 1957. "An Everyday Ode," from *Literarni Noviny* (Prague), June 23, 1956. "The Dog in the Street," from *Mlada Tvorba* (Bratislava), March 1957.



This blood-curdling picture from Communist China appeared in the Soviet periodical *Druzhba* (Moscow), No. 41, October, 1958. It was entitled "Agitators at their Posts," and apparently shows women Party agitators exhorting workers to greater efforts. There was no further explanation, however, of what nightmare task is being attempted under these shrieking furies in the mud. It is perhaps in emulation of such activity that the Bulgarian Party leader ordered functionaries to labor manually, demanding they "step a little into mud."

Current Developments

AREA

Yugoslavia: "Distribution of Roles"

There is now a carefully-planned "distribution of roles" among the participants in the anti-Yugoslav campaign, according to repeated assertions in the press of the beleaguered country. Initially, the Soviet Union keynoted the offensive on general ideological grounds; then Communist China came to the foreground with vituperative—and still continuing—attacks on the Yugoslav leadership, State and system; during the summer Bulgaria and Albania—in a transparent effort to compromise the Tito government before the "uncommitted" formerly colonial countries—began their series of denunciations of Yugoslav "imperialism" and "mistreatment" of minorities. Meanwhile, the Hungarians renewed charges of Yugoslav complicity in the October 1956 Revolt, and the Romanians reacted angrily at revelations by Yugoslav correspondents of a new wave of repres-

sion in the Satellite country. More recently, the Czechoslovak regime has moved to the van of the attack with allegations of the "failure" of Yugoslavia's comparatively uncollectivized agricultural system.

This "role distribution"—especially after the Poles, belatedly and less vigorously, joined the chorus—was doubtless calculated to show that the entire "Socialist world," not just the Soviet Union, was united in antagonism to the Yugoslavs. The latter responded directly to the most important attacks and noted them all. For example, the October 17 edition of *Borba* (Belgrade) stated that "in the last five months alone, the radio announcers of Moscow, Sofia, Tirana, Prague, Bucharest, and Budapest have read over 700 different anti-Yugoslav articles and speeches." The Skopje daily, *Nova Makedonija*, October 20, averred that "more than 670 anti-Yugoslav articles have appeared in China, the USSR and other East European countries." The journal added that the Chinese press was "first in the number of anti-Yugoslav articles, followed by the USSR, Albania, Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia [Romania and Poland

were not mentioned].” Despite these conscientious “acknowledgements,” the Yugoslavs remained undeceived as to the central direction of the campaign:

“Since the USSR is the most significant and influential country of the Socialist world, it is inevitable that in the eyes of the Yugoslav people and of world opinion the greatest responsibility for such manifestations [i.e. the anti-Yugoslav campaign] should fall precisely on the Soviet Union.” (*Borba* [Belgrade], November 6.)

Prague Hits Yugoslav Agriculture

The most concerted attack—and the first important one—on Yugoslavia’s by-and-large uncollectivized agriculture was published by the Czechoslovak Party organ *Rude Pravo* (Prague), October 8. The article charged the Yugoslav farm cooperatives with “deficiencies in selling grain and . . . with maintaining capitalism in the village, while consciously waging a struggle against Socialization of the countryside.” *Rude Pravo* also expressed regret for “the ordinary Yugoslav reader . . . who learns nothing about the real life in our country, about our standard of living which is at an unknown height and in the far distant future for the Yugoslav people.”

This article was answered in the Belgrade Party newspaper, *Politika*, October 10: “Everyone agrees that the living standard of Czechoslovakia is presumably higher than in other countries of Eastern Europe, but everyone also agrees that the standard of living in, say, the United States or Sweden, is also high.” The journal concluded that “if formerly Bulgaria and Albania were more active [in the anti-Yugoslav campaign], of late the foremost place has been taken by Czechoslovakia and in particular by *Rude Pravo*.”

A joint Czechoslovak-Romanian declaration (*Rude Pravo*, October 26) contained only one sentence concerning “Yugoslav revisionism,” and a speech in Prague by Romanian Party Chief Gheorghiu-Dej on the preceding day (*Scinteia* [Bucharest], October 26) did not mention the Tito regime at all. Nevertheless both *Borba* and *Politika* attacked the declaration in their October 27 editions as “baseless fabrications” and “misinterpretations of Marxism-Leninism.” These articles were in their turn rebutted by the Romanian Party newspaper *Scinteia*, November 2, as “slandorous comment” and examples of the Tito government’s “pretense” that an anti-Yugoslav campaign existed, when in reality only revisionism was being fought. *Scinteia* also repeated the familiar tactic of differentiating between the Yugoslav people “with their Socialist aspirations” and their leaders.

Gomulka and Kadar

The Polish and Hungarian Party chiefs continued firmly in the anti-Yugoslav camp, but Gomulka was still least antagonistic of the Satellite First Secretaries, and Kadar, though more outspoken, remained relatively restrained. Gomulka’s public statements on Yugoslavia during his visit to the USSR (see Poland, below), were typified by the following quotations from a speech made November 10:

“We believe that the time will come when the Yugo-



A picture of Soviet author Boris Pasternak which accompanied a full page of translations of his poems in the October 9 Polish paper *Przegląd Kulturalny* (Warsaw), some weeks before the storm over Pasternak’s Nobel Prize (see page 38). Among the translators are Adam Wazyk and Mieczyslaw Jastrun, both prominent Polish poets who resigned from the Party last year in protest at limitations of press freedom. The newspaper also announced a forthcoming book of translations of poetry by Pasternak, whose novel “*Dr. Zhivago*” has made him a symbol of the artist struggling for free expression under Communist dictatorship. According to *Tworczosc* (Warsaw), Sept. 1957, the Polish quarterly *Opinie* last year printed excerpts from “*Dr. Zhivago*,” which is, of course, banned in the USSR.

slav Communists and Socialist Yugoslavia will again take their place in the fraternal family of Socialist countries as well as of Communist and Workers’ Parties. Nevertheless, the initiative in this respect must come from the Yugoslav Communists. We do not preclude the possibility that the League of Communists of Yugoslavia will sooner or later abandon the false road followed at present. Life will always show Communists what is good and what is harmful to Socialism. . . . We want to develop trade relations with Yugoslavia.” (Radio Moscow, November 10.)

In the same speech Gomulka revealed that the Poles had tried to act as mediators in the dispute, before it flared into the open last Spring. He said that two Polish Politburo members (unnamed) went to Belgrade in an attempt to “divert the Yugoslav comrades from the false revisionist path” and to register the Polish “critical point of view on the most blatant formulations contained in the draft program [of the Yugoslav Communist League].”

Current Developments—Area

On October 15, speaking in Budapest, Kadar made the following comments:

"The Yugoslavs today express their intention of improving relations between our countries. We want the same thing, and we hope that good neighborly relations will develop between us. Yet if there are people in Yugoslavia who believe that such an improvement in our relations can really be brought about while their press is heaping insults upon the Soviet Union, Romania, Bulgaria and Albania, they are grossly mistaken. Our Yugoslav comrades must comprehend that in ideological or fundamental questions of international politics, there exists not the slightest difference in the viewpoint of the Soviet Union, the Chinese People's Republic, Bulgaria, Albania, Romania, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary [but not Poland—Ed.]" (*Nepszabadsag* [Budapest], October 16.)

On November 14, *Borba* openly rebutted Gomulka, calling attention to the "evolution" of the Polish Party chief's views on the Yugoslav Party program. *Borba* stated that when the program was first drafted, "the Polish comrades objected only to some of its views and were far from qualifying even these as revisionist." The journal also averred that "the fact that the program does not agree with the attitudes and concepts of Gomulka and others is not in itself proof that it is non-Marxist." This was the first lengthy and heated reply to the Poles by a Yugoslav Party organ and may presage a worsening of relations between the two countries.

There was also a quick Yugoslav response to Kadar. *Borba*, October 19, asked "who is 'heaping insults' . . . who is resorting to aspersion?" Some of the more intemperate assertions of the Bulgarian and Albanian regimes during the past months were then quoted.

Polemics with Bulgaria, Albania

On October 17, the Yugoslav Foreign Ministry announced that a protest had been lodged with the East German envoy in Belgrade because of "the unprincipled attacks made on Yugoslavia in a joint declaration between Bulgaria and East Germany." The protest condemned "the nationalist-chauvinistic campaign against the peoples and government of Yugoslavia." (Radio Belgrade, October 17.) This declaration, printed in *Rabotnichesko Delo*, October 12, had been made at the close of a visit to Bulgaria by East German Party boss Ulbricht and Premier Grotewohl.

The Bulgarian-Yugoslav quarrel over the treatment of the "Macedonian minorities" in both countries continued as before. (For previous details see *East Europe*, November, 1958, pages 28-30.) Lubco Arsov, Yugoslav Chairman of the Macedonian Executive Council, charged that the "leaders of the Communist Parties in Bulgaria and Albania [which also continued its accusations that Albanian minorities in the Kosovo were mistreated by the Tito regime] indulged in hegemonist-egotist, nationalist and chauvinist conceptions as a natural product of bureaucracy." (Radio Belgrade, October 10.) Arsov added that this course was "an open threat to peace among the nations."

The Bulgarian regime, of course, remained unswayed by Yugoslav counterattacks. On November 2, Party boss

Todor Zhivkov (in an interview with the Hungarian Party newspaper *Nepszabadsag*) called for "even more aggressive propaganda" against "Yugoslav revisionism."

On October 26, *Politika* strongly denounced the persecution of writers—in Bulgaria. Bozho Bulatovic, a Yugoslav writer and critic, defended the Bulgarian poet, Vyta Rakovsky, who had been attacked for "subjectivism" and lack of "Socialist realism" in *Literaturen Front* (Sofia), July 1958. *Politika* characterized the Bulgarian criticism as similar to a "wartime court-martial . . . without either trial or jury."

The official Albanian diatribes against Yugoslavia were handled for the most part by Premier Mehmet Shehu who called the Tito government's policies "the most striking and concrete expression of the influences of bourgeois imperialism in the ranks of the world Communist movement . . . and the world center of Trotskyism and revisionism." (*Zeri i Popullit* [Tirana], November 7.) On October 26 the same newspaper quoted Shehu bemoaning the "persecutions" of Albanians in Yugoslavia: "We raise our voices to the skies against the atrocious activities of the enslaving and bloody Tito regime against our Albanian brothers in Yugoslavia."

On October 18 *Nova Makedonija* labeled as "slanderous" another Shehu speech in which the Albanian Premier had said that, were it not for the Soviet Union, "Albania today would be an ordinary province of Tito's Yugoslavia."

The October 21 edition of *Borba* stated that Yugoslav diplomats in Albania were "watched day and night." In a passage which again hinted a possible rupture in diplomatic relations at some future date, the Yugoslav Party newspaper said that Albanian authorities "have made it impossible for the Yugoslav legation to carry out its normal activities." The journal also charged that "wives of Yugoslav legation personnel have been insulted by utterly vulgar gestures on the part of Albanian policemen."

There was further Yugoslav-Albanian quarreling over Axel Larsen, former head of the Danish Communist Party, who was recently purged for "revisionism." Radio Tirana, October 30, attacked Larsen as a "Titoist revisionist," and Radio Zagreb, November 3, defended him as a victim of "Stalinism."

Off-again, On-again Wheat Deliveries

On October 20, Radio Moscow announced that a Soviet-Yugoslav agreement had been signed in Moscow under which the USSR would send 200,000 tons of wheat from the 1958 harvest to Yugoslavia. Apparently this was the resolution of a series of Soviet advances and retreats on delivery of the wheat which had been promised before the outbreak of the anti-Yugoslav campaign last Spring. Previously, on August 24, *Borba* charged that the Soviets had refused to carry out their end of this "previously arranged" deal. There was no USSR public response until September 26, when a Soviet commercial attache in Rome was reported to have said that the deliveries would take place. On the same day the Italian Communist Party organ, *Unità* (Rome), also declared that the suspension which had been caused by "unexpected technical difficulties" had been revoked. In a statement, October 10, disregarded by the

Current Developments—Area

Yugoslav press and radio, a Yugoslav spokesman said that the Soviets had decided to send the wheat. Six days later *Izvestia* (Moscow) charged that the Yugoslavs were concealing the "truth" that the USSR was about to ship the wheat. *Borba* responded on October 18 by quoting a series of letters between the two governments which, according to the Yugoslav Party journal, revealed the Soviet "delaying tactics." *Borba* stated that "when the wheat from the Soviet Union is in Yugoslavia, we shall gladly give it prominent coverage." Two days later the "final" announcement was made.

Another point at issue between the two countries has been the question of wartime "liberation." The Yugoslav position is that there have been only three successful Communist revolutions, the Soviet, the Chinese and their own. During the previous anti-Tito campaign inaugurated by Stalin, the USSR propaganda apparatus categorically denied that there had been a Yugoslav revolution brought about by a Yugoslav "people's liberation movement" against the Nazis. The Stalinist thesis was that Yugoslavia had been liberated by the Red Army, just as was the case in the rest of the Satellite area. The Yugoslavs, of course, hotly deny this "interpretation" of history. But since the outbreak of the second anti-Yugoslav campaign, they have again been forced to defend their own "self-liberation," although the present Soviet position does not completely discount the "Yugoslav Revolution," as Stalin's did. Instead, the USSR now claims a "partnership," which the Yugoslavs will not acknowledge. The Soviet stand was indicated by the wording of an *Izvestia* article on the 14th anniversary of the liberation of Belgrade, October 20: "Moscow marked this great victory of the Soviet Army, which was achieved in military cooperation with the fighters of the National Liberation Army and the partisans of Yugoslavia."

The Yugoslav position on the liberation was outlined in the Zagreb newspaper, *Vjesnik*, October 26, which averred that the "fight for freedom began long before the Soviet troops arrived." The journal also stated that the USSR has "consciously and directly perverted historical reality by claiming that the liberation of Yugoslavia began only with the Red Army's arrival at the Yugoslav frontiers."

Khrushchev Speech

On November 10, Soviet boss Khrushchev again laid down the Soviet line on Yugoslavia. With Polish Party chief Gomulka among his listeners, Khrushchev made it clear that—for the present at least—the anti-Yugoslav campaign would be conducted against the Party and its policies, not against the country as a whole, as was the case in 1948. Khrushchev said:

"We have already stated more than once that we highly value the past merits of Yugoslavia's Communist Party and peoples, who bore so many sacrifices in the struggle against German and Italian Fascism. In this struggle our peoples fought side by side against the common enemy. Unfortunately Yugoslavia's leaders, the people at the head of the Party, are sliding down from the positions of the working class to the positions of its enemies. For this

reason, one can now hardly count on mutual understanding in our relation with the League of Yugoslav Communists on the Party line, although we would not like to lose all hope of this.

"Along State lines we shall strive to develop friendly relations with Yugoslavia and to expand trade and cultural links. We are ready to continue our trade with Yugoslavia on a mutually advantageous basis. . . . We advocate a broad exchange of different kinds of delegations. . . . Let them see that no one harbors any hatred toward Yugoslavia."

Khrushchev noted then "with satisfaction"—and in contradiction to China's stand on Yugoslavia—that "on many questions in the international sphere our positions frequently coincide [with Yugoslavia's]." But he made it clear that on the question of Party relations no concessions would be made by the Soviet bloc: "As for our difference on ideological questions, we wage and will continue to wage an irreconcilable struggle against the distortion of Marxism-Leninism. In this, all the fraternal Communist and Workers' Parties are united. They see revisionism as the main danger at the present juncture. The struggle against revisionism is a struggle for the purity of our ideas and for the monolithic unity and cohesion of the ranks of the international Communist movement."

In other developments on the Soviet-Yugoslav front the leaders of the two countries exchanged telegrams on the occasion of the 41st anniversary celebration of the Bolshevik Revolution. The Yugoslavs also published the first issue of a magazine called *Socialism*, apparently to answer the new Communist international magazine, *Problems of Peace and Socialism* (Prague), which has featured several strongly anti-Yugoslav articles. In issue Number 1 of *Socialism*, which appeared at the beginning of October, the anti-Yugoslav campaign was denounced, and there were articles against "bureaucratic" Communism and against the Soviet Academy of Sciences for allowing its "scientific authority to be used" for polemics against Yugoslavia.

Another proposed Soviet bloc publication, a "popular Marxist textbook on the history of the international workers' movement" was condemned far in advance of publication (Radio Zagreb, October 15) for its "Stalinist perversions." Publication date for the book is unannounced. Final arrangements for it were made at an East Berlin conference of Soviet and Satellite representatives in early October.

Chinese Seize Seamen

Although Tito and Chinese Party boss Mao Tse-tung exchanged messages "in connection with the Chinese national holiday" (Radio Belgrade, October 20), relations between the two countries continued stormy. On November 5, the Yugoslavs made an official protest to the Chinese government on the arrest and sentencing of two Yugoslav sailors. (Radio Belgrade, November 5.) The seamen were taken on July 13 when Chinese policemen boarded the Yugoslav ship, *Lika*, in Shanghai harbor. According to the Yugoslav protest, "our embassy was not allowed to contact the arrested seamen before the sentencing and was pre-

Current Developments—Area

vented from preparing their legal defense." The men were given jail terms of six and five years; neither the Yugoslav nor the Chinese press gave details on the alleged offenses which appear to have concerned relationships with Chinese girls.

Ambassadors Walk Out

Apparently Yugoslav ambassadors have been given orders to leave any public meeting in Satellite countries, when the speakers begin to disparage their country and its program. The Yugoslav envoy to East Germany walked out of a 41st Anniversary of the October Revolution rally in protest against Premier Otto Grotewohl's attacks. (Radio Belgrade, November 6.) The same action was taken by Yugoslav envoys in Albania and Bulgaria at similar anniversary celebrations featuring similar denunciations of the Tito regime, according to Radio Belgrade, November 7.

There was a change in Yugoslav ambassadors to the Soviet Union, as Veljko Micunovic was replaced by Lazar Moysov. The retiring ambassador was received in a farewell visit, apparently with adequate diplomatic *politesse*, by Soviet President Voroshilov. The new envoy, a Central Committee member and former Director of the Macedonian newspaper, *Nova Makedonija*, is the first Mace-

donian to receive so important a diplomatic assignment. Undoubtedly the appointment will be of value in Tito's polemics with the Bulgarian regime.

Reactions to Chinese Communes

The Satellite press started to publish many stories on the new Communist Chinese Communes,* but the gist of the articles seemed to be: they are fine for the Chinese, but they are not for us. For example, the Warsaw journal *Glos Pracy*, October 10, said: "To observe the progress of the commune movement and to study its experiences will enrich our knowledge of how, in the specific conditions of China, the complicated problems of building a new type of society are solved." The October 21 issue of *Trybuna Ludu* again reiterated the theme of "China's specific conditions" and added: "Only after one has understood this complicated problem in its entirety and placed it in the appropriate socio-historical context is one able to understand the immensity, the spontaneity and the historical significance of the whole process. One can also understand

*Massive super-collectives embracing both peasants and workers in completely regimented organizations.

Marxist Philosopher Gyorgy Lukacs Under Attack

IN RECENT MONTHS, there has been an increasing number of attacks on Gyorgy Lukacs, the world-famous Hungarian Marxist philosopher and critic who sided with Premier Imre Nagy in the 1956 Revolt and was with him treacherously taken prisoner and deported to Romania. Lukacs was later permitted to return to Hungary. Now his name is more and more being linked to the leading current sin of "revisionism" in the Party press of Hungary and other bloc countries, and it is possible that in the area's growingly chill atmosphere of doctrinaire rigidity these attacks portend regime action against the venerable philosopher.

Among the recent outbursts against Lukacs are the following. On October 2, *Gazeta Literara* (Bucharest), the Romanian Writers' Union weekly, carried an article entitled "Revolutionary Perspectives and Revisionist Blunders," which included the statements: "In a labyrinthine speech delivered at the German Writers' Congress, January 1956, G. Lukacs, ostensibly acting against a too-mechanical understanding of perspective [in literature], actually endeavored to set aside [the] fundamental trait of Socialist realism. According to him, the works of Socialist realism can only afford a very 'modest' viewpoint being otherwise endangered by schematism. In Lukacs' petty-bourgeois, defeatist conception, the Socialist viewpoint represents something extremely vague, for Socialism is, in his opinion—we quote—the characteristic of a very long period which stands before the people and their fate like something abstract, like a pure abstraction, like a mere ideal." To term as 'pure abstraction'

what is being achieved by one quarter of the world's population is not only proof of a surprising lack of foresight but is also theoretically false and has very serious consequences."

On October 9, *Tvorba* (Prague), the Czechoslovak Party weekly, castigated its countrymen for failing to fall into the anti-Lukacs campaign: "At a time when Hungarian Party organs are examining the basis of Lukacs' political beliefs and his artistic and aesthetic opinions . . . in our country . . . Lukacs' merits are being emphasized without a word being said about his errors committed in the far and near past. . . . *Novy Zivot* [The Czechoslovak Writers' Union monthly] devotes its whole issue No. 7, 1958, to contemporary Hungarian literature without at all mentioning Lukacs' influence on the Hungarian writers and critics of the Petofi Circle [the Hungarian group which led the pre-Revolt ferment] before October 1956. Behind Lukacs' search for more flexible forms of Party leadership, behind his new explanation of Leninism and behind his revisionism there is hidden a far greater danger. The Hungarian discussion has clearly disclosed that Lukacs' errors cannot be kept in the 'inner' circle of literature, aesthetics and philosophy, but have political importance of an international character."

On October 22, Radio Budapest broadcast a speech by the Deputy President of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, in which Lukacs was not only denounced as "anti-Marxist and revisionist," but also accused of retaining "erroneous conceptions" concerning the "counterrevolution" [i.e., the Revolt].

why it cannot be . . . [Trybuna Ludu ellipsis] copied."

There were similar articles in the press of the other countries, and the Slovak Party organ. *Pravda* (Bratislava), October 25, stated that its editorial office had received many letters asking for "detailed information" on the communes.

Recent developments in two of the most orthodox States, however, may have been more or less influenced by the Chinese example. In Bulgaria there has been an amalgamation of agricultural collectives, coupled with stepped-up labor requirements from their members (see Bulgaria, below), and in Albania the Party Central Committee has called on high Party and regime officials to initiate manual labor projects in which they themselves would take part. (Official Albanian News Agency, November 5.) A similar proposal was made by Bulgarian Party chief Zhivkov at a Central Committee meeting. (*Rabotnichesko Delo*, November 14.) These are the first public recommendations by Party leaders—outside of China—of manual labor for officials.

Yugoslavs Disapprove

Not only did the Yugoslavs reject the notion of communes for their own country, but they made a point of printing assertions that the Chinese didn't want them either. On October 5 *Nova Makedonija* (Skoplje) claimed that "large numbers of Chinese Party members" had voiced their dissatisfaction with Mao's regime and that "in the Spring of 1957" this criticism had "in certain parts of the country taken the form of organized armed revolts in which Party and State leaders were killed." The article also asserted that "750,000 members of the security organs" had been needed to quiet unrest aimed at the Chinese regime. Although this situation existed before the implementation of the commune program, begun last Spring, the same Yugoslav newspaper stated, October 11, that "embittered discussions" had taken place as late as August 1958 in the Chinese Politburo itself. The paper said that "actual terror has been exercised over the Chinese peasantry which has had no time to take its bearings and grasp the whole matter [of the communes]." It was also declared that "the methods applied in implementing this goal [communes] are drastic and have nothing in common with democracy." The newspaper stated that one reason for the entire program might have been "to take advantage of the present Formosa situation and the Chinese situation in general in order to mobilize the masses for political purposes."

Pasternak Denounced

The Satellite press faithfully reprinted Soviet denunciations of Boris Pasternak, who accepted the Nobel Prize for Literature, October 25, and "voluntarily" rejected it four days later. Typical of more or less "original" comment in the various countries was that of the Czechoslovak Party organ *Rude Pravo* (Prague), October 26, which said the award was "a hostile anti-Soviet political act whose goal is to contribute to the cold war against the USSR, against the Soviet order and the ideas of victorious Socialism."

The Bulgarian literary journal, *Literaturny Front* (Sofia), October 30, compared Western admiration for Pas-

"What Choice Do We Have?"

IN BUDAPEST, shortly before the recent single-slate election, the Party newspaper *Nepszava*, October 16, took a fake "poll" as part of its agitation for a unanimous vote. Twenty people of various occupations were asked their opinion on the election; all but one gave "the usual standard answers," as the paper put it, perhaps shocked into frankness by the one man who answered differently. He, a taxi-driver, replied as follows, according to the *Nepszava* account:

"I did not even know," he said, "there is going to be an election." Surprised, we gave him the necessary information, on which he commented: 'I only read the sports news. And anyway, what choice do we have if there is no opposition party? If there isn't any choice there's nothing interesting.'"

ternak with that for the recently defected young Polish writer Marek Hlasko: "Yesterday they were making noise about Hlasko, the Polish writer-hooligan. Today they promote a new prima donna—Boris Pasternak, the inspired individualist, the proud and solitary one, the petit bourgeois ideologist, symbolist and decadent."

The Romanian Party organ said the prize had been awarded at the "suggestion" of the American press, and added that Pasternak's novel, "Dr. Zhivago"—banned in the USSR—was "base" and its author's life was "meaningless." (*Scinteia* [Bucharest], November 2.)

There was no "original" comment on the Pasternak case in Hungary and Poland, although there was complete reportage of the principal Soviet denunciations of the writer. In Poland, Antoni Slonimski, the non-Communist head of the Writers' Union, had telegraphed congratulations to Pasternak on October 25 in the name of the Union, and a window display of the Russian author's books and his photograph appeared in the Warsaw International Press Club, only to disappear on October 27. Previous to the announcement of the award, the Warsaw literary weekly, *Przegląd Kulturalny*, October 9, devoted an entire page to translations of Pasternak's poetry.

There was one peculiar, and perhaps significant, bit of press coverage on the Pasternak affair in Czechoslovakia. The November 1 edition of *Kulturny Zivot* (Bratislava) carried a report of the Moscow diatribes against the author and, on the same page, a description of the proceedings of a mid-October meeting of the Moscow Writers' Union at which Pasternak was not discussed, but at which the main point made was that works of art should not be criticized unless thoroughly read and understood. (The Moscow Writers' Union, reputed to number some 1,000 members, had "unanimously" condemned the book and the writer.) It was also announced on the same page of *Kulturny Zivot* that the criticism which preceded the original Soviet rejection of "Dr. Zhivago" by the editorial board of *Novy Mir* (Moscow) in September 1956—and only recently pub-

* Published in the U.S. by Pantheon Books.

Current Developments—Area

lished in full in the Moscow *Literaturnia Gazeta*—would appear in a forthcoming issue.

Praise in Yugoslavia

Western reports stated that the Zagreb daily *Vjesnik* printed an article calling Pasternak a "great poet" and "undoubtedly one of the most significant living Soviet writers." "Dr. Zhivago" was characterized as the author's "best work," and a point was made that the two Nobel prizes for literature which have been awarded to a "Soviet writer" had gone to "exiles"; Ivan Bunin, an exile in fact, and Pasternak whose work was "more or less in exile." It was rumored that "Dr. Zhivago" might be published in Yugoslavia.

The Bloc and the Vatican

Press treatment of the death of Pope Pius XII and the election of Pope John XXIII varied with the local strength of the Roman Catholic Church. In Poland, where the Church is under attack but retains immense influence and more power than elsewhere in the area, the coverage was wide and the comments restrained. Radio Warsaw even broadcast the new Pontiff's message and blessing, and Cardinal Wyszynski alone among the Cardinals living in Communist countries was permitted to go to Rome.



Soviet bloc comment on the recent French constitutional referendum was almost completely confined to sneers, as in the Czechoslovak example above. Girl to French paratrooper: "And did you get this medal for the referendum in Algeria?" Cartoon, quoted caption from *Rohac* (Bratislava), Oct. 10, 1958

He was accompanied, October 18, by Stanislaw Stomma, the Catholic leader of the Polish Sejm (Parliament) who made the trip in an unofficial capacity.

At the other end of the Communist spectrum, the Bulgarian regime—whose subjects are mostly of the Orthodox Church ran to "political exposés" of the Vatican. On October 30, for example, the Party organ *Rabotnichesko Delo* (Sofia) called Pope John "primarily a political figure" and said that "his policy toward the countries of the Socialist camp will be flexible and hypocritical." The paper characterized his election as a "victory" for that "faction" of the Church which "would continue to interfere in the internal affairs of nations."

A similar comment appeared in the Romanian Party newspaper *Scinteia* (Bucharest), October 25, which called Pius "an implacable defender of the capitalist order" and accused the Catholic clergy in the Communist countries of "repeated spying and subversive actions." The journal also said that "the Vatican is the second financial power in the world after the US."

On October 30 the official Party newspaper of Czechoslovakia, *Rude Pravo* (Prague), stated: "It is obvious that the election of the new Pope can hardly change anything in the totally reactionary function of the Vatican in the contemporary world." Previously Pius XII had been accused of "aiding the Fascists" before World War II and of anti-Communism after the war, but was given "credit" for "speaking out against an atomic holocaust." (Radio Prague, October 9.)

With Church affairs in the news, the Czechoslovak press also took the opportunity of praising the Polish regime for its campaign against the Catholic clergy. A November 4 article in *Mlada Fronta* (Prague) "reviewed" the campaign, endorsed the Gomulka government's position and accused the Church of "violating" the 1956 agreement with the State.

Cardinal Mindszenty Refused Visa

A US request that Hungarian Cardinal Mindszenty—in refuge at the American Embassy since the Revolt—be allowed to attend the Vatican ceremonies was rejected by the regime. In an official statement, the Foreign Ministry said: "Such a procedure would violate [Hungarian and] even international law. Jozsef Mindszenty is a Hungarian citizen who was rightfully sentenced under the laws of the Hungarian People's Republic. . . . The United States has gravely violated the universally accepted provisions of the international code and of diplomatic custom by having offered haven to a Hungarian citizen." (*Nepszabadsag*, Oct. 23.)

Doubtless because of the strength of the Catholic Church throughout the country, the press coverage of the Vatican events was brief, factual and, for the most part, without comment. The only notable exception was the October 26 edition of *Magyar Nemzet* (Budapest), which is officially not a Party organ, but the newspaper of the Patriotic People's Front. The journal stated that "even the sparrows in Rome were whispering that Dulles had conferred with [Italian Premier] Fanfani to decide who the new Pope would be."

POLAND

Delegation to USSR

Headed by Party chief Gomulka, Premier Cyrankiewicz and Politburo member Zawadzki, an eleven-member Polish delegation arrived in the Soviet Union on October 24. When they left, on November 12, the famous Polish "road to Socialism" looked more like an orthodox Communist highway than at any time since Gomulka's rise to power two years previously.

In the speeches of the visitors, in the reports by the Polish press, in the final joint statement signed by the leaders of the two countries, all Soviet foreign policy stands were fully endorsed, the anti-West positions with particular vigor. Concurrently Polish internal differences from the USSR were muted, and indeed the only major one still unassailed at home by the Gomulka regime, agricultural decollectivization, was inferentially disapproved by the Polish leader himself. (For statements on Yugoslavia by the two Party chiefs, see Area.)

The Soviets apparently spared no effort in providing the trappings of "comradeship." Newspapers featured pictures of the Polish leaders, Moscow was decorated with flags and flowers and the main thoroughfare, Gorki Street, sported such signs as: "Heartfelt Greetings to our Polish Friends." At the Moscow airport, Khrushchev greeted Gomulka with a "kiss of friendship." (Two years ago at another airport—when Khrushchev descended on the smaller country for a last-ditch effort to prevent the "liberalizers" from taking power—the Soviet boss asked with a contemptuous gesture toward Gomulka, "Who is this man?" and the Pole answered, "I am the man you kept in jail.")

At their first meeting on the latest journey, Khrushchev said that the "constantly developing friendship" between the two countries "has frustrated the attempts of enemies" to "undermine or weaken" it. (Radio Moscow, October 25.) He added that the USSR and Poland "are marching shoulder to shoulder along the sure path of fraternal co-operation and mutual help." Throughout the visit Khrushchev consistently stressed his high regard for Gomulka's leadership of the Polish Party.

Gomulka's Speeches

The Polish Party chief was called to speak nearly every day of the trip. Some of his verbal concessions to the policies of his more powerful neighbor occurred early in his trip. For example, on the subject of agricultural collectivization he told the workers at the Moscow "Red Proletariat" plant that "we are still faced with the problem of transforming the small-production peasant economy into a highly productive Socialist economy." He added: "This is the only road to a final victory of Socialism in our country." (*Trybuna Ludu*, October 28.) In Kiev, the capital of the Ukraine, Gomulka approved the annexation by the USSR of territories which had belonged to Poland before World War II: "The Polish nation fully agrees to the unification of all Ukrainian territories within the frame-

work of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic and considers it an act of historic justice." (*Trybuna Ludu*, November 1.)

Gomulka hailed the Soviet Union as the "birthplace" of Socialism and acknowledged that the USSR "occupies the leading position in the family of Socialist nations." In the same speech, however, he mentioned the now forgotten Soviet declaration on "Friendship and Cooperation between the Soviet Union and other Socialist States" made on October 30, 1956 and representing the high mark of Soviet post-war conciliation and concession. The Polish leader later again referred to this document, as well as to the somewhat less "liberal" Soviet-Polish declaration of November 18, 1956. Significantly, the joint communique at the end of the visit referred only to the latter statement.

The Polish leader's condemnations of US policy were the most severe he ever voiced. Among other charges, he labeled American actions in the Formosa Straits as "gross interference" in the internal affairs of Communist China and repeatedly charged the US with supporting West German "aggressive intentions." (*Trybuna Ludu*, November 10.)

Gomulka was extremely harsh on West Germany throughout the trip. In his speech in Warsaw, November 12, "reporting" on the journey, he gave public support to Khrushchev's new demand that the West get out of Berlin, a point unmentioned in the text of the joint statement. Gomulka said: "We support the Soviet suggestions on Berlin, because the basic Potsdam Agreement has been



A bitter Polish comment on the decline of the high hopes for an independent "Polish road to Socialism." The Polish hero, having hung up his wreath and put away his torch, says, "And now, potato soup every day."

Cartoon, quoted caption from *Polityka* (Warsaw), Sept. 20, 1958

Current Developments—Poland

continuously violated by the Western powers." He coupled this stand with another attack on the West German government which, he said, had "entered again upon a policy of militarism and was dreaming of a new crusade in the East." (Radio Warsaw, November 12.)

Khrushchev on Berlin

The Soviet Party chief implied that the West should now leave Berlin in a speech broadcast over Radio Moscow, November 10. He termed the Potsdam Agreement under which the city is divided into four zones "obsolete" and accused the Western powers of making "this capital of the German Democratic Republic" a center of "subversive activity against the USSR and the Warsaw Pact participants."

The possibility that Khrushchev's main purpose was to force the West to deal directly with the East Germans, and subsequently to accord them diplomatic recognition, was raised by the following statement: "On top of everything, they [the West] enjoy the right of unhampered communication between West Berlin and West Germany by air, by rail, highways and waterways of the German Democratic Republic, which they do not even wish to recognize."

Joint Statement

The most important feature of the joint statement signed by the leaders of the two countries, November 11, was its stress on the "necessity" to strengthen the Warsaw Pact. US "delaying" tactics in easing tensions were given as the reason for this move, but the processes of building up the Communist bloc Forces were not detailed. US policies in the Near and Far East were denounced, as was West German rearmament. Revisionism and, to a lesser extent, dogmatism, were condemned, but the Yugoslavs were not mentioned, although they had been strongly criticized by both Party chiefs, in speeches during the visit. The statement upheld Soviet demands on banning nuclear tests, and the Rapacki Plan was endorsed. The Poles were promised Soviet aid—in unspecified amounts—in prospecting for oil and natural gas, in construction of refineries and enlargement of the steel mills at Nowa Huta and in the exploitation of copper mines.

The statement also announced that Khrushchev and "other Soviet Party leaders and statesmen accepted with satisfaction an invitation to visit the Polish People's Republic." No date for this event was disclosed.

Twelfth Plenum Charts Future

The long-delayed Third Congress of the Polish Workers' Party, to be held in March, was the subject of a plenary meeting of the Party Central Committee on October 15-18. The 70-man Committee heard First Secretary Gomulka report on the "Tasks of Party Organizations in the Campaign Preceding the Third Congress of the Party." It also approved preliminary directives for the Second Five Year Plan (1961-1965)—in accordance with the current integration of Satellite planning and the USSR's Seven Year Plan (1959-1965)—and directives for the Party's controversial rural policy.

Warsaw Students Vote "No"

A POLL TAKEN among undergraduates of Warsaw University revealed some startling facts about the political orientation of the students. It might have been expected that these undergraduates who are, after all, among the elite of a generation raised under Communism, would overwhelmingly adhere to at least a theoretical Marxist position, even if they did criticize the application of theory in reality. This, however, does not prove to be the case; an astonishing number of students were lukewarm or downright hostile toward basic Communist tenets; overwhelmingly they described themselves as non-Marxists.

According to *Nowa Kultura* (Warsaw), October 12, replies to the question "Would you like to see the world moving in the direction of some form of Socialism?" (note the vague and mild phrasing) were as follows: "Decidedly yes," 24.6 percent; "Rather yes," 44.7 percent; "I have no opinion on this matter," 18.2 percent; "Rather no," 8.7 percent; "Decidedly no," 1.9 percent. An indication of how loose is the students' ideas of "some form of Socialism" is given by the fact that 96 percent of them came out in favor of unrestricted free enterprise for artisans, 62 percent for small industrial establishments.

To the question "Do you think the State should limit civil rights in order to realize certain important social aims?" the answers were: "Yes, I think this is admissible even for long periods," 6.6 percent; "Yes, I think this is admissible, but the period of limitation should not last long," 15.7 percent; "I think this is admissible but only in exceptional situations and for a very short period," 52.3 percent; "I do not consider this admissible," 21.5 percent; no opinion, 3.3 percent. So much, of course, for the dogma of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

Finally and crushingly, the answers to the question "Are you a Marxist?": "Decidedly yes," 1.8 percent; "Rather yes," 11.4 percent; "No opinion," 17.2 percent; "Rather no," 33.7 percent; "Decidedly no," 34.1 percent.

In its comments, *Nowa Kultura* tried somewhat clumsily to put as good a face as possible on these remarkable results. "A masochistic fanatic," it said, "will read them with untold regret and great concern. 'What,' he will say to himself, 'after all these years of effort there are only 25 percent decided adherents [of Socialism], and these are for some sort of perhaps New-Zealandish form of Socialism, and as many as 45 percent are in-between waverers whose action you cannot foretell in a moment of crisis.' Another interpretation, towards which [we] are inclined, treats the same figures quite differently. After all, we have as many as 25 percent definite Socialists and 45 percent obvious sympathizers. Considering the situation after the period of so-called errors and warpings [i.e., the Stalinist period], the result is unbelievably good."

Current Developments—Poland

The Third Congress was originally scheduled for December 1957, and preparations for it had been made by the Ninth Plenum of the CC in May 1957. But factionalism in the Party forced the Gomulka leadership, evidently unsure of its control, to postpone the Congress while it conducted a purge of the ranks. The purge was launched at the Tenth Plenum in October 1957 and was directed chiefly at "revisionists," although the Stalinist "dogmatists" and a motley group of corrupt and careerist elements also came under fire.


Results of the Purge

In his 17,000-word speech to the Twelfth Plenum (*Trybuna Ludu* [Warsaw], October 17) Gomulka stated that 206,737 members—15.5 percent of the Party—had been removed during the "verification" campaign. The vast majority of them were "passive people, or those indifferent to Party problems," and Gomulka emphasized that they should not be stigmatized as enemies of the Party or of Socialism. The remainder, or about 14 percent of those eliminated, "were excluded for various kinds of transgressions against the Party policy, for violating Party discipline and ethics, and for actual crimes." But only 792 of these were removed for actual opposition to the Party line, apparently most of them "revisionists." The purge, said Gomulka, was most successful among the Party's factory organizations, and less so in the rural organizations where it "was conducted under considerably more difficult conditions." It was least successful in the universities and among the intellectuals.

"An atmosphere of businesslike discussion of ideological problems could not be produced there. Many comrades were reserved in expressing their ideological and political attitude. Many meetings were held in silence or else the discussion concerned unimportant questions. In these organizations the weakness which, despite all achievements, was a feature of the whole verification campaign, was especially evident. This weakness was the lack of thorough ideological work."

While he claimed that the Party had recovered "from the confusion of internal differences which were weakening it," he conceded that the membership still included heretics both to left and right of his own position. The revisionists, "who have not changed their revisionist views but only stopped propagating them," had been silenced by direct attacks from the Party leadership. Nevertheless, the "fumes" of revisionism continued to poison the air in intellectual circles, especially among writers, and were manifest "not from what they write, but from what they do not write, what they ignore." On the other hand, the dogmatists (former Stalinists) had lost their support among the Party rank and file and remained "a small handful of disappointed and embittered men, usually with strong ambitions which are not reflected in personal qualities." By attacking revisionism the Party had deprived the dogmatists of "the food upon which they fed," i.e., had left them without an issue which they could use to advance themselves.

What Gomulka and his supporters had done during the last year, in short, was to close the gap on one flank by drawing nearer to Moscow while covering the other flank



"In Poland," the caption explains, "one must pay 54 fees to obtain a passport." Above, the passport bureau; title: "The Madhouse."

Szpilki (Warsaw), September 21, 1958

with anti-revisionist fire. On practically every important issue, save that of agricultural policy, the position of Gomulka was almost indistinguishable from that of the Kremlin. He emphasized this in his remarks on the Party's foreign policy, which he said had as its fundamental principle "the strengthening of the unity of the camp of Socialist States." In his effort to eliminate the slightest trace of any difference with Moscow, he went so far as to distort the picture of the historic Eighth Plenum which had brought him to power against the open opposition of the Soviet regime.

"Two years ago when our Party, wishing to set up the best possible conditions for strengthening the fraternal bonds of friendship between Poland and the Soviet Union, adopted on this subject the relevant decisions at the Eighth Plenum, internal and international forces of reaction, various imperialist circles, tried to exploit these decisions in order to undermine our friendship and make a breach in the unity of the camp of Socialist States."

The ensuing two years, he said, had shown the Polish

Current Developments—Poland

people that "People's Poland is ruled independently, as a sovereign State; that nobody interferes with our internal affairs. On the strength of this truth, Polish-Soviet friendship has found the strongest foundation in the Polish people; it develops and flourishes not only in the people's minds but also in their hearts."

Preparing for the Congress

The greater part of his speech to the Plenum was concerned with preparations for the Third Congress of the Party in March. There would be about 1,450 delegates or one for every 750 members. The majority of them would be elected by the provincial Party organizations, a change from the past when the election of delegates was the prerogative solely of district organizations (below the provincial level). Large industrial enterprises would also be given the right to elect delegates. The new procedure will obviously strengthen the leadership's control over the selection of delegates since many of the lower echelons still include many Stalinists.

The four months preceding the Congress were to be devoted to an intensive campaign of preparation designed to impress the Party's program on the minds of both the membership and the general public. Gomulka outlined a number of tasks in the fields of economic policy, factory discipline, production and propaganda.

¶ *Manpower.* At the Eleventh Plenum in February 1958 the Party undertook a campaign to reduce the bloated labor force in State industry and administration and to transfer the surplus to areas where more manpower is needed. The campaign, according to Gomulka, has achieved some success. In August 1958, State industry had 15,725 fewer on its payrolls than a year before, although production had risen. The government apparatus had been cut by 25 percent compared with the end of 1956. Nevertheless, much remained to be done.

¶ *Workers' Self-Management.* The workers' councils which arose after October 1956 created problems for the Party and trade union leadership in the factories. In April 1958 the Party undertook to form "workers' self-management conferences" as a means of controlling the activities of the workers' councils. "So far," said Gomulka, "the Party has not yet mastered the mechanism of workers' self-management." He outlined, in considerable detail, the structure of the mechanism and the way in which it ought to function, and described what must be done in coming months.

"The [new] elections to the workers' councils will be held by the trade unions. However, Party organizations must take part in this campaign. They should take care that the best representatives of the staff are elected to the workers' councils. Then, in January and February next year, that is, directly before the Party Congress, quarterly meetings of the workers' self-management conference ought to be held. These can provide a lot of valuable material for the Party Congress. One may say that the organization and activities of workers' self-management would be a most important indicator of the constructive participation of the Party organizations at industrial enterprises in the

realization of the Party's fundamental tasks on the economic front."

¶ *Economic Policy.* The Party organizations in industrial enterprises would be expected to find ways of improving the efficiency of production. In rural areas, the organizations must study and implement the directives on agricultural policy (see below), with emphasis on encouraging "collective activities of the peasants" as a means toward the ultimate "Socialist reshaping of the village."

¶ *Labor Pledges.* In words that illustrated how far his policies have shifted from the liberal "October days," Gomulka resurrected the Stalinist device of production pledges. The pre-Congress campaign must be marked by "concrete public initiatives adopted by all industrial enterprises, towns and villages . . . to mark the Third Congress of the Party by constructive labor victories."

"It is recommended that the industrial, building and assembly enterprises should assume definite pledges to improve the fulfillment indexes of the production and investment plans. . . . One should avoid stereotyped pledges and the imposition on enterprises of unrealistic pledges drafted without their participation. . . . Pledges may be assumed by shops, teams and even individual workers. . . . The pre-Congress pledges must not be restricted to enterprises. They must spread to all quarters and all areas. . . . The idea of public initiative is that it must involve social, unpaid labor of the people which serves their good and which benefits the country. . . . This initiative has also social-educational aims. It aims at the shaping and enhancing of the sense of collective responsibility for the deeds, large and small, of the enterprise, the area, the country; it is aimed at making an individualist a member of society."

¶ *Propaganda.* All media of information and agitation were to be focused on "a strengthened ideological attack by the Party in all directions." He decried as "stupid" the view that "Socialist consciousness" develops automatically as a society industrializes. In disseminating Socialist ideas the press, particularly the Party press, "must be a faithful, active and highly-skilled assistant of the Party. . . . Not a single editor or journalist should forget that the popularity of the press must be at the same time the popularity of the Party, i.e., it must proceed from skillful propaganda for the Party policy. We do not want any other kind of popularity for the press."

Directives for 1959-1965

The chief task of the Third Party Congress—aside from consolidating Gomulka's leadership—will be a review of Poland's economic situation and the approval of plans for the period 1959-1965. This includes a modification of the targets for the last two years of the present Five Year Plan (1956-1960) and the establishment of draft directives for the Second Five Year Plan (1961-1965) which will later be enacted by the Sejm. Poland will have, in effect, a seven-year plan corresponding to—and integrated with—the Seven Year Plan of the Soviet Union. A provisional text for this plan was released at the Plenum and published in *Trybuna Ludu* on October 25. The targets set forth in it



Housing in Poland



The photographs above and the cartoon below deal with aspects of the severe Polish housing shortage. Above left, at the Warsaw housing allocation office, applicants in line. "Numerous applicants wait their turn patiently and with quiet resignation," the caption says. Right, a fortunate family prepares to move out of their old apartment. "Some people have all the luck," the caption comments wryly. Scene of the cartoon below, a sporting goods rental store. Caption: "We'd like to rent a mattress and a pup-tent." "For how long?" "Oh, half an hour."

Photos from *Zycie Warszawy* (Warsaw), October 26, 1958; cartoon from *Szpilki* (Warsaw), October 26, 1958.

are apparently the minimum objectives established by the planners, and one purpose of the Party-wide discussion preceding the Congress will be to find ways of increasing the targets. Premier Cyrankiewicz, in a speech at Katowice on October 20 (carried by Radio Warsaw on October 22), said that there had been some disagreement at the Plenum as to "the rate of development of the national economy during the new Five Year Plan."

"Everyone agreed that we have considerable [unexploited] reserves in the national economy. The discussion centered, among other things, on the question as to what degree it is possible to take the utilization of these reserves as a basis for the Plan. . . . whether we have not outlined the tasks of the . . . Plan too modestly. . . . It is certainly possible to improve these tasks. . . . We do not want to repeat the errors previously committed [during Stalinist times—Ed.] . . . Certainly it is possible to develop our economy more quickly, and even much more quickly . . . and in this way accelerate a rise in the standard of living. However, this is only on condition that our organizations fulfill their basic tasks . . . through the mobilization of personnel and through the workers' self-government, through the mobilization of a great movement for a better, cheaper and better organized, more productive functioning of our mines, foundries, factories, transport."

According to the Party document, Poland is about to enter a third stage in its economic development. During the first stage, 1950-1955, a "stormy development" of the economy took place which was accompanied by "complications, difficulties and disproportions." After Gomulka's rise to power in 1956 a period of consolidation followed, expressed in the revision of the Five Year Plan and characterized by "a certain ironing out of disproportions, an im-

provement in real wages, a stabilization in the market situation [for consumer goods], and an improvement in the supply of materials to industry." The third stage "aims simultaneously at achieving a growth of industry and of agriculture, an increase in investment and consumption, and a considerably fuller utilization of production potentials and reserves, as well as a considerable reduction in the distance which divides us from the economic standards of the most developed countries of Europe."

Tentative goals for the period 1961-1965: industrial production will rise by 50 percent (80 percent compared with 1958) and agricultural production by 20 percent (30 percent compared with 1958).

The labor force will expand by one million workers, accompanied by a 40 percent increase in labor productivity. Higher productivity must account for 80 percent of the increase in total production.

Foreign trade must increase by at least 35 percent. Machinery, equipment and transport vehicles will become Poland's chief export, exceeding coal in total value. The object is to pay off Poland's foreign debts, finance the imports necessary for industrialization, and enable a larger import of consumer goods essential to raising the standard of living. Revenue from the merchant marine and railroad transit will rise by almost 80 percent. The proportion of raw materials and semi-finished goods in total exports should decline from 61 percent in 1957 to 37 percent in 1965.

Investment—both State and private—will rise by 46 percent compared with 1956-1960, or from 16.8 percent of national income in 1960 to 18 percent in 1965.

Real wages are scheduled to rise by 23-25 percent.

Current Developments—Poland

Industrial development will emphasize the exploitation of domestic resources so as to minimize the import of raw materials, and the expansion of industries producing export goods. Electric power output will increase by 75 percent over 1958, shipbuilding will more than double, the engineering and electro-technical industries will expand 70 percent from 1961 to 1965, and in the same five-year period the output of chemicals will double.

House-building by State and private agencies will expand from 1.2 million rooms in 1956-1960 to 2 million in 1961-1965. "As a result, the average housing density in urban areas will decline from 1.75 persons per room in 1960 to 1.54 persons per room in 1965."

By 1965 "about 70 percent of the families will own a bicycle and 20 percent will own a motorcycle, a scooter or a motor-driven bicycle."

Party Program in Agriculture

The Twelfth Plenum also issued a document setting forth the Party's policy in agriculture (*Trybuna Ludu*, October 25), which will likewise be an important part of the agenda for the Third Congress. It reaffirmed the general Gomulka line of fostering private production while at the same time maintaining that "Socialism in the countryside" must be the long-range goal. It rejected two schools of thought: that collectivization should be forced upon the peasantry even at the cost of reduced production; and that the idea of collectivization should be abandoned. "The substance of the Party's policy in the countryside," said the draft, "is in combining the growth of production and the restriction of exploitation . . . with the simultaneous and gradual reshaping of the village." It expressed the belief that with the progress of industrialization and an accompanying rise in the technical level of agriculture, the peasantry would come to see the advantages of large-scale col-

lective farming. In the meantime, no effort would be spared in making present collective farms more efficient so that "Socialist agriculture will show its superiority in practice and convince the peasant masses." Collectives will have first call on supplies of machinery and equipment, and in receiving loans to purchase them.

Anti-Church Campaign

Although the campaign against the Catholic Church was somewhat muted during the period of the Pope's death and the naming of his successor (see Area), the regime continued to demonstrate its hostility. Three priests were jailed for terms of one, three and six months. The shorter sentences were in reprisal for "incitements" in sermons urging Catholic parents to oppose the regime's orders that crosses be removed from public school classrooms. (*Sztandar Mlodych* [Warsaw], October 13.) The longer sentence was for a village priest who was accused of "persecuting unbelievers" by sending delegations to their homes to "threaten" and "force" them to go to church and confession. (*Zycie Warszawy* [Warsaw], October 22.)

On October 29 *Trybuna Ludu* reported that a new law on marriages was in preparation. According to the journal, the law will stipulate that no church wedding can take place before civil marriage ceremonies have been concluded. Priests performing weddings of "legally unmarried persons" will be liable to a four-month jail sentence and a fine of 5,000 zloty.

Stefan Ignar, who heads the United Peasant Party, wrote a strong denunciation of the Church (*Trybuna Ludu*, October 16), in which he charged that "the Episcopate's offensive, in evidence since the middle of 1957, is aimed at placing the whole of Polish society under Church control." Claiming that he spoke in the name of his party—a non-Communist, fellow-traveling organization—Ignar condemned the "interference" of priests in the activities of various agricultural groups. He accused them of making members of village and higher-level national councils "succumb" to the Church. He charged that priests had tried to infiltrate and "exert influence" in his party.

Reaction to Hlasko's Defection

The press was swift to comment on the decision of Marek Hlasko—the leading young Polish writer today—to seek asylum in West Germany. (For Hlasko's statement and earlier details, see *East Europe*, November 1958, page 38.) Articles in the Warsaw dailies, *Trybuna Ludu* and *Sztandar Mlodych* on October 10 and *Express Wieczorny* on October 11 accused the writer of "posing as a martyred national hero," of "laziness," of insensitivity to his countrymen's antipathies to West German "imperialism" and of choosing exile for unjustifiable personal reasons.

One of Hlasko's previous defenders, Antoni Slonimski, non-Communist head of the Writers' Union, also expressed his disapproval: "Marek Hlasko's decision was a great personal disappointment for me. He has wronged me, as I believed in him and defended him. However, I fear he may have wronged himself even more by cutting himself off from his country." (*Trybuna Ludu*, November 10.)

The Czechoslovak press, which had often attacked



Hlasko in the past, reprinted much of the Polish press comment and weighed in with similar attacks on its own. *Mlada Fronta* (Prague), October 18, called the writer's action "senseless," and *Literarni Noviny* (Prague), October 18, quoted with approval the Slonimski statement.

Anniversaries—Celebrated and Ignored

The 15th anniversary of the Armed Forces, the 14th anniversary of the Militia (police) and the second anniversary of "the Polish October" (Gomulka's 1956 assumption of power in an atmosphere of liberalization) occurred during the month of October. Of the three, the last went unheralded by the Party hierarchy and the propaganda organs.

Delegations from all the Satellite countries, from Communist China and the Soviet Union attended the Armed Forces ceremonies, which were centered on the October 15 commemoration of the eve of the Lenino Battle in 1943, when, for the first time, Polish forces fought side-by-side with the Soviet Army against the Germans. A speech by the Soviet Marshal Ivan Konev, World War II leader and now Commander of Warsaw Pact troops, featured heavy condemnations of West Germany and the US, and no mention of Western contributions to the defeat of Germany. On the other hand, Polish Defense Minister General Spychalski—while also attacking the West—paid tribute to Polish units which had fought with the Allies, and to the non-Communist Home Army (AK). (*Trybuna Ludu*, October 12.) During the Stalinist period, the AK had been either ignored or accused of "Fascist" leanings by regime spokesmen.

The Militia anniversary was celebrated in Warsaw by the decoration of "several hundred functionaries," according to Radio Warsaw, October 7. The same broadcast hailed the "considerable achievements" of the organization, but added the following criticisms:

"The problem of discipline in the ranks leaves much to be desired. Only too often do we find it necessary to impose disciplinary punishment. We still have many justified complaints about the arrogance and often brutal behavior of the functionaries. We still have too many complaints about too much use of rubber truncheons or too much improper intervention. This must change."

Rapacki Plan Revived

The Rapacki Plan for nuclear disarmament of Poland, Czechoslovakia, East and West Germany was revived following a visit by Polish Foreign Minister Adam Rapacki to Norway, October 27-30. After consultations with Norwegian officials whose "attitude was favorable," according to Radio Warsaw, November 4, although "limited by Norway's membership in NATO," Rapacki returned to Poland and announced his amended plan. Its chief features are a "two stage" development: in the first stage there would be a ban on the production, importation and stockpiling of nuclear weapons and installations in the four countries; in the second stage there would be an agreement on conventional weapon disarmament in the area. According to Rapacki, "appropriate measures of control would accom-

The Way to a Man's Heart

THE WARSAW NEWSPAPER *Sztandar Mlodych* recently investigated the eating habits of today's Poles, trying to determine what difference, if any, the years of Communism have made in the traditional national cuisine. The results were found, it appears, somewhat discouraging. In its August 16-17 issue, the paper commented:

"Today's housewife must really rack her brains in order to provide a meal for her family. . . . Her knowledge of the culinary arts is much more restricted than that of her mother or grandmother, she has less time for cooking under the existing conditions and tempo of everyday life. She is constantly faced with lack of products on the market and with a meagerness of family budget which makes frugal and modest housekeeping imperative."

The paper went on to ask, rhetorically, bitterly and hungrily, what, under these conditions, is the chef-d'oeuvre of Polish cooking, and answered: "There will be no masterpiece. There will, however, be a chopped meat cutlet! Served with potatoes and cabbage. The meal may be rounded out with tomato soup and a stewed fruit compote for dessert. . . . There will be no 'royal borscht,' no cutlets with groats, no old-fashioned Polish *bigos* [meat stew]. Nothing, in fact, which is considered part of the once world-famous Polish cuisine. Today, as our investigation showed immediately, the chopped meat cutlet has been promoted to the rank of 'national specialty.' It is the simplest to make from the meat leftovers provided by the Municipal Meat Wholesale stores, it is cheap and can be done quickly. It reigns in homes, in factory mess-halls and is even ordered in restaurants (for reasons of economy?)."

pany the whole process."

The Radio Warsaw broadcast made a particular point of the "wide initiative" of Poland in sponsoring the pact, and Rapacki himself was quoted as saying that the conventional weapons disarmament proposal would help to allay Western coolness to the Plan. Subsequently, Soviet boss Khrushchev gave his support to the measure. However, Western response appeared cool. This was due to the fact that the Soviets, unlike the West, would be able to retain their huge war machine—including nuclear and conventional weapons—on the periphery of the denuclearized zone.

Youth Recruitment Drive

Membership in the Party youth organization, the Union of Socialist Youth (ZMS), has reached 200,000, according to *Trybuna Ludu*, October 21. This represents a gain of 100 percent over the announced total of 100,000 in February 1958, but is still far below the million-plus figure reached by the quasi-compulsory Stalinist youth organization (ZMP) before the latter collapsed in October 1956.

One of the ZMS's sub-organizations, the "Voluntary Work Brigades" (OHP), has also received press and radio attention lately. On October 10 a Radio Warsaw broadcast warned it against repetition of ZMP "mistakes" in "voluntary" recruiting. The old organization, of course, recruited by "measures of compulsion." According to the text of the Ministerial decree which set up the OHP (*Monitor Polski*, July 26), "young males between the ages of 18 and 24 are recruited," while 16- and 17-year-olds are "accepted," as are some men up to the age of 30. The minimum work periods for students are two months, for others, three months; those serving six months or more are given their choice of military branch when drafted, as well as priority consideration for officers' and non-commissioned officers' schools. Members of the OHP live in barracks, eat Army rations and, according to *Sztandar Młodych*, October 21, are "insufficiently paid."¹

Although the decree setting up the OHP did not mention women's brigades, the October 22 issue of *Trybuna Ludu* contained a picture of girls taking part in various work projects which were said to be organized by the ZMS.

ZMS policy was discussed during a recent speech by Party chief Władysław Gomułka at a ZMS meeting in Warsaw:

"The Party is the leader of the ZMS. This means that the ZMS must be guided by Party ideology, by the Party program and the Party line. The forces of the ZMS and its correct development are dependent on its links with the Party. This truth must always be borne in mind by all ZMS members." (*Trybuna Ludu*, October 22.)

New Law "Supervises" Lawyers

The country's 5,500 lawyers were placed more firmly under the control of the Justice Ministry by the passage of a stringent law during the opening meeting of the autumn Sejm (Parliament) session, November 5. The new measure, reported in a Radio Warsaw broadcast the same day, appeared to be aimed at destroying much of the "self-government" which the lawyers had won at the time of the Gomułka take-over in October 1956, including primarily the right of handling disbarment proceedings within the ranks of the profession. Now the Ministry itself is entitled to ban individuals from practicing law if, in its judgment, "the public interest" so dictates. Also, the Ministry is now empowered to be the sole judge of new admissions to the bar.

It was not yet clear how greatly the freedom of lawyers

in the conduct of the defense of clients would be affected by the law. For the past two years Polish attorneys have been relatively uninhibited in attacking the stands of the prosecution in ordinary court cases. However, an October 14 *Trybuna Ludu* article by Minister of Justice Rybicki provided little ground for optimism in legal circles. Rybicki stated: "We cannot allow the veiling of actions—which are contrary to social interests and even to the principles of elementary honesty—with noble words about independence and courage. The new bill is directed against such phenomena, against tolerance of such actions."

There was no voting opposition to the law in the Sejm, although three Deputies abstained. One of these, Miron Kolakowski, a member of the Catholic Parliamentary "Znak" group, spoke against the bill.

"Cultural" Decline Bewailed

A nationwide campaign to set up once again the Party's "Houses of Culture" was advocated by Tadeusz Galinski, the Minister of Culture and Art at a sitting of the Sejm (Parliament) committee of that name. (Radio Warsaw, October 15.) The "Culture Houses," along with Party "recreation clubs" and libraries were propaganda centers during the Stalinist era where peasants and workers were herded to hear harangues on "Socialism" and collectivization. After the Gomułka regime took power, they were generally shunned. In fact, Galinski admitted that at present there are "60 percent fewer recreation clubs" and over 4,200 less libraries than "at the beginning of 1957."

Minister Galinski stated that the situation would be remedied by "reorganization of the nation's cultural centers." He announced that his Ministry was promoting provincial conferences of "cultural activists" and that these meetings would be climaxed by a national conference in Warsaw some time after mid-November. Trade Unions and National Councils, he added, would be requested to cooperate with the Ministry in this effort.

Education Bill

A new bill on education, passed by the Sejm on November 5, appeared to be aimed chiefly at putting higher education and vocational schools more completely under control of the Ministry of Education. According to Radio Warsaw, November 5, the bill "will fix the right proportions in the relations between the Ministry and the organs of higher schools, regulating in the best possible manner the problem of academic degrees." The broadcast also stated that "the most far-fetched liberalism" could not be allowed to "lead to complete independence of higher schools from State authorities."

Plague of Fines

FINES FOR "a veritable plague" of unregistered radio sets appear to have given the regime a surprisingly large source of revenue, according to the Warsaw daily, *Dziennik Ludowy*, September 3. Such fines totalled 13,500,000 zloty in 1957, and in the first six months of 1958 a further 72,000 unlicensed radio sets were discovered. The fines range from 360 to over 1,000 zloty.

HUNGARY

Election Campaign

The campaign leading up to the November 16 elections to parliament was conducted with full propaganda furor,

Current Developments—Hungary

although the "overwhelming victory" of the unopposed, single-slate regime ticket—running under the aegis of the Patriotic Peoples' Front—was, of course, never in doubt. According to Radio Budapest, October 23, "107,000 nomination meetings were held throughout the country," and in Budapest alone "400,000 people attended these meetings." "Nearly 50 percent" of the national electorate "selected the candidates from their own ranks," Radio Budapest, October 31, stated.

These candidates were headed by Party boss Janos Kadar in Budapest and two of his most trusted associates among the "moderate" faction, Politburo members Gyula Kallai and Lajos Feher, elsewhere.* Politburo member Antal Apro, reputed leader of the "Stalinist" faction in the Party, was at the top of another list. Significantly, three clergymen excommunicated earlier in the year by the Vatican for political activities were up for election. The name of Bela Kovacs also appeared among the higher regime functionaries to be voted upon. At the time of this report, it was not clear whether this Kovacs was the renowned Smallholder Party leader who had been imprisoned before the Revolt, became a member of the Imre Nagy government during the uprising and disappeared from public view afterwards.

Tenor of Campaign

No strong new measures were forecast during the campaign. Generally speaking, the election literature and the speeches came out for a rise in living standards, but advocated no drastic measures to accomplish this aim. Collectivization of agriculture in the immediate future was not strongly stressed, and the often repeated statements that by and large the "counterrevolutionary criminals" had been punished and the uprising was a thing of the past were again sounded by the officials. There were particular efforts to woo the middle class, as witness one of Kadar's speeches at a Front meeting:

"The middle class supports the building of Socialism, as long as they are assured a certain financial basis and future security for themselves as individuals. We must take this into consideration and say openly that the middle classes of the cities have a future in Hungary. What the petite bourgeoisie can offer—for example, in the handicraft industries—will be needed for many years." (*Nepszabadsag* [Budapest], October 5.)

There was one possibly significant indication of concealed unrest within the Party itself. This appeared in the following portion of *Nepszabadsag's* October 19 report on the Party election resolution: "Although there is general approval of the [election] policy, several justified criticisms were leveled against the Central Committee and individual Party organizations . . . because Party policy is not adequately asserting itself in the management of certain State organs, councils and enterprises . . . and, what is more, in certain rare cases this policy is even distorted."

No enlargement on these "criticisms" was published in

*There was a list of candidates for each of the 15 counties and a list for Budapest. Voters were required to cast their ballots for the whole list.

the Hungarian press before the election.

Concerning post-election changes in the regime, official spokesman Laszlo Gyarus commented: "I wish to say that it is the sovereign right of the elected National Assembly to determine the kind of government to which it can entrust the leadership of the country. However, in my opinion, there will be no changes in the political leadership of the country." (Radio Budapest, October 31.)

Hegedus, Other Stalinists Return

Former Premier Andras Hegedus, one of the most trusted henchmen of Stalinist Party boss Matyas Rakosi in the pre-Revolt period, has returned to Budapest from the Soviet Union—where he took refuge during the Revolt—and is now employed in the Party library, according to the Yugoslav Party newspaper, *Politika* (Belgrade), October 11. Hegedus is the most prominent of many former Stalinist officials reported by reliable sources to have returned to the country, mostly from the USSR. Others said to be back are: General Istvan Bata, former Minister of Defense and now reportedly the commander of the Parliament guards; former Central Committee members Jozsef Szalai and Lajos Vegh, now holding minor positions in the Budapest District administration apparatus; Andor Berei, ex-chief of the planning Bureau, now working on the forthcoming Hungarian Encyclopedia; Gyula Alapi, Chief Prosecutor in the Rajk and Mindszenty trials, now employed in the Institute of Legal Science; Vilmos Olti, former President of the Supreme Court—and ex-head of the Nazi *Volksbund* organization—now reportedly in charge of purging the legal profession; Laszlo Piros, former head of the Secret Police (AVH), present position unknown.



A large Agricultural Exhibition was held in Budapest in September. Above, a peasant in from the countryside enjoying a "gypsy" fiddler at the Exhibition restaurant.

Photo from *Juvenonk* (Budapest), September 21, 1958

Where Are the Peasants?

THE HUNGARIAN REGIME's attempt to resume the collectivizing of agriculture—by “persuasion”—has laid a heavy burden on the local Party organizations, which are expected to carry out the task among a hostile and contemptuous peasantry. The October 12 issue of *Szabad Fold* (Budapest) described the efforts of Party workers in the village of Mezokomarom who went through the motions expected of them and formed a preparatory committee for establishing a collective farm, despite a total lack of support from the local peasants. “The committee consists of the village council president, the council Secretary, the manager of the agricultural association and several others who have no intention of changing their present official occupations. Ferenc Vami, the only member of the committee not employed in an office, cannot be considered a true peasant either. He has no prestige at all among the farmers.” The paper scolded the local activists for not using “the right approach.”

Church under Pressure

The regime continued its efforts to control and use the Catholic Church. Among the methods used have been financial subsidies (see *East Europe*, November 1958, page 42), the creation of puppet organizations such as the Clerical Peace Movement, which collapsed during the Revolt but is now being revived, the installation of amenable “peace” clergymen in high quasi-religious positions, and the prevention of legitimate Church leaders from carrying out their functions. It is now known that four such leaders are under house arrest; these are Bishop Petery of Vac, Bishop Badalik of Veszprem, Bishop Papp of Gyor and Bishop Endrey, the Vicar of Esztergom.

Bishops Petery and Badalik have long been considered enemies of the regime, due to their close relationship with Cardinal Mindszenty, but Bishop Papp was arrested only in August, reportedly for refusing to suspend five clergymen whom the regime accused of “reactionary leanings.” Bishop Endrey was arrested the following month for refusing to appoint the excommunicated priests Miklos Beresztoczy and Richard Horvath to head two Budapest parishes. Bishop Endrey was also removed as head of the Catholic Action organization, apparently for lack of “cooperation” with the regime. His post was given to Istvan Balogh, a priest who had collaborated with the Stalinist regime from time to time, but had held no high political-clerical posts under the Kadar authorities.

Some of the duties of Bishop Badalik have been assumed by Vicar Klempa of the Veszprem Diocese, the second largest in the country. The Vicar issued a pastoral letter recently which caused a stir in Catholic circles all over the world. (*Magyar Kurir* [Budapest], the Hungarian Catholic Church news bulletin, September 30.) The letter called on Catholics to protect “Socialist property” because

the State had granted support to the Church, and therefore the latter had a financial interest in the regime's prosperity. The letter took “several people in our diocese” to task for “preparing the financial ruin” of the local Church. It also charged “our fellow priests” with displaying a “striking indifference to the economic life of the diocese,” and said: “If the priest concerned has not complied with his obligations to at least a minimum degree, the Church authorities will find ways and means to lead the misguided soul once again onto the correct path.” The letter added that “some priests still think of the past when the Church had rich patrons; they do not understand modern times and lose their own future chances because of their personal attitude.”

“Protestant Peace Conference”

Much propaganda effort was expanded by the press on the recent “International Peace Conference of the Protestant Church” held in Debrecen, the spiritual center of Hungarian Protestantism. The organization was founded with the intention of counterweighing the World Council of Churches, and, from newspaper accounts of the speeches, appears to be fully devoted to the propagation of the Soviet-sponsored “peace” movement. (*Magyar Nemzet* [Budapest], November 1.)

The Literary Front

In the cultural field the regime's chief problem remained the “silent” writers, those literary men who supported the October 1956 Revolt and have since demonstrated their estrangement from the puppet government by refusing to write for the national press. In the great majority of cases, neither threats nor blandishments have been able to make the “silent” ones write; recently, therefore, the authorities have taken a new tack. This was expressed in the literary journal, *Elet és Irodalom* (Budapest), October 10, which said, in effect, that the uncooperative authors must either write or be replaced by “new” literary figures. The same warning was voiced in a speech by Party boss Janos Kadar: “One factor which sets the older generation of writers thinking is that—during those certain six months [after the Revolt] when it could indeed be said that they remained silent—a new young generation came forward, and already there are many young poets and writers whose names millions will some day know as the names of the poets of Socialism and the people's cause.” (*Nepzabadsag*, October 17.)

In the same speech Kadar admitted that “there was chaos in the ranks of the intelligentsia,” but dangled the hope before literary men that present-day collaboration with the regime would not entail the humiliations of the Stalinist era:

“We have not asked for the unprincipled courting of Party and government, nor for clichés muttered without conviction, and we will not ask for them in the future. On the contrary, we despise them. The person who does not like our Party, our government, our policy, will not be forced by anybody to stand up and praise them in the main square on Sunday.”

Current Developments—Hungary, Czechoslovakia

Revolt Writers Freed

Three writers who had been imprisoned for their part in the Revolt were released from jail recently. (Radio Budapest, October 15.) The most prominent of these was Zoltan Zelk, a Party member and supporter of the first Imre Nagy government (1953-55), who was one of the leaders of the large-scale intellectual ferment which preceded the 1956 uprising. Others freed were Domonkos Varga, well known for his courageous articles in the paper *Irodalmi Ujsag* in 1955-56, and Bela Nemeth, a provincial writer with a large following outside Budapest.

According to the announcement of the writers' release, they were set free before completing their sentences. They were alleged to have "shown repentance while in prison."

Academy of Sciences Meets

The yearly meeting of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences took place in Budapest, October 23-28. First Deputy Premier Antal Apro delivered the opening address, which, along with the standard propaganda directives, called on all scientists to devote themselves to the "peaceful use of atomic power" and the economical production of synthetic fabrics. (*Nepszabadsag*, October 23.) Academy President Istvan Ruzsnyak, delivered the yearly report in which he bewailed the present state of social sciences:

"[In the past] the view became accepted that the task of all social sciences was only to analyze from a social-scientific point of view the daily development of political events. As a result, direct agitation and propaganda activity often took the place of honest scientific work. However, the realization of this harmful tendency brought about an undesirable reaction among a rather large segment of our social science researchers. The pendulum swung to the other extreme, causing a sharp division between social science and propaganda activity and the spreading of dangerous revisionist views." (*Nepszabadsag*, October 29.)

The six-day meeting featured many attacks on the Academy's most outstanding member, philosopher Gyorgy Lukacs, who supported the Revolt (see box). The denunciations followed the pattern of similar diatribes over the past two years, their main point being that Lukacs was the "father of modern philosophical revisionism."

Painters' and Sculptors' Union Revived

On September 29 Radio Kossuth reported that the Painters' and Sculptors' Union had been recreated. Like the Writers' and Actors' Unions, it had been prominent in the Revolt and had been dissolved in the bloody aftermath of the Soviet intervention. The broadcast quoted a speech by the newly-appointed head of the Union, the sculptor Sandor Mikus, who stated that for an artist "loyalty to the Party line and to Socialist views were just as essential qualities as artistic talent."

Mikus's *magnum opus* was his gigantic statue of Stalin in Budapest; the statue was destroyed by the people during the uprising.

Omissions in Party History

The 40th anniversary of the founding of the Hungarian Communist Party was marked by a historical essay in the October edition of the Party monthly *Tarsadalmi Szemle*, reprinted in a significantly abridged form by the Party daily newspaper, *Nepszabadsag* [Budapest], on October 19. Among the omissions in the latter publication were: all mention of Laszlo Rajk, who was purged and executed as a "Titoist" in 1951 and whose "rehabilitation" prior to the Revolt was a symbol of the thaw; all mention of Bela Kun, who headed the short-lived Hungarian Communist regime in 1919 and was later murdered in the USSR. The Party daily also camouflaged *Tarsadalmi Szemle's* clear allusions to early Communist cooperation with the Social Democratic and Smallholders' Parties.

It may be surmised that *Nepszabadsag's* abridgements were due to the fact that it is a mass circulation publication, while *Tarsadalmi Szemle* has only a limited readership in the Party.

Economic Crimes

The unabating war on "crimes against Socialist property"—theft, embezzlement, etc.—featured the installation of a "new method" in the Public Prosecutor's Office, according to the Budapest daily newspaper, *Esti Hirlap*, October 18. In future the Prosecutor will not only proceed against the offender, the journal stated, but will also "find out whether the factories in which the crimes occurred have remedied their mistakes and have done everything possible to prevent repetition of the illegal acts."

International Contacts

On October 6 an agreement with Communist China was signed in Budapest to provide "more extensive tourist exchange" between the two countries. (*Nepszabadsag*, October 7.) This agreement appeared to be another manifestation of Red China's growing prestige in the area. Previously all Chinese tourism in Hungary had been arranged under the "sponsorship" of the USSR.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Five Year Plan Approved

On October 16 the Second Five Year Plan (1956-60) at last became law. More than two years had elapsed since it was approved in draft form by a Party Conference in June 1956. The draft had been revised at a Central Committee meeting in October 1957 (see *East Europe*, February 1958, 50) and evidently revised again last summer. A writer in *Svobodne Slovo* (Prague), October 19, explained that the remarkable delay had been caused by the upheavals in October 1956, which affected the economies of Czechoslovakia's neighbors, and by the necessity of negotiating a new long-term trade agreement with the USSR, which had likewise revised its planning. The

Current Developments—Czechoslovakia



A Romanian Party and government delegation visited Czechoslovakia in October and naturally received the standard routine for high-level visiting firemen—"The Bartered Bride," wreaths on monuments, etc. Above, Romanian Party chief Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej is shown participating in another standard act of the ritual, getting a gift of bread and salt from a peasant woman in quaint peasant costume.

Photo from *Svet v Obrazech* (Prague), November 1, 1958

revised Plan "also reflects the fact that during 1956 and 1957 the growth of production was achieved not so much by an increase in labor productivity as provided in the draft directives but rather by an increase in the labor force, meaning at higher cost than envisioned."

Total production planned for 1960 is to be 54.4 percent above that of 1955, instead of 50 percent as originally plotted. Total investment has evidently been cut, while investment has been increased in the raw material industries—fuels, metals, building materials and agriculture—and the metallurgical and machinery industries. The planned increase in real wages will be 20 percent rather than 30, and mention is no longer made of the proposal to reduce the average workweek to 42 hours by 1960.

Ministries Merged

The Ministry of the Automobile Industry and Agricultural Machinery has been merged with the Ministry of Precision Engineering to form the Ministry of General Engineering, effective October 15. Deputy Premier Karel Polacek was relieved of his office and placed at the head of the new ministry. Emil Zatloukal, former Minister of the Automobile Industry and Agricultural Machinery, was dropped. The other Minister, Vaclav Ouzky, retained his status in the government and was to be given a different function. (*Rude Pravo*, October 15 and 16.)

Polacek's transfer to a ministry reduces the number of Deputy Premiers from ten in 1953, after the death of Presi-

dent Gottwald, to only two. The merger of ministries is the latest of a series of changes in the administration of the engineering industries, which at various times have been under one, two or three ministries.

Romanians, Arabs Visit

The regime's position as the prime exemplar of orthodoxy and loyalty to Soviet policy was well demonstrated by the presence of two visiting delegations during the month of October. One of these was a Romanian Party and government group led by First Secretary Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej and Premier Chivu Stoica (October 20-25). The visitors punctuated their trip with praise for their host's relatively high standard of living which was attributed—not to the extensive industrialization inherited by the present regime from its democratic predecessor—but to Czechoslovakia's "more complete" Communization. A joint declaration signed by the representatives of the two countries stated that an agreement had been reached for "economic cooperation and exchange of goods covering the years 1959 to 1965." (*Rude Pravo* [Prague] October 26.) No details were given. (For the declaration's statement on Yugoslav "revisionism" and the repercussions which ensued, see Area.)

Defense Minister Abdel Hakim Amer of the United Arab Republic paid an unusually long visit to Czechoslovakia, October 9-19. He surveyed Czechoslovak military maneuvers and visited some units of the Armed Forces. The many speeches by Amer and various dignitaries from the host country revealed the expected espousals of mutual friendship and denunciations of Israel and the West. A communique was published in *Rude Pravo*, October 19, which stressed "political, economic and cultural cooperation." No concrete statements on Czechoslovak military and economic assistance were made.

Minority Problems

A two-day session of the National Assembly, October 16-17, had another try at settling the thorny issues created by the minority peoples within the national borders. One of the most important of these concerns 20,000 or more

Many Miles of Sewers, Etc.

"ACCORDING TO statistics, voluntary work performed by citizens from 1948 through 1957 corresponds to an investment of 5,106,000,000 *koruny*. The figure grows from year to year. Last year alone, 907 million *koruny* were added. When you pass our villages you see that in 1957 alone voluntary brigades built or repaired 548 cultural centers, 25 movie theaters, 502 fire houses, 300 public wells, over 200 bus stop waiting rooms, 200 playgrounds, many miles of sewers, etc. All this has been done by the voluntary work of our people. No one told them to do it. This shows you how much can be done by a concerted effort." (*Rude Pravo* [Prague], October 18, 1958.)

ethnic Hungarians who—along with most ethnic Germans—lost their Czechoslovak citizenship in 1945, and who, like many of the Germans still in the country, have revealed little enthusiasm for regaining that citizenship. With this situation in mind, the Assembly decreed (*Rude Pravo*, October 18) that these Hungarians would automatically become citizens, providing they had fulfilled residence requirements. No application and no oath of allegiance is required. A similar measure applying to the German minority went into effect in 1953.

Further provisions of the law stated that the district national committees would have jurisdiction in determining the nationality of a child born in a foreign country of one Czechoslovak and one foreign parent and the nationality of a foreign woman who married a Czechoslovak citizen. A previous provision depriving of their citizenship Czechoslovak women who marry foreigners and leave the country was abolished. Also embodied in the act was a provision that the State would be empowered to withdraw citizenship from a Czechoslovak living in a foreign country without valid Czechoslovak travel documents if his return is judged "undesirable."

Polish Border "Adjusted"

The National Assembly decreed the "final outlining" of the Polish-Czechoslovak borders by acceding to the "transfer of 837 hectares of land to Polish sovereignty and 1,205 hectares to Czechoslovak sovereignty." (*Radio Prague*, October 17.) According to the broadcast, Poland was "compensated for the difference by receiving ownership rights to land totaling 368 hectares owned in Poland by Czechoslovak citizens or corporations."

"Independence Day"

The fortieth anniversary of the founding of the Czechoslovak Republic was celebrated in a festive rally in Prague, October 28. Termed "Independence Day," the official slogan of the affair was: "1918-1958—without the [Soviet] October Revolution there would be no independent Czechoslovakia." The propaganda campaign which surrounded the festivities sought to link the establishment of the Republic with the Bolshevik Revolution, and Politburo member Vaclav Kopecky, who delivered the main oration, reiterated all important points of Soviet foreign policy.

In 1951, October 28 had been officially named Nationalization Day by the regime in honor of the 1945 nationalization decrees. This attempt to impart a more "Socialist" meaning to the day was modified this year.

New *Rude Pravo* Editor

Oldrich Svestka became editor-in-chief of the official Party organ *Rude Pravo* (Prague) on October 11. He has been an alternate member of the Party Central Committee since June and has been on the newspaper's staff since the Stalinist era. Svestka's predecessor, Vladimir Koucky, is reported to have taken over the supervision of all of the Czechoslovak Party press. Since June he has been a Secretary of the Central Committee.

BULGARIA

Squeezing Five Years into Three

The tendency toward more rational economic planning in Bulgaria has suddenly been reversed with the startling announcement that the Third Five Year Plan, which began this year, must be completed in three to four years. The full meaning of the switch has not yet been made clear. Originally the regime had proposed a Three Year Plan for the period 1958-1960, which would have brought Bulgaria's time-schedule into line with that of the other Satellites whose Plans end in 1960. But last April the Party Central Committee decided instead to publish directives for a Third Five Year Plan, and these were formally adopted at the Seventh Party Congress in June (see *East Europe*, July 1958). The first indication of the new change came following a plenary meeting of the CC at the beginning of October, which was said to have discussed "fulfillment of the Five Year Economic Plan in reduced time." (*Rabotnichesko Delo* [Sofia], October 5.) The statement was so vague as to suggest that the Central Committee itself did not know exactly what it intended to do.

"Initiative of the Masses"

The tone of subsequent statements and the fact that an important change in policy has been made without the usual careful propaganda preparation, indicate that the decision did not originate in Sofia or that the top leadership itself was less than united. There was a note of embarrassment in a speech made by First Party Secretary Todor Zhivkov at Vratsa on October 24, at a meeting of Party and economic activists. "Only five months ago," he admitted, "the Seventh Party Congress assigned directives for the Third Five Year Plan, which is law for everybody. Can it be that the directives and plans are wrong? No, comrades, the decisions and directives of the Seventh Party Congress are



A Bulgarian comment on the state of cleanliness in public eating places. Visitor to the kitchen: "What, me eat sausages? Never! I'm off to a vegetarian restaurant."

Sturshel (Sofia), October 24, 1958

Buttons and Zippers

THERE ARE YOUNG PEOPLE whose outward appearance is disagreeably different from that of modest, nicely dressed young men and girls. For some reason, they consider this difference pleasurable. However, this is not the case. Their extravagant clothing, their ugly 'fashionable' hair styles and their slacks which are covered with buttons and zippers are intended only for one purpose—to draw attention to the person of the wearer. . . .

"Such young people have no interest beyond fashions, the opposite sex and having a good time. They are not interested in good books or in working."

(*Narodna Mladezh* [Sofia], August 24.)

correct. . . . What in reality are our economic plans? To us, the economic plan is not something unchangeable and fixed. . . . The masses are changing and improving our State economic plan by calling for the fulfillment of the tasks within shorter time limits. Many factors indicate that the activity and creative initiative of the masses, that is, the people's renascent powers, may change the old indexes, norms and systems, and assign new tempos, systems, norms and indexes. . . . Therefore in the future our planning organs must bear in mind the untamable tendencies of the masses to forge ahead." (*Rabotnichesko Delo*, October 26.)

In effect, Zhivkov was disclaiming responsibility for a decision which is not likely to be welcomed by most Bulgarians. The goals previously set forth for 1962 would not have been easy to achieve, requiring a 60 percent increase in industrial production and a 35 percent increase in agricultural production. The previous Five Year Plan was largely underfulfilled (see *East Europe*, May 1958, 45-46). Progress in the first three quarters of this year had not been impressive: the official summary published in *Rabotnichesko Delo* on October 24 listed a number of important industries said to be lagging behind their plans, and admitted that the capital investment program had been carried out by only 87 percent, and construction by only 90 percent, of the targets scheduled. What Moscow seems to have ordered is not the literal fulfillment of the Plan in three years—a thing manifestly impossible—but a general intensification of effort on the part of the Bulgarians, particularly in agriculture. Some of the implications for the average person were spelled out by Zhivkov in the remainder of his speech, which was devoted to tasks in agriculture.

"Five Million Working Hands"

Zhivkov said that the chief way of speeding things up lay in the discovery and exploitation of "internal reserves"—meaning a more effective use of the existing means of production. He emphasized repeatedly that the collective farms could not expect to achieve their targets through the use of additional machinery and capital investment: "We do not have the machines on hand and we cannot obtain

them within the time available." Neither would there be enough chemical fertilizer, cement and other materials. "The main thing is to mobilize and use the efforts and labor of the people." The program he outlined bore a disconcerting resemblance to the Chinese Communist system of mobilizing labor in large masses. Bulgaria's collective farms are to be amalgamated into larger units (see below) which will provide more manpower for the "practical work" involved in fulfilling the Plan. The irrigation program will be vastly increased—from the original 600,000 hectares to a full million, Zhivkov said. At the same time, another 500,000 hectares of unused land are to be brought under cultivation and devoted to grapes and other fruit. Land currently in use is to be improved by removing stumps, bushes and stones. To make up for the lack of chemical fertilizer, emphasis will be put on the use of animal manure. Where cement and other building materials are not available, substitutes must be found. To provide forage for larger livestock herds, the meadows and pastures must be cleaned and cultivated. Fields must be ploughed deeper; better quality seeds must be sown.

Most of this work will be done by hand. "During the autumn and winter there are nice days on which collective farm members are not busy with field work. These days must be used. . . . Our army of kolkhoz members numbers nearly 2.5 million, 5 million working hands, comrades. This is a tremendous power which can accomplish wonders. . . . It must be fully utilized for the further consolidation and development of the collective regime, and to cut the time needed for the fulfillment of agricultural tasks."

Harder Work in the Factories

The regime was slower in explaining how the speed-up would be applied to the industrial sector, where production ultimately depends on the amount of capital invested. An editorial in *Rabotnichesko Delo* on November 12 stated that investment would not be increased in industry. It said that present equipment was not being exploited to full capacity and that some plants were run practically on a "handicraft" basis. It left a plain implication that the new program will demand faster working tempos and longer workweeks, and that factory managers will be forced to drive their employees harder.

Merging Collective Farms

Having become the first of the Satellites to collectivize practically all of its agriculture, Bulgaria is now passing into the next stage of Communist organization. Regime leaders are urging the country's collective farms to merge themselves "voluntarily" into larger collective entities. Within a few months it seems likely that Bulgaria's 3,300 collectives (comprising more than a million formerly independent farms) will have become only 1,200 or 1,500. A precedent exists in the Soviet Union, which had 250,000 collective farms in 1950 and has since merged them into about 70,000. The precise goals of the Bulgarian campaign have not been announced—there has, in fact, been no formal declaration by the Party with regard to the mergers

Be It Ever So Crummy, or Home is Where You Hang Your Head

THE FOLLOWING PLAINTIVE remarks on housing (and rare new housing at that) in Czechoslovakia appeared in *Literarni Noviny* (Prague), October 18:

"I do not live in a bad apartment: I am quite mad with joy to think that I have a modern apartment. The house, too, is modern. . . . Some shortcomings have disappeared during the year that elapsed since we moved in, others have made their appearance. Why should new buildings always be complete? One appreciates each little thing more if it accrues gradually. . . .

"Why should you hunt for a washhouse immediately after having moved in? After some time the boiler arrives, later they bring the rest. One day they fix the wiring and another day they remove it again and put it somewhere else. Then they take away the washing machine and bring another one. . . . Or the bells to the apartments. Not quite one year after moving in they fix the bells for you at the entrance of the house and they connect them in different ways. . . . The bells don't work anyhow. . . . As soon as the bell in any apartment rings all the tenants go to open the door. The house is splendidly resonant. The walls constantly communicate to the people what's going on in the life of this cozy collective. The piano from the third floor encourages the laundress in the cellar . . . and one radio set is enough for the whole house. . . . We spent last Christmas in the dark. Not through any fault of the builders but through our own fault. We believed that the standby repair squads of the communal enterprises would really be standing by.

"Our wives at first refused to go to the theatre because their shoes remained stuck in the mud of the street. Then a beautiful street was built but the difficulties were not removed. The new street had to be dug up again to lay the gas pipes. The street is again full of mud and puddles. We have got used to it be-

cause we have not been waiting for the sidewalks for more than one year. . . . The other day we attended a performance of Negro dancers. . . . All elements of the Afro-Negro dance came in very handy when we went home in the dark over stones, pipes, heaps of mud, puddles and unexpected new holes. Soon we are going to perform these dances half-naked as this would correspond to their folkloristic character. Because clothes must constantly be sent to the cleaners and at the somewhat relaxed pace of these public services one runs out of clothing. . . .

"Some people have solved the style of their life more reasonably. They begin with the car (a Spartak). I know some such families. They content themselves with one room and do not try to get an apartment. Not because they have no furniture. On the contrary, they can afford the luxury of having their bedside tables on the wardrobes, their chest of drawers on the wash stand, the sofa half-way under the dining table and when they go to sleep they spread the mattresses right on the floor. There are no pictures on the walls, only the television screen. The following plan has been developed: 1. the television set (they have it), 2. the Spartak (they will have it in the near future), 3. eventually a decent apartment (no hurry, there is room for two or three children even now).

"I consider this quite reasonable because I know of cases where the children are already here, and now they too have to help save towards a Spartak. There is, of course, another consideration: one day these pale, under-nourished and nervous children (shouted down in the insignificant space of the room) will be taken out in the family's own Spa-tak into Nature to recuperate. And then Nature will have to work real miracles because the operation of the Spartak costs money and somewhere this will have to be saved."

—but speeches and editorials show that the pressure is intense.

The press campaign began with an editorial in *Rabotnichesko Delo* on October 16 which stressed the importance of larger farms in the effort to fulfill the Second Five Year Plan ahead of schedule. The paper said the merging should be completed "in the next few years." But on October 26 Radio Sofia announced that 1,392 collective farms—more than 40 percent of the total—had already been merged into 511 big farm complexes. Some of the mergers are said to have occurred in past years. According to *Zemledelsko Zname* (Sofia), October 19, before 1958 116 collective farms in the district of Varna had merged into 46. "Seeing the good results, a number of collective farms in the district united their forces this year. By October 10, an additional 121 had united into 50. . . . At present there are 96 enlarged collective farms in this district, made up of 232 smaller collectives." In the district of Vratsa mergers started in

1954, it was stated, and now total 53, comprising 136 smaller farms with 173,800 hectares of land. In the district of Kolarovgrad, where collectivization was finished last spring, there were no mergers until the fall; then 263 farms were amalgamated into 93. Other reports state that 35 farms in the district of Kazanluk merged into 9; 30 in the district of Byala into 12; and 46 in the district of Turgovishte into 11.

First Party Secretary Todor Zhivkov supplied the rationale for the merger movement in his speech at Vratsa on October 24. "The amalgamation of the kolkhozes will considerably increase their economic power and labor productivity, will also create opportunities to increase the indivisible fund [capital stock] and thus the capital investment in agricultural production necessary to insure a further development of Socialist agriculture. Collective farms of 200, 300, 600 and 700 hectares cannot solve all their problems successfully. Our experience shows this." [A hectare equals 2.47 acres.] He said that the merging must be "vol-

untary" on the part of collective farm members and that two or three years should be allowed in the case of the newer collectives.

Party Control In Army Stressed

Dissatisfaction with political conditions in the Army was indicated during apparently extensive discussions at a Party Central Committee meeting in Sofia, October 2-4. (*Rabotnichesko Delo* [Sofia], October 5.) Although no details were divulged—except the announcement that "appropriate decisions" were taken—a subsequent article, October 18, in the official Army newspaper *Narodna Armia*, clearly expressed the official discontent.

According to the journal, "Leninist standards of Party life have been infringed upon" in Army life and this state of affairs "still exists." Advocating increased emphasis on the "leading role of the Party," the publication chided "many commanders" for "avoidance of Party activity and considering themselves outside Party influence."

ROMANIA

New Laws for Repression

As the large-scale wave of repression continued through the autumn months, its "legal basis" became entirely known for the first time. This was Decree Number 318 of the Penal Code, partially reported in Yugoslavia, but unpublished in the Romanian press except in the *Official Bulletin* for July 21, which apparently was not circulated until recently. Among the particularly brutal provisions of the decree are:

1. The death penalty for acts which would "cause the Romanian State to become involved in a declaration of neutrality or a declaration of war" or which might "subjugate the State to a foreign power." The death penalty was also prescribed for theft of "Socialist property" in excess of 100,000 lei* and for thefts of less than that sum if they involved "exceptional social danger due to the frequency of the offense or the gravity of its consequences."

2. Jail terms of five to fifteen years for those not returning from foreign assignments, of one to five years for those who fail to denounce such persons "in time" for them to be apprehended.

3. Raising maximum sentences for distributing "forbidden" publications from two to seven years, for "spreading false news of a kind to disturb the peace" from six months to five years.

In a final draconic touch the decree stated that all the various punishments prescribed apply to "crimes" committed in Romania, not only against the State itself, but also against other Communist States and even against the "interests of the workers in any other country."

The remarkable death penalty for a "declaration of neutrality" was doubtless inspired by the fact that Hungarian Premier Imre Nagy's Revolt government (October-No-

vember 1956) issued such a declaration. Making "subjugation of the State to a foreign power" also a capital offense was a move taken with no apparent self-consciousness by the Soviet-installed and dominated Romanian regime. The imposition of heavy jail sentences for those who do not denounce voluntary exiles "in time" to prevent their flight is, of course, a preventive measure.

Private Medical Practice Threatened

The decline in the private practice of medicine was indicated by an article in the official Party organ *Scinteia* (Bucharest), October 26. Characterizing private medical practices as "no longer useful to society" and as "favorable ground for perpetuating mercantile tendencies," the newspaper triumphantly announced the "voluntary" decision of several groups of doctors to cease private practice and enter the State medical apparatus. Among these groups were "doctors from the Iasi Medical Institute" and an "important number of the higher medical cadre from Cluj and Timisoara." *Scinteia* stated that 1,450 private medical practices "still existed" in Bucharest.

A similar article appeared in the Ministry of Health organ *Muncitorul Sanitar* (Bucharest), September 21, which said: "The majority of doctors in the region [Constanza], realizing that private practice has seriously impeded care for national health, have decided on their own initiative to give up private practice." Doctors were quoted as saying that "in a Socialist society . . . neither a correct diagnosis nor a well-directed treatment can be achieved in private practice." The publication also stated that only nine of the former total of 115 private practices in the Constanza region had not been abandoned. It added that "similar steps had been taken in dental practices."

Harassment of private doctors has appeared elsewhere in the area, most recently in Czechoslovakia last August where private medical practice was virtually abolished by regime decree. The Romanian authorities apparently prefer to use pressure to gain "voluntary" compliance from individual doctors.

Ferment: Writers' Publication Attacked

Official strictures against the long-standing literary ferment seemed to center recently about the Cluj Writers' Union organ *Steaua*, which was heavily criticized in several publications, as well as in a forward to its own "festive" edition, Number 100. The latter, which was scheduled for June publication, did not appear until September—no reason was given—and was headed by a lengthy passage decrying its own past "faults." Among the self-accusations to which *Steaua* "pleaded guilty" were the charges of making too many concessions to "modernism," "aestheticism," "objectivism" and to "injuring our literary front in general." The publication also admitted that it had printed too many apolitical poems.

Criticism of *Steaua* was not restricted to past issues, but was applied even to the self-critical edition mentioned above. For example, *Contemporanul* (Bucharest), October 10, stated that *Steaua's* faults had been "perpetuated" and listed some of these as "contemplative and evasionist

*Official exchange rate: 6 lei to a dollar.

Current Developments—Romania, Albania

poems" and "ideological concessions." *Tribuna* (Cluj), October 4, conceded the "good will" of *Steaua's* editorial staff, but declared that this was not "sufficient" for the promotion of "Socialist-realist literature and criticism." The Writers' Union publication *Gazeta Literara* (Bucharest), October 16, also weighed in with criticism of *Steaua's* "festive" number. It singled out the poems of A. E. Baconsky, Aurel Ghurghianu and Victor Felea as "depressing and nostalgic."

Professors Criticized

The Bucharest Party theoretical journal, *Probleme Economice*, devoted a long article in its August edition to a condemnation of classroom lectures by professors at the Lenin Institute of Economic Science and Planning. Among those attacked was Professor C. Ionete for "anti-Marxist ideas" and Professor P. Tanasie for stressing "the system of workers councils existing in Yugoslavia and Poland." The periodical denied the existence of such councils in Poland and called their function in Yugoslavia one of "competition and anarchy." Professor C. Botea was accused of "justifying the slanderous inventions of the bourgeoisie and the revisionists" by allegedly stating: "The people's revolution has not had an objective internal basis in Romania."

Communist Youth Censored

The regime continued to belabor the Communist Working Youth Union (UTM) for "indifference," for "lack of revolutionary fervor" and for "formalism." (*Scinteia Tineretului* [Bucharest], September 26.) The newspaper assailed not only the rank and file of the organization, but also its leaders who were characterized as "without initiative or sustained interest."

On the following day the same journal condemned as "unsatisfactory" the UTM group at the University Center in Bucharest. In some organized conferences, according to the newspaper, "there was more discussion of the problems of love and friendship than of the problems of Marxist philosophy."

Another strong criticism by *Scinteia Tineretului* appeared on October 16, when the UTM was assailed for "ignoring a series of certain seemingly minor matters in the behavior of the students and thus creating a climate favorable to the damaging influences of rotten bourgeois morality." The newspaper stated that "the UTM organization chose to ignore all these manifestations."

Bugs in the Enterprise Fund

The ingenuity with which workers and managers take advantage of the industrial premium and bonus system for their own ends has forced the government to seek new ways of plugging the loopholes. In March 1957, the regime had set up an Enterprise Fund in factories and other State-owned enterprises to encourage more efficient production by allotting the employees a share in the proceeds. Enterprises which overfulfilled their production plans were allowed to put a certain percentage of the extra profits in the enterprise fund, to be spent in part for prizes to out-

standing workers or for welfare benefits, and in part for the construction of housing, clubs, rest homes and for social activities. *Scinteia* (Bucharest), October 17, announced changes in the regulations designed to correct abuses such as the following:

"At the metallurgical factory 'Unio' of Satu Mare . . . premiums had been paid to technical-administrative personnel during the whole of 1957 and the first quarter of 1958 on the basis of presumed achievements in . . . production greater than those actually revealed in the books. Likewise, at the 'Local Enterprise of Textile and Leatherware,' premiums had been paid to technical-administrative personnel during the first half of 1958 amounting to over 50,000 lei without realizing the planned reduction in costs."

The new regulations are an attempt to link the enterprise fund and the premiums given to technical-administrative personnel more closely to the actual results achieved. In future the sums allotted to them will depend on: (1) the fulfillment of the production plan, both as to volume and as to assortment; (2) fulfillment of the cost-reduction plan; and (3) fulfillment of the profit plan. At least 67 percent of the enterprise fund must be used to build houses for the workers, under the supervision of the local government. Up to 28 percent will go to maintain canteens, and 5 percent will be used for bonuses to outstanding workers. Technical and administrative employees will have a separate premium fund, likewise dependent on results actually achieved. Premiums for foremen may total as much as 65 percent of their basic salaries, for managers, engineers and technicians as much as 50 percent, and for other personnel as much as 30 percent.

ALBANIA

"Amnesty" Extended

On October 8 Radio Tirana stated that "amnesty for political refugees has been extended until December 31, 1959." The broadcast averred that there had been "many repatriations during the first two years of the amnesty—1956 to 1957," and advised exiles to "abandon the road of treason and misery and return to their fatherland, where they can live with their families and work as free men."

Collectivization Advances

At the beginning of November Albania had 1,935 collective farms, covering 75 percent of the arable land, according to Radio Tirana, November 11. In January 1958 there were said to be 1,698 covering 58.1 percent of the arable land. The broadcast stated that 7 out of Albania's 27 districts have been fully collectivized, and that the process is almost complete in the valleys. Efforts are now being made to collectivize the mountainous areas.

The smallest of the Satellites is now second in this respect to Bulgaria, where more than 90 percent of the arable land has been collectivized.

Recent and Related

A Case History of Hope, by Flora Lewis (Doubleday, \$3.95). This is probably the best and most comprehensive survey so far of events in Poland from the time of Stalin's death to Wladyslaw Gomulka's rise to power in October 1956. The author, a well-known foreign correspondent in her own right, is the wife of *The New York Times*' Sidney Gruson, who covered these events for his paper. The account is based on Miss Lewis' personal observations, interviews with key personalities and thorough research. It covers major aspects of the revolutionary changes that took place in the destruction of the Stalinist mold and the birth of a new, more "liberal" and "nationalist" form of Communism. After a brief historical review, the author pinpoints the major causes of the upheaval, covering Josef Swiatlo's dramatic revelations and the breakup of secret police power, the tempestuous third plenum of the Central Committee, January 1955, as well as the rumbling discontent among youth, intellectuals, the disgruntled peasants and the impoverished workers. In this process of disintegration, Miss Lewis singles out such events as the 20th Congress of the Soviet Party in February 1956, Polish First Party Secretary Bierut's sudden death and the turnabout of Soviet policy with respect to Yugoslavia—all of which, reinforced by popular discontent, culminated in the Poznan strike of June 1956. Miss Lewis is particularly revealing in her discussion of the Party squabbles and splits which took place at that time and allowed a sudden flowering of civil and intellectual liberties in Poland. Using what must have been unique sources of information she quotes from hitherto secret Party documents, giving an exact and exciting account of the role played in this drama by each of the more prominent leaders of the Party. The book culminates in a first-rate, blow-by-blow description of Gomulka's assumption of power in the brink-of-war situation between Poles and Russians in the fall of 1956. For the first time a thorough analysis is presented not only of the official pronouncements and overt moves but also of the gigantic struggle that took place behind closed doors between Gomulka and the Soviet interventionists led by Nikita Khrushchev.

The last few pages are anticlimactic, reflecting Gomulka's disappointing retreat from the ideals which made his comeback possible and from the promise of his own earlier "liberal" and "national" policies. Miss Lewis' conclusions,

written before the latest accelerated return to conformity, are perhaps more optimistic than warranted by present-day reality and future prospects. However, the author's contention that Communists in Poland succeeded in modifying some of the basic aspects in the orthodox creed still holds true.

The Great Arms Race, by Hanson W. Baldwin (Praeger, \$2.95). A short book discussing what would happen if the Soviet Union should deliver a surprise attack on the United States tomorrow. It is a topical evaluation of the military strengths and weaknesses of the United States versus those of the Soviet Union; although the US leads in most aspects, Russia has caught up rapidly since 1949 and has exceeded us in some areas. The author devotes a large part of his text to an analysis of US weaknesses and ways in which they can be corrected. Mr. Baldwin is military editor of *The New York Times*; his book is composed of six articles which appeared in that newspaper between February 2 to 7, 1958, and an excerpt of another which appeared in the Sunday magazine section of March 16. The text is supported by ten pages of maps, charts, and tables illustrating the status of US armed strength in relation to that of Russia.

India and America, by Phillips Talbot and S. L. Poplai (Harper, \$3.75). A volume in the series sponsored by the Council of Foreign Relations; it is the product of a two-year research program held jointly by the Council and the Indian Council of World Affairs, and presents the results of debates on Indian-American relations by thirty-four Indian and American specialists. Communism is a recurrent theme in the discussion, particularly in the section devoted to international and domestic Communism in India. This presents the topic from both the Indian and American points of view; it shows where there is conflict in attitude and what policies each nation has adopted to deal with Communism; it discusses military pacts in Indian-US relations and the Hungarian crisis. Index.

Niki, by Tibor Dery (Doubleday, \$2.95). A splendid novella about a dog, a man and his wife—and the denial of liberty. Tibor Dery is one of the four leading Hungarian writers sentenced to long imprisonment in November 1957 for "hostile activities" during the Hungarian Revolt. He has been called the Hungarian Thomas Mann.

The Soviet Cultural Scene, 1956-1957, edited by Walter Z. Laqueur and George Lichtheim (Praeger, \$3.75). This book of essays presents a running commentary on the cultural and ideological trends in the Soviet Union over the past two years. The thirty pieces are taken from the review *Soviet Survey*, a quarterly published under the auspices of the Congress for Cultural Freedom; the *Survey* is the cooperative effort of scholars from several countries. The book discusses the most significant developments in Soviet literature and the arts, history and philosophy, and the social sciences and social scene. Part Four covers similar developments in other countries of the Communist bloc, and includes two articles on the impact of the 1956 "thaw" on Poland and Hungary. Since the official Soviet doctrine controlling matters of art, music, religion, etc., has changed radically in emphasis since Stalin's death, the authors and editors concentrate on these changes as well as pointing out the new restrictions imposed by today's orthodoxy. Bibliographic footnotes, Index.

Stalin's Failure in China, 1924-1927, by Conrad Brandt (Harvard University Press, \$4.75). The 31st volume in Harvard's Russian Research Center Study series describes the first Soviet entrance into China and the first attempt to make China a Communist province. The author shows why Stalin failed and how China and Chinese policy became in effect a theoretical football between Stalin and Trotsky rather than a conquest based on realistic appraisal of the structure of Chinese society. After a preliminary chapter establishing the background for the Soviet entry into China—Lenin's ideas on the integration of Asian nationalism and communism—Mr. Brandt devotes several chapters to the early history of the Chinese Communists, placing it in a perspective which contemporary Chinese leaders have distorted or concealed. Two final chapters examine the ultimate contours of Chinese Communism, and the extent of Stalin's defeat along with his explanation of it to Russian leaders. Some of the author's sources for the research on this book include the Trotsky archives, not previously used in a study of the Chinese revolution, both Chinese and Russian source material, and supplementary information gleaned from conversations with a former Chinese Communist leader. Notes, bibliography, index.



East Europe
Free Europe Committee, Inc.
2 PARK AVENUE, NEW YORK 16, N. Y.
Return Postage Guaranteed

Sec. 34.66, P.L. & R.

**U. S. POSTAGE
PAID**

New York, N. Y.
Permit No. 13933

UNIVERSITY MICROFILMS
313 NO FIRST ST
ANN ARBOR MICH
ATTN STEVENS RICE
5168

7-57

*Form 3547 Requested
Forwarding postage guaranteed*



Printed in U.S.A.